

The Macroeconomics of Wage Rigidity and Job Separations*

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Abstract

We study the macroeconomic implications of wage-rigidity-induced job separations in an equilibrium labor market model with four features: worker productivity shocks, staggered wage contracts, search frictions, and two-sided lack of commitment. Endogenous quits and layoffs are unilaterally initiated whenever a worker's wage-to-productivity ratio or markdown moves outside an inaction region. We derive sufficient statistics for the labor market response to inflationary shocks based on the distribution of markdowns, which we show how to identify using microdata on wage changes and worker flows between jobs. Using an extension of the model for quantitative analysis, we find that aggregate shocks generate significant cyclical volatility in endogenous job separations, including 62 percent of the empirical quit volatility and 94 percent of the empirical layoff volatility.

Keywords: Search Frictions, Limited Commitment, Inaction, Quits, Layoffs, Sufficient Statistics

JEL Classification: E31, E52, J64

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1 Introduction

Since [Bewley \(1999\)](#), there is mounting empirical evidence that wage rigidity is linked to job separations. For example, many layoffs occur without wage renegotiations that could have prevented the job separation ([Davis and Krolkowski, 2025](#)). Furthermore, firm layoffs and worker quits move in opposite directions in response to identified monetary shocks ([Graves et al., 2026](#)). This evidence poses a challenge to the tradition of labor market models in which wages can be costlessly and instantaneously adjusted (e.g., [Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994](#)). In this tradition, job separations are mutually agreed upon and occur only if the worker-firm match surplus is exhausted, independent of the prevailing wage rate. Thus, existing frameworks abstract from the empirical link between wage rigidity and different types of job separations in business-cycle studies of the labor market.

We aim to fill this gap by studying the aggregate implications of wage-rigidity-induced job separations in an equilibrium labor market model with four features. First, there are idiosyncratic shocks to worker productivity. Second, wages are fixed within staggered contracts. Third, job search is frictional. Fourth, neither workers nor firms can commit to staying in a match. The combination of all four model features generates endogenous job separations linked to wage rigidity. Productivity shocks cause the output in a match to fluctuate. Due to wage rigidity, this leads to fluctuations in the ex-post surplus split between a matched worker and firm. Search frictions impose a cost for workers to find a new employer and for firms to find a new employee. Limited commitment means that both workers and firms choose privately optimal job-separation strategies in each state of the world. Consequently, the wage-to-productivity ratio or *markdown*, which is the state variable in a worker-firm match, moves within an inaction region until a job separation occurs in the form of a worker-initiated quit or a firm-initiated layoff. Combining these four features allows us to characterize how wage-rigidity-induced job separations at the micro level affect the propagation of aggregate shocks at the macro level.

We first study the stationary equilibrium of a frictional labor market in continuous time. In addition to search frictions, worker-firm matches are subject to two contractual frictions. First, wages are rigid within staggered contracts à la [Calvo \(1983\)](#).¹ Second, neither workers nor firms can commit to staying in a match, which can be unilaterally dissolved in the form of a quit initiated by the worker and a layoff initiated by the firm.

In this environment, a matched worker and firm play a *nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with stopping times*: Idiosyncratic productivity follows a Brownian motion, and each

¹We follow a long tradition of modeling time-dependent wage rigidity. We abstract from such rigidity's microfoundations, which may include contracting costs, worker morale, and information asymmetries.

party strategically chooses when to separate from the match, while the equilibrium match surplus remains positive. To characterize the solution to this problem, we leverage tools from functional analysis based on variational inequalities.

Wage rigidity implies that the prevailing wage rate, in addition to productivity, becomes part of the state in a worker-firm match. However, we show that a matched worker's and firm's behavior can be written in terms of only a single state variable: the markdown. A match is dissolved when this ratio falls outside an inaction region with two thresholds. On one side, workers quit when their markdown falls below their optimally chosen lower threshold. On the other side, firms lay off workers whose markdown rises above their optimally chosen upper threshold. Endogenous job separations due to two distinct outcomes—i.e., quits and layoffs—are unilateral in the sense that they occur voluntarily in the eyes of one party, even if they are involuntary in the eyes of the other party.

Our theoretical analysis yields three main results. First, we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. This result requires substantially different methods than those in existing models of search and matching, which we extend to a continuous-time setting with wage rigidity and endogenous separations. Second, we characterize match surplus, entry wages, job-finding rates, and continuation regions in relation to the expected discounted match duration, which here—unlike in models with flexible wages or full commitment—depends on rent sharing between a worker and a firm. Third, we demonstrate that two-sided lack of commitment has implications that are profoundly different from those of existing models of inaction. The ability of workers and firms to unilaterally separate tempers the responsiveness of the quit threshold and the entry markdown to the drift (compared to the pricing adjustment thresholds in [Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977](#)) and bounds the option value of a match with respect to the volatility of productivity (in contrast to the option value of investment in [Barro, 1972](#)).

Having characterized the stationary equilibrium, we introduce aggregate inflationary shocks by assuming that incumbents' wages are nominally rigid while the aggregate price level fluctuates. Inflationary shocks shift incumbents' real wages, leading to movements in the rate of endogenous job separations in the form of quits and layoffs. Under flexible entry wages, the wage that unemployed workers search for responds to the change in the price level. Motivated by recent empirical work on the limited cyclicity of wages for new hires, we also study rigid entry wages, under which unemployed workers search for the same wage level as before the inflationary shock, thereby changing firms' incentives to post vacancies. In this environment, inflation can "grease the wheels of the labor market" by affecting both job-separation (i.e., quit versus layoff) and job-finding rates.

To study the effects of an inflationary shock on aggregate employment, we analyze the

economy's *cumulative impulse response (CIR)*, defined as the area under an *impulse response function (IRF)*. To this end, we extend the seminal work of [Alvarez et al. \(2016\)](#) on sufficient statistics in the product market to a labor market context, which yields substantively new insights. Under flexible entry wages, the CIR of aggregate employment is fully described by three data moments: the inverse of the job-finding rate, the inverse standard deviation of workers' wage changes across jobs, and the skewness of wage changes across jobs. The fact that skewness appears in the sufficient statistic is a novel result specific to our labor market context. Intuitively, wage changes between jobs reflect workers' markdowns, the skewness of which reflects the relative mass of workers near the quit versus layoff thresholds.

Under rigid entry wages, the CIR of aggregate employment additionally depends on the job-finding rate's elasticity with respect to the aggregate shock, which itself is a function of the share of inefficient job separations. Intuitively, inflation leads to lower real wages, which incentivizes firms to post more vacancies. However, the magnitude of this effect is decreasing in the share of inefficient job separations because firms choose when to lay off workers but do not control workers' quit decisions, which limits a firm's expected returns on vacancies.

While our model highlights novel theoretical mechanisms at play in labor markets with wage-rigidity-induced job separations, we also explore the theory's implications vis-à-vis the data. First, we compute our sufficient statistic for the CIR of aggregate employment to an unanticipated inflationary shock, which reveals the extent of amplification. Specifically, the sufficient statistic suggests that the relative dominance of layoffs over quits in the data is associated with expansionary effects of an aggregate inflationary shock on aggregate employment. We then calibrate an extension of our model to study the propagation of business-cycle shocks to aggregate productivity and the price level in a series of quantitative exercises. The calibrated model replicates the aforementioned empirical evidence on wage rigidity and different types of job separations, while generating substantial fluctuations in the rates of job finding and job separations, and realistic comovement with inflationary shocks. Notably, the quantitative model shows that aggregate shocks generate significant volatility in endogenous job separations, including 62 percent of the empirical quit volatility and 94 percent of the empirical layoff volatility.

Related Literature. Relative to the existing literature, we make two contributions. Our first contribution is to study the macroeconomic implications of wage-rigidity-induced job separations in an equilibrium labor market model. Business-cycle models have highlighted wage rigidity as the key friction that generates a realistic transmission of aggregate shocks

(e.g., [Broer et al., 2020](#); [Auclert et al., 2023](#)). Recent search-theoretic advances have shed light on the role of wage rigidity in amplifying unemployment fluctuations through *job creation*, following [Shimer \(2005a\)](#). However, these models assume bilaterally efficient contracts, as in [Hall \(2005\)](#), which preclude the dissolution of matches with positive surplus, so there is no effect of wage rigidity on *job separations*. In this sense, most existing work has satisfied the constraints of the [Barro \(1977\)](#) critique of inefficient outcomes under long-term labor contracts. While this research agenda has produced many important insights, it is unable to speak to mounting empirical evidence of wage rigidity’s link to the sensitivity of job separations to aggregate shocks,² the distinction between quits versus layoffs,³ and bilaterally inefficient job separations.⁴ An older literature has proposed alternative distinctions between quits and layoffs and also deviated from the bilaterally efficient benchmark in the presence of other frictions.⁵ We add to this literature an equilibrium model that is consistent with the above-referenced empirical evidence and generates propagation of aggregate shocks in terms of key labor market statistics.

In light of this first contribution, our main insights are analytical in nature and pertain to the labor market propagation of aggregate shocks in the presence of endogenous quits and layoffs. This complements recent contributions by [Carlsson and Westermarck \(2022\)](#) and [Gertler et al. \(2025\)](#), who study business-cycle models with endogenous layoffs but without endogenous quits, and by [Heathcote and Cai \(2023\)](#), who study the optimal design of UI with endogenous quits but without endogenous layoffs. Our paper is also complementary to [Mueller \(2017\)](#), who numerically solves a model with endogenous separations due to staggered wage contracts but focuses on the model’s implications for measures of wage cyclicality. Related work by [Gertler et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Blanchard and Galí \(2010\)](#) points to the possibility of endogenous job separations arising due to the interaction between wage rigidity and only aggregate—i.e., no idiosyncratic—productivity shocks but abstracts from their occurrence in practice. We demonstrate that allowing for wage-rigidity-induced job separations has important implications for the propagation of aggregate shocks on

²Empirical work has linked wage rigidity to employment fluctuations ([Adamopoulou et al., 2025](#)), layoff and quit rates ([Elsby et al., 2010](#)), and the transmission of monetary policy ([Faia and Pezone, 2024](#)).

³Quits are procyclical and layoffs countercyclical among unemployment inflows ([Graves et al., 2026](#)).

⁴Many unemployment insurance (UI) recipients would accept significant wage cuts in lieu of being laid off ([Davis and Krolikowski, 2025](#); [Bertheau et al., 2025](#)).

⁵In contrast to our theory, quits and layoffs in [McLaughlin \(1991\)](#) are only labels with predictive content, but no fundamental difference. [Hall and Lazear \(1984\)](#) generates socially costly separations as a disciplining mechanism under incomplete information about the other party’s outside option. [Hashimoto and Yu \(1980\)](#) generates wage rigidity associated with worker quits and firm layoffs as a feature of the optimal contract with firm-specific human capital investment when there is a hold-up problem. Socially costly job separations may occur even with unlimited possibilities for renegotiating wage contracts under dynamic enforcement constraints, as in [Ramey and Watson \(1997\)](#).

macroeconomic outcomes at business-cycle frequency.

Our second contribution is to extend the economics of inaction to frictional labor markets characterized by wage rigidity.⁶ In existing work, job separations are modeled either as exogenous shocks (e.g., [Shimer, 2005a](#)) or as following a *one-sided* threshold rule in the form of a positivity restriction on the worker-firm match surplus (e.g., [Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994](#)). The first class of models predicts counterfactually acyclical unemployment inflows, while the second features no fundamental distinction between quits versus layoffs. This motivates our modeling approach based on a *two-sided* threshold rule, according to which endogenous job separations in the form of worker quits and firm layoffs occur at opposite ends of an inaction region over the markdown in a match. We add to this literature the first sufficient statistic for the labor market response to aggregate shocks.

In light of this second contribution, we adapt the powerful tools of stochastic control with fixed adjustment costs to our labor market setting with two distinct features: strategic worker-firm interactions and endogenous state switching between employment and unemployment. Both features set us apart from existing models of inaction (e.g., [Baley and Blanco, 2021, 2026](#); [Alvarez et al., 2022, 2024b](#)). In that context, [Alvarez et al. \(2016\)](#) link the CIR of aggregate output to the ratio of *kurtosis* to the frequency of price changes in a class of pricing models. We complement their insights with our novel result that the CIR of aggregate employment is a function of the *skewness* of wage changes in our labor market model. Skewness intuitively reflects asymmetry in the distribution of worker-firm matches over the inaction region, outside of which job separations occur in the form of worker quits versus firm layoffs, which constitute a unique feature of our environment with strategic interactions and state switching.

Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model of wage-rigidity-induced job separations. Section 3 derives sufficient statistics for the economy’s response to aggregate shocks. Section 4 takes a first step toward quantifying our theory’s implications. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 A Model of Wage-Rigidity-Induced Job Separations

In this section, we develop a model of job separations in the form of worker quits and firm layoffs arising endogenously due to the combination of search frictions, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, staggered wage contracts, and two-sided lack of commitment.

⁶Prior studies have focused on inaction in labor markets that are frictionless ([Alvarez et al., 2024a](#)) or not constrained by the same type of wage rigidity ([Alvarez and Shimer, 2011](#)).

2.1 Environment

Time is continuous and indexed by t . A unit mass of heterogeneous workers and an endogenous mass of homogeneous firms meet in a frictional labor market.

Preferences. Both workers and firms discount the future at rate $\rho > 0$. Firms maximize profits. Workers have risk-neutral preferences over consumption streams $\{C_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ given by $\mathbb{E} [\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} C_t dt]$.

Technology. A worker's flow income depends on their productivity Z_t and their employment state E_t , which can be either employed (h) or unemployed (u). Employed workers produce $Y_t = Z_t$ and consume their wage W_t . Unemployed workers consume BZ_t from home production, with $B \in (0, 1)$. Henceforth, lower-case letters denote the logarithm of variables in uppercase.

Stochastic Process. Workers' idiosyncratic productivities follow a Brownian motion, $dz_t = \gamma dt + \sigma d\mathcal{W}_t^z$, with drift γ , volatility σ , and a Wiener process \mathcal{W}_t^z that is iid across workers.

Search Frictions. Unemployed workers and idle firms direct their search across segmented submarkets indexed by worker productivity z and the wage w . In each submarket $(z; w)$, firms post vacancies at flow cost Ke^z for $K > 0$ and satisfy a free-entry condition. Given $\mathcal{U}(z; w)$ unemployed workers and $\mathcal{V}(z; w)$ vacancies, a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale produces $m(z; w) = \mathcal{U}(z; w)^\alpha \mathcal{V}(z; w)^{1-\alpha}$ matches, where α is the elasticity of matches with respect to the unemployed. Given market tightness $\theta(z; w) := \mathcal{V}(z; w) / \mathcal{U}(z; w)$, workers' job-finding rate is $f(\theta(z; w)) = m(z; w) / \mathcal{U}(z; w) = \theta(z; w)^{1-\alpha}$ and firms' job-filling rate is $m(z; w) / \mathcal{V}(z; w) = \theta(z; w)^{-\alpha}$. Existing matches can end for any of three reasons: they can be exogenously dissolved at Poisson rate δ , or they can be endogenously and unilaterally dissolved by either the worker or the firm.

Wage Determination. While wages are competitively set at match formation, they are intermittently rigid thereafter. Staggered wage renegotiations occur at rate $\delta^r \geq 0$ and follow a Nash bargaining protocol with worker weight χ . We start by studying the limiting case with $\delta^r = 0$. We then extend our key insights to the case of $\delta^r > 0$ in Section 3.3.⁷

⁷We treat wage rigidity as technological in nature, similar to adjustment costs in pricing and investment.

Agents' Choices. An unemployed worker's choice of submarket $(z; w)$ is associated with a job-finding rate $f(\theta(z; w))$. Exogenous separations occur at rate δ , inducing a stopping time τ^δ . Given the wage w , a matched worker chooses a continuation productivity set $\mathcal{Z}^h(w)$, inducing the worker's stopping time $\tau^h(z; w) = \inf\{t \geq 0 : z_t \in \mathcal{Z}^h(w)^c, z_0 = z\}$, where $X^c := \mathbb{R} \setminus X$. Similarly, given w , a matched firm chooses a continuation productivity set $\mathcal{Z}^j(w)$, inducing the firm's stopping time $\tau^j(z; w) = \inf\{t \geq 0 : z_t \in \mathcal{Z}^j(w)^c, z_0 = z\}$.

Agents' stopping times must be measurable with respect to their productivity history. Given the worker's and the firm's continuation sets and the exogenous separation hazard, the match duration is the first stopping time in $\vec{\tau}^m = (\tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta)$, denoted $\tau^m = \min\{\tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta\}$. We naturally label a separation triggered by a worker as a quit (i.e., $\tau^m = \tau^h$), a separation triggered by the firm as a layoff (i.e., $\tau^m = \tau^j$), and a separation triggered by nature as exogenous (i.e., $\tau^m = \tau^\delta$).

2.2 Block-Recursive Equilibrium (BRE)

A BRE can be described in two steps.⁸ In the first step, we describe the optimal search behavior of unmatched workers and firms. Let $u(z)$ be the value of an unemployed worker under the optimal search policy given productivity z . Let $\theta(z; w)$ denote market tightness in submarket $(z; w)$. Let $h(z; w)$ and $j(z; w)$ be the equilibrium values of an employed worker and a filled job. The problem of an unemployed worker is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,

$$\rho u(z) = Be^z + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} + \max_w f(\theta(z; w)) [h(z; w) - u(z)], \quad (1)$$

with optimal search strategy $w^*(z)$. Equation (1) states that unemployed workers' flow value is that of an asset with a return equal to the sum of flow dividends (i.e., home production) and expected capital gains (i.e., productivity fluctuations and finding a job). Free entry requires that

$$\min \{Ke^z - q(\theta(z; w))j(z; w), \theta(z; w)\} = 0. \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) dictates zero (non-positive) profits in open (closed) submarkets.

In the second step, which is the novel focus of this paper, we describe the strategic interaction that forms part of the *game* between a matched worker-firm pair, which has three features. First, payoffs are *nonzero-sum*, since the match flow value, e^z , exceeds

⁸BRE objects do not depend on agents' distribution, which we omit from notation (Menzio and Shi, 2010).

the flow value of separating, Be^z . Second, agents' payoffs are *stochastic* and *differential*, since worker productivity z follows a Brownian motion. Third, agents' strategies consist of when to unilaterally separate from the match; i.e., the *stopping times* implied by their continuation sets $\mathcal{Z}^h(w)$ and $\mathcal{Z}^j(w)$. Thus, the interaction between a worker-firm pair can be formulated as a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with stopping times (Bensoussan and Friedman, 1977). The application of these mathematical methods in a labor market context is different from existing work and a key contribution of this paper.

Value Functions. As long as one agent stays in the match with state z , the other agent chooses whether to stay in the match or to separate, reflecting the two-sided lack of commitment. Thus, we use *variational inequalities* to characterize the values of both agents. The HJB equation of a worker employed at wage w with productivity z inside the firm's optimal continuation set $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)$ is

$$\rho h(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta [u(z) - h(z; w)] , \rho u(z) \right\}. \quad (3)$$

Equation (3) reflects the employed worker's choice between staying matched and quitting the firm. The flow value of staying is that of an asset for which the return is the sum of flow dividends (i.e., the wage) and expected capital gains (i.e., productivity fluctuations and separation). The flow value of quitting the firm is simply that of unemployment. The variational inequality in equation (3) satisfies $h(\cdot; w) \in \mathcal{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)) \cap \mathcal{C}(\mathbb{R})$. That is, the value of the employed worker is continuously once-differentiable inside the firm's optimal continuation set and continuous everywhere. These continuity and differentiability conditions correspond to the *value matching* and *smooth pasting* conditions of the worker's value function under their own best response. Importantly, a smooth pasting condition characterizes the optimal boundary of the worker's continuation region.

Analogously, the HJB equation of a firm employing a worker at wage w with productivity z inside the worker's optimal continuation set $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)$ is

$$\rho j(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^z - e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial j(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 j(z; w)}{\partial z^2} - \delta j(z; w) , 0 \right\}. \quad (4)$$

Equation (4) reflects the firm's choice between staying matched and laying off the worker. The flow value of staying is that of an asset for which the return is the sum of flow dividends (i.e., profits) and expected capital gains (i.e., productivity fluctuations and separation). The flow value of laying off the worker is simply that of being idle. The variational inequality in equation (4) satisfies $j(\cdot; w) \in \mathcal{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)) \cap \mathcal{C}(\mathbb{R})$. That is, the value of the matched

firm is continuously once-differentiable inside the worker's optimal continuation set and continuous everywhere. Again, a smooth pasting condition characterizes the optimal boundary of the firm's continuation region.

If either agent leaves, then the other agent receives their outside option value. Therefore, the worker's and the firm's values of a match with productivity z and wage w satisfy:

$$h(z; w) = u(z) \quad \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w))^c, \quad (5)$$

$$j(z; w) = 0 \quad \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w))^c. \quad (6)$$

Equations (5)–(6) define each agent's payoff outside the other agent's continuation set. Value-matching conditions imply the continuity of each agent's value function at the boundaries of the other agent's continuation set. However, smooth pasting conditions *do not* apply to either agent's value at the boundary of the other agent's continuation set because the HJB equations (3)–(4) do not hold when an agent has no optimization problem to solve, which happens outside the other agent's continuation set.⁹ For the same reason, we do not require value functions to be differentiable in the entire domain, but only in the part where an agent has a choice between staying matched or not.

Continuation Sets. Two sets of conditions characterize agents' optimal continuation sets. First, agents optimally choose to continue whenever

$$h(z; w) > u(z), \quad (7)$$

$$j(z; w) > 0. \quad (8)$$

Second, to resolve ambiguity in the strategic choice of an indifferent party, we focus on the socially (weakly) preferable outcome by invoking an equilibrium refinement. Specifically, we assume that agents choose to continue whenever staying in the match is a weakly dominant strategy. For *any* policy of the worker, the firm strictly prefers to continue the match if flow profits are strictly positive—i.e., $e^z - e^w > 0$ —because the firm always has the option of firing the worker in the future. Therefore, the firm's optimal continuation set is

$$\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w) := \text{int} \{z : j(z; w) > 0 \text{ or } e^z - e^w > 0\}. \quad (9)$$

Analogously, the worker's optimal continuation set includes all productivity levels for which the sum of the current wage and the discounted capital gains from unemployment

⁹E.g., for $z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w))^c$, $0 = \rho j(z; w) < \max\{e^z - e^w + \gamma \partial j(z; w) / \partial z + (\sigma^2 / 2) \partial^2 j(z; w) / \partial z^2 - \delta j(z; w), 0\}$.

is positive:

$$\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w) := \text{int} \left\{ z : h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } 0 < e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} \right\}. \quad (10)$$

The unemployed worker's HJB equation (1) implies $0 < e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma(\partial u(z)/\partial z) + (\sigma^2/2)\partial^2 u(z)/\partial z^2$ if and only if $Be^z + \max_{w'} f(\theta(z; w'))[h(z; w') - u(z)] < e^w$. Thus, continuing strictly dominates quitting precisely when the wage strictly exceeds the flow opportunity cost.

Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium values and optimal policies of a worker-firm match. The firm's continuation set is $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w) = (z^l(w), \infty)$, which contains productivities for which the firm makes strictly positive flow profits—i.e., $z > \bar{z}^l(w) := w$ —as well as productivities for which the worker and the firm continue despite negative flow profits due to a positive and large enough continuation value—i.e., $z \in (z^l(w), \bar{z}^l(w))$. Analogously, the worker's continuation set is $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w) = (-\infty, z^q(w))$, which contains productivities for which the worker's wage strictly exceeds the flow opportunity cost—i.e., $z < \bar{z}^q(w)$, where \bar{z}^q satisfies $0 = e^w - \rho u(\bar{z}^q) + \gamma \partial u(\bar{z}^q)/\partial z + (\sigma^2/2)\partial^2 u(\bar{z}^q)/\partial z^2$ —as well as productivities for which the worker and the firm continue despite the worker's negative net flow value due to a positive and large enough continuation value—i.e., $z \in (\bar{z}^q(w), z^q(w))$. The existence and uniqueness of a threshold characterizing each agent's separation policy are not assumptions but results formally derived below.

A Markov perfect equilibrium of this game is a fixed point between agents' best-response mappings involving continuation productivity levels z , given wage w . To address the trivial multiplicity of equilibria, our equilibrium definition implicitly imposes weakly dominant strategies.¹⁰


Definition 1. A BRE consists of value functions $\{u(z), h(z; w), j(z; w)\}$, the market tightness function $\theta(z; w)$, the matched worker's and the matched firm's continuation sets $\{\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w), \mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)\}$, and the unemployed worker's search strategy function $w^*(z)$ s.t.:

1. Given $h(z; w)$ and $\theta(z; w)$, $u(z)$ solves (1) with optimal search strategy $w^*(z)$.
2. Given $j(z; w)$, market tightness $\theta(z; w)$ satisfies the free-entry condition (2).
3. Given $u(z)$ and $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(z)$, $h(z; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$ solves (3) and (5). Given $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(z)$, $j(z; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$ solves (4) and (6).

¹⁰Supplementary Material I.1 derives the recursive equilibrium in continuous time from its discrete-time counterpart. Supplementary Material I.2 shows the equivalence between sequential and recursive formulations of this environment.

4. Given $u(z)$, the continuation set of the firm, $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(z)$, is (9) and that of the worker, $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(z)$, is (10).

FIGURE 1. EQUILIBRIUM VALUES AND OPTIMAL POLICIES



Notes: The figure plots the value functions of workers (blue lines) and firms (red lines) for a given log wage w as a function of log productivity z . Solid lines show the values in the match, which are $h(z; w)$ for the worker and $j(z; w)$ for the firm. Dashed lines show the values outside of a match, which are $u(z)$ for the worker and 0 for the firm. The equilibrium continuation sets of the worker and the firm are $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w) = (-\infty, z^q(w))$ and $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w) = (z^l(w), \infty)$, respectively. The worker has positive net flow payoff for any productivity level $z < z^q(w)$, where z^q satisfies $0 = e^w - \rho u(z^q) + \gamma \partial u(z^q) / \partial z + (\sigma^2 / 2) \partial^2 u(z^q) / \partial z^2$. The firm makes strictly positive flow profits for any productivity level $z > \tilde{z}^l(w) := w$. Source: Model simulations.

Part 1 of Definition 1 requires unemployed workers' search strategies to be optimal. Part 2 imposes free entry. The remaining parts describe agents' best responses in two steps. Given the other agent's optimal continuation set, Part 3 describes the value function under the optimal continuation policy. Given these value functions, Part 4 describes the optimal continuation sets.

Equilibrium Refinement. Our equilibrium definition rules out any trivial equilibrium, in which both agents choose to dissolve the match, despite having a positive joint value from continuing for a small period dt , simply because they expect the other agent to do the same. We rule out these trivial equilibria by incorporating a refinement based on weakly dominant strategies. For illustration, suppose time is discrete, a period lasts dt , and the match will end in the following period with certainty. If continuation is optimal today in expectation of match separation next period, which is the worst possible outcome from the

next period onward, then continuation must be optimal under any possible outcome from next period onward. Table 1 lists the payoffs in the period game. Suppose that productivity z is such that flow payoffs in the match exceed flow payoffs from the outside options for both the worker and the firm—i.e., $(e^z - e^w) dt > 0$ and $e^w dt + \mathbb{E}_{z'}[e^{-\rho dt} u(z')|z] > u(z)$. Then, there are two equilibria: one in which both agents choose to separate and one in which both agents decide to continue. However, the first equilibrium does not survive the *elimination of weakly dominated strategies* since, independent of what the other agent does, it is weakly better to continue. As $dt \rightarrow 0$, we recover the continuation sets in equations (9)–(10), which incorporate a restriction to weakly dominant strategies in continuous time. That is, $(e^z - e^w) dt > 0$ and $e^w dt + \mathbb{E}_{z'}[e^{-\rho dt} u(z')|z] > u(z)$ imply $e^z - e^w > 0$ and $0 < e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \partial u(z) / \partial z + (\sigma^2 / 2) \partial^2 u(z) / \partial z^2$ as $dt \rightarrow 0$. It is worth noting that the restriction to weakly dominant strategies yields the largest continuation set by eliminating the empty-set continuation policies.

TABLE 1. ILLUSTRATING THE EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT IN THE PERIOD GAME

	Firm separates	Firm continues
Worker separates	$(u(z), 0)$	$(u(z), 0)$
Worker continues	$(u(z), 0)$	$(e^w dt + \mathbb{E}_{z'}[e^{-\rho dt} u(z') z], (e^z - e^w) dt)$

Notes: This table shows the payoffs to the (worker, firm) in a discrete-time approximation of the game played between a matched worker and firm under the assumption that the match separates in the following period.

Wage-Rigidity-Induced Job Separations. The flow benefit of a match, net of its opportunity cost, is given by $e^z - (Be^z + \max_w f(\theta(z; w))[h(z; w) - u(z)]) > 0$, reflecting the positive social value of a match. Motivated by the empirical observation that job separations depend on wage rigidity, wages in our model are *allocative* in the sense that match duration depends on their level. For this reason, *bilaterally inefficient job separations* occur whenever a match is endogenously dissolved by either the worker or the firm given a positive match surplus. The lack of commitment is reflected in the equilibrium definition: Endogenous separations are optimal at each point of the state space for at least one of the agents. Importantly, inefficiencies on the job-separation margin also affect job creation due to their effects on unemployed workers' search decisions through $h(z; w)$ and on firms' vacancy posting decisions through $j(z; w)$. Thus, wage rigidity leads to bilaterally inefficient job separations in the form of endogenous quits versus layoffs, in contrast to standard labor market theories with flexible wages (e.g., [Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994](#)) in which the two events are substantively identical since job separations occur if and only if match surplus is exhausted.

2.3 Equilibrium Characterization

With productivity shocks and rigid wages, both variables co-determine a worker-firm match. We can show that the relevant state variable for both workers and firms is the log-markdown, $\hat{w} := w - z$. Thus, we express agents' values and policies as functions of the scalar \hat{w} instead of the duplet $(z; w)$. To simplify notation, we define the transformed drift $\hat{\gamma} := \gamma + \sigma^2$ and the transformed discount factor $\hat{\rho} := \rho - \gamma - \sigma^2/2$. The following result characterizes the equilibrium.

Lemma 1. *Suppose that the set $(u(z), h(z; w), j(z; w), \theta(z; w))$ satisfies the equilibrium conditions (1)–(6), given the continuation sets $\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)$ and $\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)$ defined in (9)–(10) and search policy $w^*(z)$. Then,*

$$(\hat{U}, \hat{J}(w - z), \hat{W}(w - z), \hat{\theta}(w - z)) = \left(\frac{u(z)}{e^z}, \frac{j(z; w)}{e^z}, \frac{h(z; w) - u(z)}{e^z}, \theta(z; w) \right)$$

equivalently characterizes the equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Given $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})$, \hat{U} satisfies

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}), \quad (11)$$

where the optimal choice of submarket for an unemployed worker to search in is $\hat{w}^ = w^*(z) - z$.*

2. Given $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$, free entry is satisfied: $\min\{K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w})\} = 0$.
3. Given $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*} := \text{int}\{\hat{w} : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } e^{\hat{w}} > \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\}$ and $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*} := \text{int}\{\hat{w} : \hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } e^{\hat{w}} < 1\}$, the transformed value functions $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ satisfy the variational inequalities

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \begin{cases} \max\{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) - \delta\hat{W}(\hat{w}), 0\} & \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*}, \\ 0 & \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*})^c, \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \begin{cases} \max\{1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}) - \delta\hat{J}(\hat{w}), 0\} & \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*}, \\ 0 & \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*})^c, \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

with $\hat{W} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^}) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$ and $\hat{J} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*}) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$. Finally, the optimal stopping times are given by $\tau^{h^*} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \hat{w}_t \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*})^c, \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^*\}$ and $\tau^{j^*} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \hat{w}_t \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*})^c, \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^*\}$.*

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.3. □

The equilibrium conditions in Lemma 1 are transformed versions of those of the original problem stated above. Part 1 gives the value of unemployment under the optimal search strategy in equation (11). Part 2 states the transformed free-entry condition. Part 3 describes a nontrivial equilibrium, with equations (12)–(13) referencing agents’ optimal continuation regions such that workers’ wages are above the flow value of unemployment whenever $e^{\hat{w}} > \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ and firms’ flow profits are positive whenever $e^{\hat{w}} < 1$.

Next, we state a key result on equilibrium existence and uniqueness.

Proposition 1. *There exists a unique BRE.*

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.4. □

Although equilibrium existence and uniqueness are important properties of models of directed search, in our context they do not follow from previous work. Standard arguments in discrete time with only exogenous job separations involve Schauder’s fixed-point theorem (e.g., [Menzio and Shi, 2010, 2011](#); [Schaal, 2017](#)), which critically relies on two conditions: continuity in the value functions and continuity in the mapping between value functions that characterize the BRE. These standard arguments no longer apply to the above-referenced models in discrete time after the inclusion of endogenous separations, nor do they carry over to our continuous-time setup.

Instead, we leverage quasi-variational inequalities to prove the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial equilibrium in our model. The proof proceeds in three steps. In the first step, we represent the equilibrium conditions (12)–(13) in terms of quasi-variational inequalities. In the second step, we use the results in [Lions and Stampacchia \(1967\)](#) to show the existence of the agents’ best response functions and their associated value functions. In the third step, we define a functional equation $Q(\cdot)$ that maps the worker’s value function to itself using both agents’ best response functional equations. Thus, proving the existence of a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium becomes equivalent to finding a fixed point \hat{W}^* such that $Q(\hat{W}^*) = \hat{W}^*$. To this end, we show that the operator $Q(\cdot)$ is monotonic, thus allowing us to establish the existence of the fixed point by invoking the Birkhoff-Tartar theorem ([Aubin, 2007](#)), which applies under relatively weak regularity conditions. Finally, we show that the operator $Q(\cdot)$ satisfies a type of concavity property, which allows us to establish the uniqueness of the fixed point. This uniqueness result is nontrivial given the complementarity in agents’ continuation decisions based on strategic worker-firm interactions within a match. Importantly, our continuous-time setup also allows us to leverage properties of the employed worker’s and the firm’s value functions—e.g., continuity with respect to \hat{U} —which are necessary to find a unique equilibrium of this economy.

At an intuitive level, the result follows from two observations. First, taking the value of

unemployment as given, the firm chooses a layoff productivity threshold $z^l(w)$ and the worker chooses a quit productivity threshold $z^q(w)$. If the firm decides to delay a layoff (i.e., a lower $z^l(w)$), then the worker's best response is also to delay a quit (i.e., higher $z^q(w)$). But the response is less than one-for-one, because the benefit from delaying separation materializes in the future. In the extreme, as one agent commits to staying in the match, the other party still has an incentive to separate in some future states. Thus, each agent's best-response threshold is decreasing and responds less than one-for-one to the other agent's threshold. Second, if the future value of unemployment is higher, then workers will quit sooner (i.e., lower $z^q(w)$) and the match value is lower. This in turn reduces the current value of an unemployed worker. Thus, current and future unemployment values are "strategic substitutes," pushing toward the uniqueness of equilibrium.

Next, we characterize the properties of the BRE. We postulate that there exist optimal policies in the form of piece rates $\hat{w}^q < \hat{w}^* < \hat{w}^l$, where \hat{w}^q is the worker's optimal quit threshold, \hat{w}^* is the optimal search strategy at match formation, and \hat{w}^l is the firm's optimal job-separation threshold. We define the transformed surplus of the match as $\hat{S}(\hat{w}) := \hat{f}(\hat{w}) + \hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and the worker's share of the transformed surplus as $\eta(\hat{w}) := \hat{W}(\hat{w})/\hat{S}(\hat{w})$.

Proposition 2. *The BRE has the following properties:*

1. *The joint match surplus satisfies*

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}), \quad (14)$$

where $B < \hat{\rho}\hat{U} < 1$ and the expected discounted match duration is given by

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) := \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} dt | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right]. \quad (15)$$

2. *The competitive entry wage, $\hat{w}^* = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w})$, exists and is unique. Moreover, it solves*

$$\hat{w}^* = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \left\{ \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \hat{f}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \right\} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \left\{ \eta(\hat{w})^\alpha (1 - \eta(\hat{w}))^{1-\alpha} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) \right\}, \quad (16)$$

with the unique solution characterized by the following optimality condition:

$$\underbrace{\eta'(\hat{w}^*) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} - \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\eta(\hat{w}^*)} \right)}_{\text{share channel}} = - \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}}_{\text{surplus channel}}. \quad (17)$$

3. The equilibrium job-finding rate $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$ and the flow opportunity cost of employment $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ are

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) = [(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*))(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})/K]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}, \quad (18)$$

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \left(K^{\alpha-1} (1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*))^{1-\alpha} \eta(\hat{w}^*)^\alpha (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}. \quad (19)$$

4. If $\gamma \neq 0$ or $\sigma \neq 0$, then each agent's continuation set is connected and that of the game is bounded:

$$\hat{Z}^{h*} = (\hat{w}^q, \infty) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{Z}^{j*} = (-\infty, \hat{w}^l), \quad (20)$$

where $-\infty < \hat{w}^q \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) < 0 \leq \hat{w}^l < \infty$. Workers' and firms' value functions satisfy the following smooth pasting conditions: $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^l) = 0$.

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.5. □

Starting with Part 1 of Proposition 2, equation (14) states that the match surplus equals the product of the transformed flow surplus $1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ and the expected discounted match duration $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$ defined in equation (15), which depends on the wage \hat{w} and the width of the match's continuation set (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l) . Also, the flow opportunity cost of employment $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ is bounded between 1 (i.e., the transformed value of flow output in the match) and B (i.e., the transformed value of home production). Since $1 > \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$, the joint match surplus is always strictly positive, so that all endogenous job separations are inefficient.

Equations (16)–(17) of Part 2 show that the optimal entry wage \hat{w}^* balances a *share channel* and a *surplus channel*. Unemployed workers search for wages that are competitively set as if they were a Nash bargaining solution with worker weight α . This result derives from free entry, which implies that workers' job-finding rate is proportional to the firm's value. A larger entry wage increases the worker's surplus share by $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)\alpha/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ but reduces the job-finding probability by $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)(1 - \alpha)/(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*))$. This trade-off is reflected in the share channel and standard in models of directed search (e.g., Shimer, 1996; Moen, 1997).

In addition, the novel *surplus channel* captures the dependence of expected match duration on the wage set at match formation. The higher (lower) the entry wage, the sooner the firm (worker) will dissolve the match in expectation. Only if $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$, then the worker's surplus share is $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$, as in bilaterally efficient models. These considerations are unique to our environment.

Part 3 states workers' job-finding rate (18) and the flow opportunity cost of employment (19) as functions of the worker's surplus share and the expected discounted match

duration.

Part 4 shows that the continuation set of the worker and that of the firm in (20) follow threshold rules in the log-markdown \hat{w} . Workers do not quit as long as $\hat{w} > \hat{w}^q$, while firms refrain from firing the worker as long as $\hat{w} < \hat{w}^l$. Thus, the continuation set for the match is given by $\hat{Z}^{h*} \cap \hat{Z}^{j*} = (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)$. These thresholds satisfy $\hat{w}^q \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and $\hat{w}^l \geq 0$, reflecting both parties' willingness to accept flow payoffs below that from their respective outside option. Finally, the smooth pasting conditions apply at the worker's quit threshold \hat{w}^q and at the firm's firing threshold \hat{w}^l , reflecting the optimality of agents' continuation thresholds.

It is worth highlighting that the optimal entry wage (see Part 2) will be set at an optimal distance from both separation thresholds (see Part 4). To convey the intuition, consider a markdown \hat{w} close to the quit threshold \hat{w}^q . Both the worker's and the firm's value functions are increasing for \hat{w} sufficiently close to \hat{w}^q since both values are zero when $\hat{w} < \hat{w}^q$ and positive when $\hat{w} > \hat{w}^q$. Therefore, around the quit threshold, raising wages is Pareto improving, as it results in a higher flow payoff for the worker and at the same time a lower quit probability, which extends the expected match duration and increases the firm's value. A symmetric argument shows that lowering wages is Pareto improving near the layoff threshold.¹¹

2.4 Understanding the Economic Mechanisms

Static Considerations. We first consider equilibrium policies under fixed productivity.

Proposition 3. *If $\gamma = \sigma = 0$, then optimal policies are given by*

$$(\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^l) = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}, \alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}, 1),$$

with $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 1/(\hat{\rho} + \delta)$, and no smooth pasting conditions apply.

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.6. □

Note that $\hat{w}^q < \hat{w}^* < \hat{w}^l$ and $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$ for the match duration, so there are no endogenous job separations absent productivity fluctuations. From this, we see that lack of commitment and wage rigidity by themselves do not generate inefficient job separations. Absent idiosyncratic productivity fluctuations, agents' behavior is bilaterally efficient, in that it maximizes the joint match surplus.

In addition to the static forces outlined above, two dynamic considerations guide workers' and firms' choices: the *option value effect* and the *anticipatory effect*.

¹¹Supplementary Material I.7 graphically illustrates workers' and firms' value functions over \hat{w} .

Dynamic Consideration I: The Option Value Effect. To understand the option value due to productivity fluctuations, we temporarily abstract from the drift in worker productivity.

Proposition 4. *If $\hat{\gamma} = 0$ and $\alpha = 1/2$, then, to a first-order approximation of flow payoffs around the entry wage, $\hat{w}^* = \log((1 + \hat{\rho}\hat{U})/2)$ and job-separation thresholds satisfy $\hat{w}^q = \hat{w}^* - h(\varphi, \Phi)$ and $\hat{w}^l = \hat{w}^* + h(\varphi, \Phi)$ for some function $h(\varphi, \Phi)$ with $\varphi := \sqrt{2(\hat{\rho} + \delta)}/\sigma$ and $\Phi := (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})/(1 + \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. The following properties hold:*

1. $h(\varphi, \Phi)$ is decreasing in φ and increasing in Φ .
2. $\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow \infty} h(\varphi, \Phi) \leq 3\Phi$ and $\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 0} h(\varphi, \Phi) = \Phi$.
3. $\varphi h(\varphi, \Phi)$ is increasing in φ .

The equilibrium surplus share is $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha = 1/2$ and the expected discounted match duration,

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = \frac{1 - 2 \left(e^{\varphi h(\varphi, \Phi)} + e^{-\varphi h(\varphi, \Phi)} \right)^{-1}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}, \quad (21)$$

is increasing in φ and Φ and satisfies $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$.

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.6. □

Proposition 4 demonstrates that idiosyncratic volatility, by itself, does not affect the split of the match surplus between the worker and the firm. Such an economy is symmetric around the entry wage, which implies $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$ and $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$. Thus, a larger \hat{w}^* reduces the match duration by increasing the likelihood of a layoff but increases the match duration by reducing the likelihood of a quit. Weighing both forces, $\mathcal{T}(\cdot, \hat{\rho})$ is maximized at $\hat{w}^* = \log((1 + \hat{\rho}\hat{U})/2)$ and $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = 1/2$.

This result provides a tight characterization of the worker's and the firm's optimal policy functions, which yield the continuation region of the match (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l) being symmetrically centered around the optimal entry wage \hat{w}^* . In addition, the width of the continuation region is increasing in volatility σ and decreasing in $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ (Part 1). The width of the inaction region increases with σ due to the option value effect: Though the worker's productivity might fall below the wage, the firm is willing to wait before firing the worker because productivity may increase in the future. The width of the inaction region decreases with $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$, a higher value of which decreases match surplus and makes it more costly to wait.

The option value effect naturally arises in models of inaction. However, our model features a departure from canonical models of inaction in product pricing and investment

(e.g., Barro, 1972; Bernanke, 1983). In those models, the width of the continuation region typically grows unboundedly with the volatility σ . Instead, in our model, the width of the continuation region has an upper bound (Part 2). To see the intuition behind this result, consider the problem of a firm that finds itself in a match with negative flow profits—the worker case is exactly analogous. The marginal benefit from remaining in a currently unprofitable match is that, with some probability in the future, productivity increases enough to make the match profitable by rendering the markdown less than unity. At the same time, inaction on the part of the firm is risky: Productivity may increase by a large enough amount for the worker to choose to quit. Given the two job-separation thresholds, as volatility approaches infinity, the probability of remaining in the profitable part of the inaction region approaches zero. Thus, the two-sided lack of commitment imposes an upper bound on the option value associated with remaining in a match.

The inefficiency due to the lack of commitment also manifests itself in the expected duration of the match in (21). Since the separation thresholds, indexed by $h(\varphi, \Phi)$, remain bounded as $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$, the expected match duration decreases as the volatility of productivity shocks increases (Part 3).

Dynamic Consideration II: The Anticipatory Effect. To understand the anticipatory effect due to the productivity drift, we temporarily abstract from volatility in worker productivity (i.e., $\sigma = 0$) and focus on the case with weakly positive drift (i.e., $\hat{\gamma} \geq 0$), with other cases being analogous.

Proposition 5. *If $\sigma = 0$ and $\hat{\gamma} \geq 0$, then the quit threshold is $\hat{w}^q = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and*

$$\hat{w}^* = \hat{w}^q + \tilde{T} \left(\frac{\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}, \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \right),$$

where $\tilde{T}(\cdot)$, defined in equation (I.56) of the Supplementary Materials I.6, is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in its second argument. Moreover:

1. As $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow 0$, then $(\tilde{T}(\cdot), \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}), \eta(\hat{w}^*)) \rightarrow \left(\log \left(\frac{\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \right), \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}, \alpha \right)$.
2. As $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty$, then $(\tilde{T}(\cdot), \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}), \eta(\hat{w}^*)) \rightarrow (\tilde{T}^{limit}, 0, \eta^{limit})$, where \tilde{T}^{limit} and η^{limit} satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} &= \frac{e^{\tilde{T}^{limit}} - 1 - \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \left(1 - \frac{\tilde{T}^{limit}}{e^{\tilde{T}^{limit}-1}} \right)}{\tilde{T}^{limit}}, \\ \eta^{limit} &= \alpha + \frac{1-\alpha}{\tilde{T}^{limit}} \frac{(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\eta^{limit}}{\eta^{limit} + \hat{\rho}\hat{U}(1-\eta^{limit})}. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

Proof. See Supplementary Material I.6. □

When productivity grows at a constant rate, the job-separation threshold \hat{w}^q equals the static opportunity cost of employment since workers benefit from remaining matched up to that point and workers have no incentive to delay separation beyond that point. The fact that \hat{w}^q is insensitive to the drift differs from the canonical result in [Sheshinski and Weiss \(1977\)](#) who studied the problem of a firm setting prices subject to menu costs with positive trend inflation. Their main result is that, in order to economize on menu costs associated with price changes, firms both decrease the lower threshold of the inaction region for real prices and increase the nominal reset price in response to higher trend inflation. Here, the quit threshold \hat{w}^q is independent of the drift due to limited commitment—the worker cannot credibly promise to remain in the match. From Proposition 5, the entry wage \hat{w}^* is increasing in both the weighted sum of opportunity costs ($\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$) and the drift ($\hat{\gamma}$). We refer to the latter as the anticipatory effect: Workers anticipate higher future productivity and modify their search strategy accordingly. The following two cases illustrate this point by exploring two limiting behaviors of the anticipatory effect.

As $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow 0$ (Part 1), the equilibrium entry wage \hat{w}^* is the same as in the case without drift; thus, $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$. As the drift increases, workers optimally search for a job with a higher entry wage. Therefore, the average wage in the economy increases above the weighted sum of opportunity costs; recall that \hat{w}^q remains fixed. This results from the worker internalizing the trade-off whereby a higher wage implies (i) a reduced job-finding rate and (ii) a lower frequency of inefficient job separations and, thus, a longer expected match duration. As $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty$ (Part 2), the entry wage \hat{w}^* becomes unresponsive to the drift because the job-finding rate becomes so small that it dominates the trade-off. Thus, the effect of the drift on the entry wage is bounded, in contrast to the reset price in [Sheshinski and Weiss \(1977\)](#). Finally, as seen in (22), the anticipatory effect gives workers a higher surplus share when $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty$ compared to $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow 0$.

Workers' lack of commitment gives them the option to quit, which implies the invariance of \hat{w}^q to $\hat{\gamma}$ and a decreased value of searching for a job. To see this, suppose a worker commits to some \hat{w}^q as $\delta \rightarrow 0$. Then, the worker chooses a single instrument, namely the entry wage \hat{w}^* to balance two objectives. On one hand, the worker chooses \hat{w}^* to steer the rate of inefficient separations, which occur at a tenure of $(\hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^q)/\hat{\gamma}$, as captured by the surplus channel. On the other hand, the worker chooses \hat{w}^* close to the weighted sum of opportunity costs, as captured by the share channel. Since these objectives are conflicting, lack of commitment distorts both the expected match duration and job-finding rates in equilibrium.

3 Aggregate Shocks and Nominal Fluctuations

How do wage-rigidity-induced job separations affect the transmission of aggregate shocks in the labor market? To answer this question, we extend our model to include nominal fluctuations.

3.1 Introducing Nominal Fluctuations

To characterize the labor market response to fluctuations in the aggregate price level P_t , we assume that $p_t \equiv \log P_t$ follows $dp_t = \pi dt$, where π denotes the inflation rate. We assume that the vacancy posting cost and the value of home production are denominated in real terms.

The introduction of nominal-real distinctions requires minor adjustments to our framework. Most important is the adjustment in the stochastic process for productivity and the introduction of dynamics in the aggregate state. Given fluctuations in the price level, the relevant state variable becomes the *real wage-to-productivity ratio* $\hat{w} := w - z - p$, which equals the worker's real wage $w - p$ minus worker productivity z . All policies $(\hat{w}^l, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^q)$ are then adjusted for the aggregate price level. In addition, it will be useful to keep track of the negative of the cumulative shocks to $z + p$ since the beginning of a spell of employment or unemployment, denoted $\Delta z := \hat{w} - \hat{w}^*$, which evolves as

$$d\Delta z = -(\gamma + \pi) dt + \sigma dW_t^z.$$

Let $G_h(\Delta z)$ and $g^h(\Delta z)$ denote the steady-state cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF), respectively, of cumulative worker productivity shocks within a spell in steady state. This distribution's support is given by $[-\Delta^q, \Delta^l]$, where $\Delta^q := \hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^q$ and $\Delta^l := \hat{w}^l - \hat{w}^*$. For any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we define this distribution's k^{th} moment as $\mathbb{E}_h(\Delta z^k) := \int_{\Delta z} \Delta z^k dG_h(\Delta z)$.

The steady state of our model implies a set of observable statistics: the rate of transitions from employment to unemployment, s , and that from unemployment to employment, $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$, total employment, \mathcal{E} , and changes in the log nominal wage between consecutive job spells, Δw .¹²

¹²While worker wages and productivities do not have a stationary distribution in *levels*, the distribution of wage *changes* across jobs is stationary. Although not necessary for our purposes, the former could be rendered stationary by assuming that workers permanently leave the labor force at a constant hazard rate.

3.2 Sufficient Statistics Following an Inflationary Shock

Starting from the steady state without aggregate shocks, we consider a small, unanticipated shock $\zeta > 0$ to the price level at time $t = 0$, so that $p_0 = \lim_{t \uparrow 0} p_t + \zeta$. We are interested in the economy's CIR of aggregate employment and price-level-adjusted wages to such an aggregate shock.

While here we introduce shocks to the aggregate price level directly, we provide two alternative microfoundations for the aggregate price level when monetary policy is conducted either via money supply or an interest rate-based Taylor rule.¹³ In both models, monetary policy moves the aggregate price level p_t and thus real wages within matches.

We focus on fluctuations in the price level P_t to illustrate the mechanism in our model and to derive the sufficient statistics for this shock, but we accommodate persistent shocks in inflation and aggregate productivity shocks in the quantitative section, which are frequently studied in the quantitative macro-labor literature (Shimer, 2005a; Hall, 2005).


An Illustration. Figure 2 shows the evolution of key variables after an unanticipated one-off increase in the price level. The distribution of real wage-to-productivity ratios \hat{w} shifts to the left (Panel A), resulting in lower real wages per capita $\bar{w}_t := \int_0^1 \mathbb{1}[E_{it} = h] w_{it} di$ (Panel B), and changes in the job-separation rate s_t (Panel C), the shares of quits and layoffs (Panel D), the job-finding rate f_t (Panel E), and aggregate employment \mathcal{E}_t (Panel F).

While employed workers' wages are rigid, we allow for two polar cases guiding the wages of new matches, which are commonly considered a key determinant of the job-finding rate (Pissarides, 2009). In the first case of *flexible entry wages*, we assume that unemployed workers adjust their search behavior to the new price level, so \hat{w}^* remains at its steady-state level. Consequently, firms' price-level-adjusted value of hiring is unaffected, so job-filling and job-finding rates remain unchanged (dashed line in Panel E). The only effect of the price-level shock is to shift \hat{w} in the inaction region, which affects the time path of endogenous job separations in the form of quits and layoffs (Panel D). Thus, employment dynamics under flexible entry wages are driven only by job-separation rates.

In the second case of *rigid entry wages*, we assume that unemployed workers are unaware of the shock realization at $t = 0$ and learn about it only after becoming employed. Given this lack of information, unemployed workers do not adjust their search behavior to the higher price level and keep searching for jobs that pay the old steady-state nominal wage-to-productivity ratio, which is $\hat{w}^* - \zeta$ in real terms. Once they find a job, future workers' search strategies incorporate their knowledge about the shock and search for jobs

¹³For details, see Supplementary Material II.1 and Supplementary Material II.2, respectively.

FIGURE 2. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS OF LABOR MARKET VARIABLES



Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of real wage-to-productivity ratios $\hat{w} := w_{it} - z_{it} - p_t$ in steady state and after a price-level shock of size ζ . Panels B–F show the IRFs of the average price-level-adjusted per-capita wage \bar{w}_t , the job-separation rate s_t , the shares of quits and layoffs, the job-finding rate f_t , and aggregate employment \mathcal{E}_t , respectively. Source: Model simulations.

that pay the steady-state real wage \hat{w}^* . Since firms know about the shock realization, the job-finding rate is affected by the free-entry condition. Consequently, temporarily lower entry wages induce firms to post more vacancies and the job-finding rate increases (solid line in Panel E). In summary, employment dynamics under rigid entry wages are driven by both job-separation and job-finding rates.

The case of rigid entry wages is motivated by the empirical evidence that new-hire

wages evolve similarly to the wages of incumbent workers within a firm at business cycle frequencies (Grigsby *et al.*, 2021) and that wages for new hires rarely change between successive vacancies at the same job (Hazell and Taska, 2022). It is possible to think of various alternative microfoundations for this assumption, and we choose not to rely on a single one.¹⁴

Impulse Responses. Our goal is to characterize the effects of an inflationary shock on aggregate employment \mathcal{E} . To this end, we define $IRF_x(\zeta, t) := x_t - x_{ss}$ as the value of variable x at time t relative to its steady-state value x_{ss} , following an unanticipated one-off shock ζ to the price level at time 0. Following Alvarez *et al.* (2016), we define the CIR of variable x to a price-level shock ζ as

$$CIR_x(\zeta) = \int_0^{\infty} IRF_x(\zeta, t) dt,$$

which is simply the area under the IRF for all $t > 0$. The CIR summarizes in a single scalar the full path—i.e., the on-impact response and dynamics—of the labor market response to the inflationary shock. Therefore, the CIR can be interpreted as a *multiplier* of the original shock to the price level. To illustrate the logic behind the CIR, suppose that there are no nominal rigidities so that the nominal wages of both newly hired and incumbent workers respond one-for-one to the shock. In this case, $IRF_x(\zeta, t) = 0$ for all t and thus $CIR_x(\zeta) = 0$ for $x \in \{\mathcal{E}, \bar{w}\}$, which reflects the fact that given our assumptions there are no consequences of price-level shocks. With nominal rigidities, an inflationary shock affects both employment and wages, the magnitude of which is given by the CIR.

Next, we relate the economy’s CIR of employment to conventional labor market microdata in two steps. First, we show that the CIR can be characterized only in terms of cross-sectional steady-state moments. Intuitively, changes in a worker’s idiosyncratic productivity Z_{it} and changes in the price level P_t symmetrically affect the log-real-wage-to-productivity ratio $W_{it}/(Z_{it}P_t)$, so the response of a match to idiosyncratic worker productivity changes in steady state can inform the aggregate effects of shocks to the price level. Second, we show that the log-markdown $W_{it}/(Z_{it}P_t)$ can be inferred from data on workers’ employment outcomes across jobs, which allows us to express the CIR in terms of observable moments of the data.

For ease of exposition, we assume $\gamma + \pi = 0$ for the remainder of the main text. In the Supplementary Materials, we treat the general case.

¹⁴For notable models of rigid entry wages, see Fukui (2025) and the discussion in Shimer (2004) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011).

CIR of Employment with Flexible Entry Wages. To facilitate the exposition, we first present the case with flexible entry wages. Proposition 6 characterizes the CIR up to a first order.¹⁵

Proposition 6. *Up to first order, the CIR of employment under flexible entry wages is*

$$\frac{CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} + o(\zeta) \quad (23)$$

Proof. See Supplementary Material II.3. □


Let us begin by inspecting the result in equation (23) of Proposition 6, which expresses the CIR in terms of model objects. To build intuition, we consider two cases in which aggregate employment has a zero response to an inflationary shock. In the first case, all job separations are exogenous, so the IRF of the job-separation rate identically equals zero. In the second case, all job separations are endogenous, but the mass of workers quitting exactly equals the mass of workers saved from layoffs along the entire IRF. In both cases, equation (23) features $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] = 0$. As a third case, consider an economy with $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] < 0$. Such an economy features a larger share of layoffs than quits, so a shock-induced reduction in inflation-adjusted wages reduces the separation rate and increases total employment. Finally, the CIR is scaled by the steady-state unemployment rate, $1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}$, which is informative of the steady-state job-finding rate $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$ and thus the speed of (re-)matching.

Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates this analysis by showing the steady-state distribution of cumulative shocks to the real wage-to-productivity ratio Δz within spells of employment. The blue solid line shows the case when $\delta = 0$ and $\Delta^q = \Delta^l$ and the red dashed line shows the case when $\delta > 0$ and $\Delta^q, \Delta^l \uparrow \infty$. In these two cases, the distribution is symmetric around zero, thus, $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] = 0$. In the last case, we have that $\Delta^l < \Delta^q$, so the layoff threshold is closer to the entry point and the distribution is tilted to the left, so $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] < 0$. Intuitively, this asymmetry reflects the fact that workers are more likely to be laid off when they experience negative shocks to their real wage-to-productivity ratio than to quit when they experience positive shocks. Therefore, a shock-induced reduction in real wages leads to a larger reduction in layoffs than in quits, which reduces the separation rate and increases aggregate employment.

To operationalize this theory and use it to describe aggregate fluctuations in terms of measurable sufficient statistics, we map the model's unobservables (i.e., equation (23)) into observables (i.e., moments of the distribution of wage changes across jobs). To this end,

¹⁵That is, $CIR_x(\zeta) = CIR_x(0) + (CIR_x)'(0)\zeta + O(\zeta^2)$, where $CIR_x(0) = 0$.

FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTIONS OF WAGE CHANGES AND CUMULATIVE SHOCKS



Notes: The figure plots the distribution of wage changes between jobs $l^w(\Delta w)$ and the distribution of cumulative productivity shocks in employment $g^h(\Delta z)$ for two calibrations. In the first calibration, we set $(\Delta^q, \Delta^l, \gamma + \pi, \sigma, \delta, f(\theta(\hat{w}^*))) = (0.2, 0.2, 0, 0.1, 0.02, 0.15)$ so that $\delta \approx s$ (red dashed line) and all separation are exogenous. In the second calibration, we set $(\Delta^q, \Delta^l, \gamma + \pi, \sigma, \delta, f(\theta(\hat{w}^*))) = (0.05, 0.05, 0, 0.02, 0, 0.5)$ so that all separation are endogenous and quits and layoffs with equal share. In the third calibration, we set $(\Delta^q, \Delta^l, \gamma + \pi, \sigma, \delta, f(\theta(\hat{w}^*))) = (0.1, 0.05, 0, 0.02, 0, 0.5)$ so that all separation are endogenous and layoffs are larger than quits. Source: Model simulations.

we exploit the insight that the cumulative shocks in employment, Δz , can be inferred from data on workers' employment outcomes across jobs, as we explain below.

Proposition 7. *The volatility of workers' productivity shocks and $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$ can be expressed in terms of measurable data objects:*

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{\text{Var}[\Delta w]}{1/f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + 1/s'} \quad (24)$$

$$\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] = -\frac{\mathbb{E}[\Delta w^3]}{3\text{Var}[\Delta w]}. \quad (25)$$

Therefore, the CIR of employment under flexible entry wages is

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_\xi(\zeta)}{\zeta} = \frac{1}{3} \times \underbrace{\frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}_{\text{avg. u. dur.}} \times \underbrace{\frac{1}{\text{Std}[\Delta w]}}_{\text{precision}} \times \underbrace{\text{Skew}[\Delta w]}_{\text{asymmetry}} + o(\zeta). \quad (26)$$

Proof. See Supplementary Material II.3. □

Equation (24) of Proposition 7 states that the volatility of productivity σ^2 equals the ratio of the variance of wage changes between jobs, $\text{Var}[\Delta w]$, to the average duration between consecutive job start dates, $1/f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + 1/s$. Intuitively, this result leverages the

insight that the distribution of changes in wages between jobs reflects a selected sample of all idiosyncratic productivity fluctuations.

Next, in order to recover the distribution of Δz conditional on a job separation, we exploit worker flows between employment and unemployment. Consider a worker who at time t_0 starts a job with wage w_{t_0} , at time $t_0 + \tau^m$ separates, and at time $t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u$ finds a new job with wage $w_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u}$. Assuming no change in the price level for ease of exposition, the worker's wage change between jobs is given by

$$\Delta w = w_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u} - w_{t_0} \quad (27)$$

$$= \underbrace{(w_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u} - z_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u})}_{=\hat{w}^*} - \underbrace{(w_{t_0} - z_{t_0})}_{=\hat{w}^*} + \underbrace{z_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u} - z_{t_0}}_{=\Delta z \text{ after EUE transition}} \quad (28)$$

$$= \underbrace{\hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^*}_{=0} + \underbrace{z_{t_0 + \tau^m} - z_{t_0}}_{-\Delta z | \text{EU transition starting from } z_{t_0}} + \underbrace{z_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u} - z_{t_0 + \tau^m}}_{-\Delta z | \text{UE transition starting from } z_{t_0 + \tau^m}} \quad (29)$$

Equation (27) gives the definition of Δw . Next, equation (28) adds and subtracts $z_{t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u} - z_{t_0}$ before grouping terms into the wage-to-productivity ratio in the old job, the wage-to-productivity ratio in the new job, and the cumulative productivity shocks between the starting dates of the two jobs. Then, equation (29) adds and subtracts $z_{t_0 + \tau^m}$ before applying the definition of \hat{w}^* and that of Δz . In summary, the wage change across jobs equals the sum of three random variables: (i) the difference of entry wage-to-productivity ratios across jobs, which is identically zero; (ii) Δz conditional on a job separation starting from z_{t_0} ; and (iii) Δz conditional on finding a new job, which is independent of productivity z_t for $t \in (t_0 + \tau^m, t_0 + \tau^m + \tau^u)$. Exploiting this independence, we can use data on Δw to infer the distribution of the second term, which is given by (25).

Equipped with this auxiliary result, we are able to derive equation (26), which expresses the CIR in terms of a sufficient statistic that depends only on the observed distributions of wage changes across jobs and unemployment duration. This sufficient statistic is composed of three terms: (i) the average unemployment duration, $1/f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$; (ii) the precision of wage changes, $1/Std[\Delta w]$; and (iii) the asymmetry of the wage change distribution, $(1/3) \times Skew[\Delta w]$. Note that these moments summarize the entire distribution of workers over the inaction band, not just the mass of workers at the separation thresholds. Each of the three terms in the CIR plays an intuitive role. First, the unemployment duration scales the aggregate employment response. Second, a larger dispersion of wage changes indicates a wider inaction region or matches that are more resilient to shocks, which is inversely related to the share of endogenous separations and responsiveness of aggregate employment to a given impulse. Third, the asymmetry measure reflects the relative

distances of the separation thresholds \hat{w}^q and \hat{w}^l from the entry wage \hat{w}^* and thus the relative incidence of quits versus layoffs.

Panel B of the figure illustrates the asymmetry by comparing the distribution of wage changes across jobs in two cases: symmetric thresholds ($\Delta^l = \Delta^q$, blue line) and asymmetric thresholds with layoffs exceeding quits ($\Delta^l < \Delta^q$, black line), both with $\delta = 0$. When thresholds are symmetric, quits and layoffs are equally likely, so the distribution of wage changes across jobs is symmetric around zero. When instead layoffs exceed quits, the distribution becomes positively skewed: there is a large mass of workers experiencing small negative wage changes—reflecting the high frequency of layoffs—and a thin right tail of large positive wage changes—reflecting the relatively low frequency of quits. This positive skewness directly amplifies the aggregate employment response to price-level shocks.

Propositions 6 and 7 also shed new light on the conventional wisdom whereby fluctuations in the job separation rate are not the primary driver of aggregate employment dynamics (e.g., Shimer, 2005a). These sufficient statistics allow us to empirically verify conditions under which our theory predicts endogenous job separations following an inflationary shock to be either small or large. Given only aggregate data on total job separations in response to an identified aggregate shock, one might be tempted to conclude that wage rigidity does not entail significant inefficiencies. However, equation (23) shows that the CIR of aggregate employment can be small despite the presence of inefficient separations at the micro level. Thus, aggregate data on total job separations is insufficient to assess the incidence of inefficient turnover. To do so, more detailed labor market microdata is needed.

CIR of Employment with Sticky Entry Wages. When entry wages are sticky, an additional novel channel arises, which involves the rent-sharing elasticity $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$.

Proposition 8. *Up to first order, the CIR of employment under sticky entry wages is*

$$\frac{CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} \right] + o(\zeta). \quad (30)$$

Proof. See Supplementary Material II.4. □

The first term in brackets in equation (30) captures the same forces as under flexible entry wages. The second term operates through the rent-sharing elasticity $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$: a lower inflation-adjusted entry wage raises the firm's value of a filled vacancy and therefore vacancy creation and the job-finding rate. One might be tempted to conclude that the prevalence of inefficient separations is immaterial for how much a wage cut affects the

firm's value, and hence for aggregate job creation. This conclusion, however, is incorrect: the share of endogenous separations shapes the magnitude of $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ itself.

To see why, consider a marginal reduction in the entry wage. It lowers the firm's layoff probability and raises the worker's quit probability. Suppose the two movements offset, so that expected match duration—and, by construction, the total separation rate—remain unchanged. These movements are nonetheless asymmetric from the firm's perspective. The firm sets its layoff threshold to maximize firm value, so by an envelope condition the induced change in the layoff probability has no first-order effect on the value of a filled vacancy. The worker sets the quit threshold; thus, the induced rise in the quit probability reduces the firm's value at first order, because at the quit threshold the firm would have strictly preferred to retain the match. The firm's value of a filled vacancy thus rises by less than the direct wage cut alone would suggest, so the elasticity of the worker's share to the entry wage falls short of its exogenous-separation benchmark (Shimer, 2005a) by an amount that is increasing in the share of endogenous separations s^{end}/s . Ex-post inefficiencies on the separation margin therefore have first-order consequences for equilibrium job creation.

3.3 Model Extension to Staggered Wage Renegotiations

So far, our approach has been based on the minimum ingredients needed to characterize how wage-rigidity-induced job separations at the micro level affect the propagation of shocks at the macro level. To speak to data on wage changes on the job, we extend our analysis to the case of staggered wage renegotiations, which follow a Nash bargaining protocol with worker weight χ and occur at rate $\delta^r \geq 0$ à la Calvo (1983). The generalized model nests as a special case the economy with fully rigid wages ($\delta^r \rightarrow 0$) and also the case with fully flexible wages ($\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$). By convexifying between these two cases, the generalized model allows us to replicate the empirical frequencies of wage changes in employment. The generalized model with staggered wage renegotiations reinforces our main conclusions, with all insights up to here extending to an environment with $0 < \delta^r < \infty$ subject to minor modifications.¹⁶ For example, we extend Proposition 2 with a simple change to the definition of match duration $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{p} + \delta^r)$, which now references the duration of a *wage spell* (i.e., the subsegment of an employment spell with a constant wage) instead of an *employment spell*.

Importantly, the sufficient statistics for the CIRs can be extended to the case of staggered wage renegotiations following a similar intuition. This allows us to write the CIR as a

¹⁶See Supplementary Material III.1 for details of this derivation.

function of the wage renegotiation hazard, δ^r , namely $\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta, \delta^r)$. We now distinguish between two types of empirical wage changes, previously denoted Δw . We denote the change in the wage between the previous job's last wage spell and the next job's first wage spell as $\Delta^{EUE}w$. We contrast this with the change in the wage between consecutive wage spells within a job as $\Delta^r w$. When $\mathbb{E}[\Delta^{EUE}w] = 0$, then the CIR of aggregate employment under staggered wage renegotiations is

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta, \delta^r)}{\zeta} = \frac{\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta, 0)}{\zeta} \times \underbrace{\frac{1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}[(\Delta^r w)^3]}{\mathbb{E}[(\Delta^{EUE}w)^3]} - 1 \right)}{\left(1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \left(\frac{\text{Var}[\Delta^r w]}{\text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w]} - 1 \right) \right)^2}}_{\text{renegotiations}} + o(\zeta). \quad (31)$$

As $\delta^r \rightarrow 0$, the renegotiations term converges to one, and we recover the CIR of aggregate employment without renegotiations from Proposition 6, $\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta, 0)/\zeta$, which equation (31) generalizes to the case with $\delta^r \geq 0$.

Similarly, we define the generalized volatility of worker productivity as

$$\sigma^2(\delta^r) = \frac{s \text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w] + \delta^r \text{Var}[\Delta^r w]}{1 + s/f(\theta)} = \sigma^2(0) \times \underbrace{\left(1 + \frac{\delta^r \text{Var}[\Delta^r w]}{s \text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w]} \right)}_{\text{renegotiations}}. \quad (32)$$

As $\delta^r \rightarrow 0$, the renegotiations term goes to one, and we recover the volatility of worker productivity with fixed wages from Proposition 7, $\sigma^2(0)$, which equation (32) generalizes to the case with $\delta^r \geq 0$.

Both of these results reflect our previous main insight that the aggregate state of the economy is the distribution of cumulative shocks in employment, Δz . In our baseline model, the only way to reset Δz to zero was through job transitions. In the generalized model with wage renegotiations, Δz can be reset in two ways: either through job transitions or through wage renegotiations on the job. Adjusting our key model objects for the occurrence of wage renegotiations in this way allows us to carry over the same economic arguments as in Section 3.

4 Exploring the Theory's Quantitative Implications

In this section, we take a first step toward evaluating the quantitative implications of our theory. Motivated by the empirical link between wage rigidity and job separations (e.g., [Davis and Krolkowski, 2025](#)) as well as the empirically relevant quit-layoff distinction

(e.g., [Graves et al., 2026](#)), our goal is twofold: first, to validate the model by replicating recent empirical evidence on wage rigidity and job separations; and second, to quantify the model’s propagation mechanism through endogenous job separations, namely quits and layoffs. We start by computing our sufficient statistic for the CIR of aggregate employment to an unanticipated inflationary shock in US labor market microdata. This allows us to inspect the key drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations based on the analytical results derived in our theoretical model. We then calibrate a quantitative extension of our model using additional moments from the US labor market microdata, including recent empirical evidence on the distinction between quits versus layoffs among job separations. We use the calibrated version of our model to quantitatively study the amplification of business cycle shocks on key labor market statistics. Our main finding is that aggregate shocks generate significant volatility in endogenous job separations, including 62 percent of the empirical quit volatility and 94 percent of the empirical layoff volatility.

4.1 Data Description

Data Sources. We use the 1996–2001 panel of the *Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)*, which is a multistage, stratified, representative sample of the US population. Each individual is followed for a period of up to 48 months. For each month, the data contain the respondent’s employment status and wages. We complement the SIPP data with selected moments from published work on US labor markets based on microdata from the *Current Population Survey (CPS)* and *Automatic Data Processing (ADP)*, as well as aggregate data on labor productivity and US inflation from the *Major Sector Productivity (MSP)* program and *Consumer Price Index (CPI)* of the *Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)*, respectively.

Sample Selection. We restrict the data to male reference persons aged 25 to 54. We keep only workers who have been employed for at least 12 months over the entire panel and job spells that last for a minimum of 2 months. To minimize measurement error, we focus on workers who directly report their hourly wages, rather than imputing them based on reported total earnings and hours worked. To minimize the influence of outliers, we winsorize wages in the top and bottom 1% and we also trim observations in the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of wage changes. Consistent with our model without on-the-job search, we restrict attention to worker flows with at least 1 month of unemployment between jobs.¹⁷

¹⁷Our model produces what looks like job-to-job transitions with less than a month of intervening unemployment due to time aggregation from continuous time in our theory to monthly data in simulations.

Variable Construction. We construct *regular wages* in the data as the empirical counterpart to constant wage segments between staggered renegotiations in our theory. To this end, we filter out transitory wage fluctuations and measurement error within a job spell using the non-parametric wage filter developed in [Blanco *et al.* \(2022\)](#). Building on our previous work, we calibrate the threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis of no wage change to match the monthly within-job wage change frequency of 6.9 percent reported by [Grigsby *et al.* \(2021\)](#) based on the ADP data. We use a monthly job separation rate of 3.3 percent from [Shimer \(2005a\)](#) based on the CPS data and an unemployment rate of 7%.

4.2 Sufficient Statistic for the CIR of Aggregate Employment

Before turning to a more realistic extension of our framework, we first quantify the aggregate employment response to an inflationary shock in the theoretical model. To do so, we compute the total CIR of aggregate employment and its components using equation (31) in Section 3.3, which incorporates staggered wage renegotiations.

Table 2 shows that the CIR of aggregate employment is 0.642, which is equivalent to a cumulative increase in aggregate monthly employment of 0.642 percentage points for an increase in the aggregate price level of 1 percent. Thus, the CIR predicts an expansionary effect of a positive shock to the aggregate price level starting from the steady state. This number is the product of $1/3$, an average unemployment duration of 2.243, a precision term of 3.655, an asymmetry term of 0.123, and a renegotiations term of 1.911.

Our model specification with homothetic home production values and vacancy costs as well as flexible entry wages ensures that the job finding rate is invariant to an unanticipated, one-time permanent increase in the aggregate price level. Thus, the positive CIR of aggregate employment purely reflects a drop in job separations in response to the higher price level. The positive response of aggregate employment to an inflationary shock suggests that the marginal reduction in layoffs exceeds the marginal increase in quits, so that total separations decline when real wages fall.

Our finding of a positive CIR of aggregate employment with respect to an expansionary aggregate (price level) shock implies that wage-rigidity-induced job separations contribute to a greater volatility of macroeconomic variables by endogenizing unemployment inflows (cf. [Shimer, 2005b](#)). While the reduction in layoffs dominates the increase in quits in response to an expansionary shock, the magnitude of amplification is moderated by the near symmetry (i.e., skewness close to zero) of the distribution of worker-firm matches over the inaction region, as inferred through the lens of our theoretical framework.

A more realistic quantification of our model mechanism requires additional ingredients:

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED SUFFICIENT STATISTICS FOR THE CIR OF AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT

CIR of agg. emp.	Avg. u. dur.	Precision	Asymmetry	Renegotiations
$\frac{CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta, \delta^r)}{\zeta}$	$= \frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}$	$\times \frac{1}{Std[\Delta w]}$	$\times Skew[\Delta w]$	$\times \frac{1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s + \delta^r} \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}[(\Delta^r w)^3]}{\mathbb{E}[(\Delta EUE w)^3]} - 1 \right)}{\left(1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s + \delta^r} \left(\frac{Var[\Delta^r w]}{Var[\Delta EUE w]} - 1 \right) \right)^2}$
0.642	2.243	3.655	0.123	1.911

Notes: This table shows the CIR of aggregate employment (column 1) and its four components in equation (31) of Section 3.3—i.e., the average unemployment duration (column 2), precision (column 3), asymmetry (column 4), and renegotiations (column 5). *Source:* SIPP, CPS, and ADP.

persistent shocks to aggregate productivity and the price level, and rigid entry wages. Additionally, the quantitative exercise allows us to decompose fluctuations in various labor market statistics, including layoffs and quits. Because these features go beyond our analytical CIR formula, we numerically solve for equilibrium propagation in a model extension with these additional ingredients.

4.3 Model Estimation

Having explored the analytical insights of our theoretical framework, we now estimate a more realistic extension of our model to microdata from the US labor market, which forms our baseline quantitative model. To this end, we first choose a model specification. We then externally set a number of parameters. Finally, we internally calibrate the remaining model parameters to match a theory-guided selection of moments from the microdata.

Model Specification. For the following analysis, our starting point is the version of our model with homotheticity in real home production (i.e., Be^z) and real vacancy costs (i.e., Ke^z), staggered wage renegotiations (i.e., $\delta^r > 0$), and zero drift in idiosyncratic productivity (i.e., $\gamma = 0$). These choices balance empirical realism with our goal to highlight the model’s key mechanism linking wage rigidity to different types of job separations. Later in this section, we investigate various variants of and extensions to this baseline quantitative model specification.

While we calibrate the model in steady state to the data, we later introduce persistent shocks, both to the price level and to aggregate productivity, and rigid entry wages with respect to the aggregate price level. In particular, the level of aggregate productivity, e^{a_t} , and the inflation rate π_t follow a discrete Markov process over an equidistant grid, $(a_t, \pi_t) \in ((a_1, \pi_1), \dots, (a_n, \pi_n))$. We choose the transition rates λ_{ij} to match the empirical

transition matrix corresponding to the US time series of labor productivity based on the MSP program and inflation rates based on the CPI by the BLS.

Externally Set Parameters. The frequency of our model is monthly. We set a standard value for the discount rate, $\rho = 0.058/12$, corresponding to an annual discount rate of 5.8 percent as in Hall (2017). The elasticity of the matching function is set to $\alpha = 0.500$, following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Next, we set the worker’s bargaining power, $\chi = 0.500$, equal to the elasticity of the matching function, as is standard in the literature. These assumptions imply that the entry markdown is equal to the incumbent worker’s markdown following renegotiation. Finally, we set the inflation target to 2 percent as in the US. Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the externally set parameters and their sources.

Internally Calibrated Parameters. This leaves us with five remaining model parameters which we internally calibrate: δ^r , σ , B , K , and δ . Two of these parameters can be directly read off from the data. First, the frequency of bargaining, $\delta^r = 0.071$, corresponds to the frequency of wage adjustments within jobs from Grigsby *et al.* (2021). Second, the volatility of worker productivity, $\sigma = 0.061$, is inferred from the distribution of wage changes within and between job spells according to equation (32) of Section 3.3.¹⁸

The three remaining parameters are jointly calibrated, although each is particularly closely informed by an empirical counterpart. First, the relative flow value of home production, B , is informed by the empirical average job duration through its effect on the range of the inaction region. Second, the relative flow cost of vacancies, K , is informed by the empirical job finding rate, and thus the unemployment rate, through the matching function. Third, the exogenous job separation rate, δ , is informed by the skewness of wage changes across consecutive employment spells through the pattern of selection of employed workers into unemployment and consecutive reemployment.

To discipline the three internally calibrated parameters, we use the empirical job separation probability of 3.2 percent per month (Shimer, 2005a) and the unemployment rate of 7 percent, which implies a job finding probability of 36 percent per month, as well as the skewness of wage changes across consecutive employment spells of 0.123 from the SIPP data.

Calibration Results. Panel B of Table 3 shows the estimated model parameters. We find a relative flow value of home production of $B = 0.097$, implying substantial match

¹⁸ The model matches the weighted sum $s \text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w] + \delta^r \text{Var}[\Delta^r w]$ as in the data, but not the two variances separately. In the data, $\text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w] = 0.074$ and $\text{Var}[\Delta^r w] = 0.021$, while the model generates $\text{Var}[\Delta^{EUE}w] = 0.082$ and $\text{Var}[\Delta^r w] = 0.013$.

surplus (cf. [Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008](#)). As shown in Proposition 4, the size of the separation threshold depends mainly on the match surplus, $1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$. Given the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks of around 6 percent per month, the model requires a large match surplus to generate a sufficiently wide inaction region and thus a sufficiently low job separation rate. The relative flow cost of vacancies, $K = 2.962$, is pinned down by the level of the job finding rate—see equation (18) in Proposition 2. Finally, the exogenous job separation rate is $\delta = 0.010$, implying an important role for endogenous job separations.

Targeted Moments. Panel C of Table 3 shows that the calibrated model successfully matches the empirical job finding probability, the job separation probability, the skewness of wage changes between jobs, the theory-implied moment of the wage-change distribution, and the probability of wage changes.

Untargeted Moments. Although the model we bring to the data is simplistic along several dimensions, we show that it can speak to a diverse set of empirical regularities that might otherwise seem puzzling through the lens of leading theories of the labor market. For example, our model speaks to the empirical link between wage rigidity and job separations (e.g., [Davis and Krolkowski, 2025](#)) as well as the empirical incidence of quits versus layoffs (e.g., [Graves et al., 2026](#)).

Panel D of Table 3 shows the shares of different types of job separations in the model and in the data. We distinguish between worker quits, firm layoffs, and other (exogenous) separations. The data numbers are based on empirical estimates of layoffs, quits, and other separations into unemployment for the period from 1978 to 2019, as reported by [Graves et al. \(2026\)](#) based on CPS data. The model numbers are untargeted and implied by our calibrated parameter values. The model replicates the dominant role of layoffs among the three types of job separations. At the same time, the baseline quantitative model overstates the incidence of quits relative to other types of job separations. Intuitively, the model generates too much symmetry in the distribution of worker-firm matches over the inaction region.¹⁹

Our baseline model features around 70 percent inefficient job separations. Recent empirical evidence suggests that this share may be overstated: for example, [Davis and Krolkowski \(2025\)](#) put an upper bound on the share of layoffs that are bilaterally inefficient at 35 percent (their Table 8) in the US. However, they also find that discussions between laid

¹⁹Additional skewness in that distribution toward the layoff threshold and away from the quit threshold could be generated through asymmetric renegotiation hazards, which we introduce in a model extension in the Supplementary Materials IV.1. This version of the model offers a better match to the levels of quits (9%) and layoffs (62%).

TABLE 3. MODEL PARAMETERS AND MODEL VERSUS EMPIRICAL MOMENTS

A. Externally Set Parameters			
Parameter	Description	Value	Source
ρ	Monthly discount rate	0.058/12	Hall (2017)
α	Elasticity of matching function	0.500	Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
χ	Worker bargaining power	0.500	Standard
π	Monthly inflation target	0.020/12	US inflation target
γ	Monthly productivity growth	0.000	Symmetric model

B. Internally Calibrated Parameters			
Parameter	Description	Value	Target
K	Cost of vacancies	2.962	Job finding probability
B	Value of home production	0.097	Job separation probability
δ	Exogenous job separation rate	0.010	Skewness of $\Delta^{EUE}w$
σ	Volatility of worker productivity	0.061	Equation (32)
δ^r	Frequency of wage renegotiations	0.071	Frequency of $\Delta^r w \neq 0$

C. Targeted Moments			D. Untargeted Moments		
Moment	Data	Model	Moment	Data	Model
Job finding probability	0.355	0.394	Quits (%)	15.64	33.28
Job separation probability	0.032	0.036	Layoffs (%)	53.99	38.58
Skewness of $\Delta^{EUE}w$	0.123	0.124	Other (%)	30.37	28.15
$sVar[\Delta^{EUE}w] + \delta_r Var[\Delta^r w]$	0.004	0.004			
Wage renegotiation probability	0.069	0.069			

Notes: Panel A reports externally set parameters. Panel B reports internally calibrated parameters and their corresponding calibration targets. Panel C reports targeted moments in the data and in the calibrated model. Panel D reports untargeted steady-state moments for the decomposition of separations into quits, layoffs, and other separations. For the data, we use empirical estimates of layoffs, quits, and other separations into unemployment for the period from 1978 to 2019. All rates are monthly, and all moments are expressed in decimals except where percentages are explicitly indicated. Empirical rates have been converted to their corresponding monthly probabilities using $1 - \exp(-\text{rate})$. Source: Model simulations based on SIPP, CPS, and ADP.

off workers and their former employers about cuts in pay are exceedingly rare (their Table 5) and so there remains significant uncertainty about the degree to which the bargaining set was empty or not at the time of separation. In line with this, other recent evidence by Bertheau *et al.* (2025) finds that over 61 percent of employers “do not know” what size of pay cut would prevent layoffs, and that among those who do, around 46 percent

say a relatively modest pay reduction would prevent layoffs in Denmark. Given the uncertainty around their empirical prevalence, we will assess the importance of inefficient job separations by varying their incidence across model simulations below.

4.4 Business Cycle Fluctuations

Our first objective is to use the calibrated model with persistent shocks to aggregate productivity and inflation to study fluctuations in key labor market statistics over the US business cycle.

TABLE 4. AMPLIFICATION OF BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS

Standard deviation ($\times 100$)				
f_t	s_t	q_t	l_t	w_t
Data				
12.00	11.49	13.84	17.25	1.38
Models				
<i>Baseline quantitative model</i>				
6.61	7.90	8.30	16.43	0.50
<i>Alternative model 1: No productivity shocks</i>				
0.61	0.48	5.55	5.43	0.08
<i>Alternative model 2: No price-level shocks</i>				
7.01	6.20	4.00	15.24	0.60
<i>Alternative model 3: Flexible entry wages</i>				
4.71	7.86	8.50	16.11	0.61
<i>Alternative model 4: Flexible wages</i>				
3.65	–	–	–	0.68

Notes: The job finding rate (f_t), separation rate (s_t), quit rate (q_t), and layoff rate (l_t) are all from [Graves et al. \(2026\)](#). Real wages are from the Atlanta Wage Growth Tracker, deflated by the CPI. The data is from 1978–2019, except for real wages, which are available from 1997–2019. Model baseline refers to the model with inflation and productivity shocks and sticky entry wages. Each cell reports the mean based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations. All variables are reported in logs as deviation from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 10^5 ([Shimer, 2005a](#)). *Source:* Model simulations based on SIPP, CPS, and ADP.

Data. The first row in Table 4 shows the standard deviation of the job finding rate (f_t), separation rate (s_t), quit rate (q_t), layoff rate (l_t), and real wages (w_t) in the US labor

market microdata. The data cover the period 1978–2019, except for real wages which are available only from 1997. All statistics are computed for the variables in logarithms, HP-detrended with smoothing parameter 10^5 (Shimer, 2005a). In the data, both job finding and job separation rates are highly volatile relative to real wages. Fluctuations in the total separation rate mask underlying fluctuations in two of its components. Both quits and layoffs are more volatile than total separations, but layoffs are even more volatile than quits. Beyond their volatilities, it is also worth noting that quits and layoffs are negatively correlated in the data, in line with what our model predicts.

Baseline Quantitative Model. Our baseline quantitative model, once calibrated to US labor market microdata, generates significant volatility in the job finding and separation rates, as well as in quit and layoff rates, separately—around at least 60 percent of their empirical counterparts. This means that the calibrated model successfully puts job finding and job separations on equal footing, and also successfully features a dominant role of layoffs relative to that of quits. Our main finding is that aggregate shocks generate significant volatility in endogenous job separations, including 59 percent of the empirical quit volatility and 95 percent of the empirical layoff volatility. This is a notable finding because our model with wage rigidity gets around the puzzling finding of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that a very small match surplus is required in order to obtain realistic labor market fluctuations in response to shocks. At the same time, the model generates a lower volatility of real wages than in the data—around 36 percent of its empirical counterpart. Of course, there are many reasons why the rigidity of wages is too stark in our (calibrated) framework, including the nature of time- but not state-dependent wage renegotiations. In what follows, we consider four alternative models that shed light on the nature of amplification of business cycle fluctuations in our baseline quantitative model.

Alternative Model 1: No Productivity Shocks. To understand the role of nominal fluctuations in the labor market, we simulate data from an alternative model with only inflationary shocks and rigid entry wages. The third row in Table 4 provides the simulated business cycle statistics in this case. We find that the volatility of job creation and job destruction decreases substantially, by over 90 percent. At the same time, real wages become almost acyclical. The fact that inflationary shocks are associated with such a low volatility of job separations is striking. However, this is not because of a lack of propagation of inflationary shocks in our model. What happens is that, with inflationary shocks alone, quits are positively correlated with inflation and layoffs are negatively correlated with inflation. Following an inflationary shock, the increase in quits is offset by a decrease in

layoffs, as previously reflected in the asymmetry term of our sufficient statistic for the CIR. Since layoffs are more important than quits to begin with, the net effect of an inflationary shock on the job separation rate is negative, but its magnitude is small relative to the individual cyclicalities of quits and layoffs.

Alternative Model 2: No Price-Level Shocks. We quantify the role of productivity fluctuations by simulating data from our model with only productivity shocks and rigid entry wages. The results from this alternative model are in the fourth row of Table 4. The result shows a marked decrease in the volatility of quits by over 50 percent from baseline. However, layoffs are relatively more stable compared to baseline, resulting in a decrease in the volatility of job separations by around 7 percent. All other business cycle statistics are comparatively stable.

Alternative Model 3: Flexible Entry Wages. To understand the role of rigid entry wages in the labor market, we simulate a model with flexible entry wages. The fifth row in Table 4 summarizes simulations from this third alternative model. In this case, the volatility of the job finding rate decreases significantly, by around 28 percent from baseline. On the other hand, the volatility of job separations, quits, and layoffs remains similar to baseline.

Alternative Model 4: Fully Flexible Wages. To isolate our framework's novel role of wage rigidity for incumbent workers, we modify the previous alternative model by taking the frequency of wage renegotiations to infinity, $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, so that both entry wages and incumbent wages become fully flexible. The last row in Table 4 reports the simulated business cycle statistics from this model. Two results stand out. First, the volatility of the job finding rate falls sharply relative to baseline, indicating that little of the amplification on the hiring margin survives once wages are allowed to absorb aggregate shocks. Second, by construction, the volatilities of the total-separation, quit, and layoff rates tend to zero: with fully flexible wages, the split of joint match surplus is continuously adjusted so that no incumbent match is ever pushed below the threshold for endogenous separations, so that all observed separations are exogenous, and thus acyclical. This limiting case underscores that the endogenous separation margin—in particular, the dominant role of layoffs documented in our baseline—requires meaningful wage rigidity for incumbent workers, not just for new hires.

4.5 Persistence and Comovement with the Aggregate Price Level

Traditional studies of the aggregate labor market have focused on shocks to total factor productivity (Shimer, 2005a). Here, we focus on the more novel question of how key labor market outcomes comove with the aggregate price level. To this end, Table 5 shows the autocorrelation of key labor market statistics and their correlation with inflationary shocks.²⁰ Starting with the autocorrelation structure, the data show that the job finding rate (f_t), the job separation rate (s_t), the quit rate (q_t), the layoff rate (l_t), and real wages are positively autocorrelated in the data. The model broadly replicates these positive autocorrelations. In particular, the high autocorrelations in quits and layoffs reflect significant persistence generated by our model mechanism linking inaction to distinct types of endogenous separations. The magnitudes of the autocorrelations are nearly realistic, except for the much lower autocorrelation of separations predicted by our model, in which bursts of separations are followed by periods of offsetting quits and layoffs.

Turning to the structure of correlation with inflation, the data show a positive comovement with job finding, a negative comovement with job separations, quits and layoffs moving in opposite directions, and a mild correlation with real wages. Once more, the model successfully replicates the signs of all empirical correlations. In terms of magnitudes, the model gets close to the empirical job separation correlation, though the quit and layoff correlations as well as the real-wage correlation are individually stronger than in the data, possibly pointing toward real-world adjustment mechanisms that are outside of our model. Still, our quantitative model and the data agree on one of our main theoretical predictions, namely a positive comovement of quits and a negative comovement of layoffs with respect to inflationary shocks.

5 Conclusion

There is mounting empirical evidence that wage rigidity is linked to job separations (Davis and Krolkowski, 2025), and that worker quits and firm layoffs move in opposite directions in response to identified monetary shocks (Graves *et al.*, 2026). To understand the macroeconomic consequences of wage rigidity on different types of job separations, we developed a theory of labor markets with four features: productivity shocks, staggered wage renegotiations, search frictions, and two-sided lack of commitment to remaining in a match. A defining feature of our theory is the endogeneity of job separations, which

²⁰As noted by Shimer (2005a), modern US labor market data exhibit several notable puzzles with respect to how key labor market outcomes comove with aggregate productivity, which are left for future inquiry.

TABLE 5. PERSISTENCE AND COMOVEMENT WITH THE AGGREGATE PRICE LEVEL

Autocorrelation					Correlation with inflation				
f_t	s_t	q_t	l_t	w_t	f_t	s_t	q_t	l_t	w_t
Data									
0.93	0.85	0.69	0.88	0.93	0.30	-0.36	0.42	-0.41	-0.09
Model									
0.85	0.18	0.85	0.82	0.92	0.92	-0.46	0.91	-0.92	-0.78

Notes: The job finding rate (f_t), separation rate (s_t), quit rate (q_t), and layoff rate (l_t) are all from [Graves et al. \(2026\)](#). Real wages are from the Atlanta Wage Growth Tracker, deflated by the CPI. The data is from 1978–2019, except for real wages, which are available from 1997–2019. Model baseline refers to the model with inflation and productivity shocks and sticky entry wages. Each cell reports the mean based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations. All variables are reported in logs as deviation from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 10^5 ([Shimer, 2005a](#)). Source: Model simulations based on SIPP, CPS, and ADP.

come in the form of quits and layoffs as two separate outcomes. In general equilibrium, wage-rigidity-induced job separations also affect job creation and wage determination. We first analytically characterized the equilibrium of this model. We used this framework to derive sufficient statistics for the labor market response to aggregate shocks, reflecting the propagation of macroeconomic fluctuations through the key model mechanism of wage-rigidity-induced job separations. We developed a quantitative version of this framework to study the transmission and amplification of aggregate shocks on key labor market statistics. Our main finding was that aggregate shocks generate significant cyclicity in endogenous job separations, including 62 percent of the empirical quit volatility and 94 percent of the empirical layoff volatility.

While its parsimony allowed us to delineate several novel theoretical insights, our framework can be extended in other dimensions in order to provide empirically disciplined quantifications. Among such extensions are non-homotheticities in the home production technology and vacancy costs, and on-the-job search (see [Afrouzi et al., 2026](#)), state-dependent wage setting (see [Blanco et al., 2025](#)), and additional dimensions of heterogeneity. Incorporating these additional features into a unified framework with empirical discipline will allow future work to assess the role of allocative wages in the labor market for issues including monetary policy (e.g., state dependence and non-linearities), fiscal policy (e.g., UI), and labor market regulations (e.g., severance pay).

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The Macroeconomics of Wage Rigidity and Job Separations

Supplementary Materials—Not for Publication

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I Proofs for Section 2: A Model of Wage-Rigidity-Induced Job Separations

This section presents additional results extending the analysis in Section 2.

I.1 Derivation of Recursive Equilibrium from Discrete Time

This section presents the discrete-time counterpart of the model described in Section 2 in time intervals Δt ; i.e., $t = 0, \Delta t, 2\Delta t, \dots$. We use the equilibrium concept of a Markov perfect equilibrium. We follow [Stokey \(2009\)](#) to construct a discrete-time approximation of the worker's idiosyncratic productivity:

$$z'_\Delta = \begin{cases} z_\Delta + \sigma\sqrt{\Delta t} & \text{with probability } \frac{1+\frac{\gamma}{\sigma}\sqrt{\Delta t}}{2} \\ z_\Delta - \sigma\sqrt{\Delta t} & \text{with probability } \frac{1-\frac{\gamma}{\sigma}\sqrt{\Delta t}}{2} \end{cases}. \quad (\text{I.1})$$

Observe that the process is locally consistent with $dz_t = \gamma dt + \sigma dW_t^z$ (see [Kushner and Dupuis, 2001](#)).

Given the discrete-time nature of the problem, the timing within the period is as follows. At the beginning of the period t , workers' idiosyncratic productivity shocks are realized. Then, the labor market opens: exogenous and endogenous separations and new matches are realized. Finally, production takes place, and agents receive their payoffs. We define all the value functions after the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks and before the labor market opens.

Value functions. The value of an unemployed worker $u_{\Delta t}(z)$ is

$$u_{\Delta t}(z) = \max_w \left\{ e^{-f(\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w))\Delta t} \left[B e^z \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} [u_{\Delta t}(z') | z] \right] + \left[1 - e^{-f(\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w))\Delta t} \right] \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} [h_{\Delta t}(z'; w) | z] \right] \right\}. \quad (\text{I.2})$$

Here, $B e^z \Delta t$ is the flow income from unemployment, $1 - e^{-\Delta t f(\theta(z;w))}$ is the probability of finding a job with flow income $e^w \Delta t$ and continuation value $\mathbb{E}_{z'} [h_{\Delta t}(z'; w) | z]$, $e^{-\rho\Delta t}$ is the discount factor and z' is a random variable with law of motion (I.1). We use the notation $w_{\Delta t}^*(z)$ to denote the optimal search policy of an unemployed worker.

The vacancy cost for a period Δt is $K e^z \Delta t$ and the expected return is $[1 - e^{-q(\theta(z;w))\Delta t}] j_{\Delta t}(z; w)$.

The free entry condition is given by

$$\min\{Ke^z \Delta t - [1 - e^{-q(\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w))\Delta t}] j_{\Delta t}(z;w), \theta_{\Delta t}(z;w)\} = 0. \quad (\text{I.3})$$

Thus, if the cost of posting vacancies is larger than the expected value of finding a worker—i.e., $Ke^z \Delta t - [1 - e^{-q(\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w))\Delta t}] j_{\Delta t}(z;w) > 0$ —then $\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w) = 0$. Similarly, if the submarket $(z;w)$ is open, then the free entry condition holds with equality $Ke^z \Delta t = [1 - e^{-q(\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w))\Delta t}] j_{\Delta t}(z;w)$.

Let $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h(z;w) \in \{0,1\}$ be an indicator variable equal to one when the worker chooses to continue in the match and 0 if the worker chooses to quit. Similarly, based on the $(z;w)$ pair, a matched firm chooses to lay a worker off when $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z;w) = 0$ and to continue in the match when $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z;w) = 1$.

Given firm policy $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z;w)$, the value function of a worker with productivity z employed at wage w is

$$h_{\Delta t}^j(z;w) = \begin{cases} \max \left\{ e^{-\delta \Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[h_{\Delta t}^j(z';w) | z \right] \right] + (1 - e^{-\delta \Delta t}) u_{\Delta t}(z), u_{\Delta t}(z) \right\}, & \mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z;w) = 1 \\ u_{\Delta t}(z), & \mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z;w) = 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.4})$$

If the firm chooses not to lay the worker off, then the employed worker chooses between quitting her job or not while consuming the constant wage w . The notation makes it clear that the fixed point in (I.4) depends on the firm's policy function. We define $h_{\Delta t}(z;w) := h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}}(z;w)$, where $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}$ denotes the firm's *optimal* policy function.

Similarly, given a worker's policy $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h(z;w)$, the value of a firm matched with a worker with wage w and productivity z is

$$j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h}(z;w) = \begin{cases} \max \left\{ e^{-\delta \Delta t} \left[(e^z - e^w) \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h}(z';w) | z \right] \right], 0 \right\} & \text{if } \mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h(z;w) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } \mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h(z;w) = 0 \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.5})$$

We define $j_{\Delta t}(z;w) := j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h*}}(z;w)$, where $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h*}$ denotes the worker's *optimal* policy function.

We are ready to define a Markov Perfect equilibrium with the additional refinement that continuation in the match needs to be a *weakly* dominant strategy.

Definition I.2. A Markov Perfect equilibrium is a set $\{h_{\Delta t}(z;w), j_{\Delta t}(z;w), u_{\Delta t}(z), \theta_{\Delta t}(z;w)\}$ of value functions and market tightness together with policy functions $\{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h*}, \mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}, w_{\Delta t}^*(z)\}$ such that:

- (i) Given $h_{\Delta t}(z;w)$ and $\theta_{\Delta t}(z;w)$, $u_{\Delta t}(z)$ satisfies the value function (I.2) with optimal policy function $w_{\Delta t}^*(z)$.

(ii) Given $j_{\Delta t}(z; w)$, the market tightness $\theta_{\Delta t}(z; w)$ satisfies (I.3).

(iii) Given $u(z)$ and $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j^*}$, $h_{\Delta t}(z; w) = h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j^*}}(z; w)$ satisfies the value function (I.4) with optimal policy $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h^*}(z; w)$. Moreover, if for any function $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j$, the value function in (I.4) given by $h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j}(z; w)$ satisfies

$$e^{-\delta\Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j}(z'; w) | z \right] \right] + (1 - e^{-\delta\Delta t}) u_{\Delta t}(z) \geq u_{\Delta t}(z)$$

with strict inequality for some $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j$, then $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h^*}(z; w) = 1$.

(iv) Given $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h^*}$, $j_{\Delta t}(z; w) = j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h^*}}(z; w)$ satisfies the value function (I.5) with optimal policy $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j^*}(z; w)$. Moreover, if for any function $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h$, the value function in (I.5) given by $j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h}(z; w)$ satisfies

$$e^{-\delta\Delta t} \left[(e^z - e^w) \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[j_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h}(z'; w) | z \right] \right] \geq 0$$

with strict inequality for some $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^h$, then $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j^*}(z; w) = 1$.

A comparison with the main text's recursive equilibrium is helpful. First, in the main text, we use the *optimal* continuation set of each agent to define the equilibrium's best response. This is the reason why the value functions were not indexed by the continuation set of the other agent. Second, unmatched workers and firms internalize the outcome of the nontrivial Nash equilibrium through $h_{\Delta t}(z; w)$ and $j_{\Delta t}(z; w)$, respectively. Third, the Nash equilibrium part of the definition imposes that the worker's optimal quit strategy is the best response to the firm's layoff policy and vice versa. Fourth, the refinement based on weakly dominating continuation strategies is applied in two steps. In the first step, we solve the decision problem of an agent for a given continuation policy of the other agent. In the second step, we verify that continuing in the match weakly dominates leaving it for all continuation policies of the other agent—not necessarily the optimal one.

We now proceed to derive the equilibrium conditions when $\Delta t \downarrow 0$. Define the following limits

$$\begin{aligned} u(z) &= \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} u_{\Delta t}(z), \quad h(z; w) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} h_{\Delta t}(z; w), \\ j(z; w) &= \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} j_{\Delta t}(z; w), \quad \theta(z; w) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \theta_{\Delta t}(z; w). \end{aligned}$$

Below, we use the fact that for any function $u_{\Delta t}(z)$ the following two properties hold:

$$\lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{z'} [u_{\Delta t}(z') | z] - u(z)}{\Delta t} = \mathcal{A}^z u,$$

where \mathcal{A}^z is the characteristic operator of $dz_t = \gamma dt + \sigma d\mathcal{W}_t^z$, and

$$\lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E}_{z'}[u_{\Delta t}(z')|z] = u(z).$$

Similar properties apply to $h_{\Delta t}(z; w)$ and $j_{\Delta t}(z; w)$. For details regarding the convergence of the limit when $\Delta t \downarrow 0$, see Chapters 9 and 10 of [Kushner and Dupuis \(2001\)](#).

Unemployed worker's HJB equation. Using the fact that $e^{-\rho\Delta t} = 1 - \rho\Delta t + o(\Delta t^2)$ and $e^{-f(\theta(z; w))\Delta t} = 1 - f(\theta(z; w))\Delta t + o(\Delta t^2)$, from (I.2) we have that $0 = Be^z + \frac{\mathbb{E}_{z'}[u_{\Delta t}(z')|z] - u_{\Delta t}(z)}{\Delta t} - \rho\mathbb{E}_{z'}[u_{\Delta t}(z')|z] + \max_w f(\theta_{\Delta t}(z; w))\mathbb{E}_{z'}[(h_{\Delta t}(z'; w) - u_{\Delta t}(z'))|z] + o(\Delta t)$.

Using the fact that $\lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{z'}[u_{\Delta t}(z')|z] - u_{\Delta t}(z)}{\Delta t} = \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2}$, $\lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E}_{z'}[u_{\Delta t}(z')|z] = u(z)$, and $\lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \mathbb{E}_{z'}[h_{\Delta t}(z'; w)|z] = h(z; w)$, we have that $\rho u(z) = Be^z + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} + \max_w f(\theta(z; w))(h(z; w) - u(z))$.

Free entry condition. For free entry in (I.3), notice that $[1 - e^{-q(\theta_{\Delta t}(z; w))\Delta t}] = q(\theta_{\Delta t}(z; w))\Delta t + o(\Delta t^2)$. Thus, taking the limit, we obtain $\min\{Ke^z - q(\theta(z; w))j(z; w), \theta(z; w)\} = 0$.

Nontivial Nash Equilibrium. First, assume that $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}(z; w) = 0$. Then, $h_{\Delta t}^{j*}(z; w) = h_{\Delta t}(z; w) = u_{\Delta t}(z)$. Taking the limit, $\mathbb{I}^{j*}(z; w) = 0$, then $h(z; w) = u(z)$.

If $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}(z; w) = 1$ and $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h*}(z; w) = 1$, then

$$h_{\Delta t}(z; w) = e^{-\delta\Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'}[h_{\Delta t}(z'; w)|z] \right] + (1 - e^{-\delta\Delta t})u_{\Delta t}(z)$$

and $h_{\Delta t}(z; w) \geq u_{\Delta t}(z)$. Or equivalently,

$$0 = e^w + \frac{\mathbb{E}_{z'}[h_{\Delta t}(z'; w)|z] - h_{\Delta t}(z; w)}{\Delta t} - \rho\mathbb{E}_{z'}[h_{\Delta t}(z'; w)|z] + \delta[(u_{\Delta t}(z) - h_{\Delta t}(z; w))] + o(\Delta t)$$

and $h_{\Delta t}(z; w) \geq u_{\Delta t}(z)$. Taking the limit, if $\mathbb{I}^{j*}(z; w) = 1$ and $\mathbb{I}^{h*}(z; w) = 1$, then

$$\rho h(z; w) = e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta(u(z) - h(z; w)),$$

$$h(z; w) \geq u(z).$$

If $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{j*}(z; w) = 1$ and $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^{h*}(z; w) = 0$, then

$$h_{\Delta t}(z; w) \geq e^{-\delta\Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho\Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'}[h_{\Delta t}(z'; w)|z] \right] + (1 - e^{-\delta\Delta t})u_{\Delta t}(z)$$

and

$$h_{\Delta t}(z; w) = u_{\Delta t}(z).$$

In the limit, $\mathbb{I}^{j*}(z; w) = 1$ and $\mathbb{I}^{h*}(z; w) = 0$,

$$\begin{aligned}\rho h(z; w) &\geq e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta (u(z) - h(z; w)), \\ h(z; w) &= u(z).\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we can summarize the worker's optimality condition as

$$\rho h(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta (u(z) - h(z; w)), \rho u(z) \right\} \text{ if } \mathbb{I}^{j*}(z; w) = 1.$$

Applying the same argument to the firm's problem, we have that

$$\rho j(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^z - e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial j(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 j(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta (-j(z; w)), 0 \right\} \text{ if } \mathbb{I}^{h*}(z; w) = 1$$

Finally, we characterize agents' continuation sets. We show that the worker's continuation set is

$$\mathcal{Z}_{\Delta t}^h(w) = \{z : h_{\Delta t}(z; w) > u_{\Delta t}(z) \text{ or } e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} [u_{\Delta t}(z') - u_{\Delta t}(z) | z] > 0\}.$$

Clearly, the worker will continue in the match if $h_{\Delta t}(z; w) > u_{\Delta t}(z)$. We now derive the equilibrium condition for continuation to be a weakly dominating strategy at $(z; w)$. Let us start from the definition of a weakly dominating strategy: Continuing in the match weakly dominates separating when the state is $(z; w)$ if, for all firm's policies $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j$, we have that

$$e^{-\delta \Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j}(z'; w) | z \right] \right] + (1 - e^{-\delta \Delta t}) u_{\Delta t}(z) \geq u_{\Delta t}(z),$$

with strict inequality for at least one policy $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j$. Operating

$$e^{-\delta \Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j}(z'; w) - u(z) | z \right] \right] \geq 0.$$

Since this holds for all $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z; w)$ at $(z; w)$, it also holds for the infimum of the firm's policy function. Thus,

$$e^{-\delta \Delta t} \left[e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} \left[\inf_{\mathbb{I}^j} h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j}(z'; w) - u_{\Delta t}(z) | z \right] \right] \geq 0$$

Since worker's optimality imposes that $h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j}(z; w) \geq u_{\Delta t}(z)$, with equality when $\mathbb{I}^j(z; w) = 0$,

we have that $\inf_{\mathbb{I}^j} h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j}(z; w) = u_{\Delta t}(z)$ and

$$e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} [u_{\Delta t}(z') - u_{\Delta t}(z) | z] \geq 0.$$

Define the productivity set

$$\mathbb{WID}_{\Delta t}^h(w) = \left\{ z : e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{z'} [u_{\Delta t}(z') - u_{\Delta t}(z) | z] \geq 0 \right\}.$$

Observe that if $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z; w) = 1$ for a given w and all z , it is easy to check that $h_{\Delta t}^{\mathbb{I}^j=1}(z; w) > u_{\Delta t}(z) \forall z \in \mathbb{WID}_{\Delta t}^h(w)$. Thus, the set $\mathbb{WID}_{\Delta t}^h(w)$ characterizes the productivity levels for which continuation is a weakly dominating strategy for the worker. Taking the limit, we have that

$$\mathcal{Z}^h(w) = \left\{ z : h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} \geq 0 \right\}.$$

Applying the same argument to the firm's problem, we have that

$$\mathcal{Z}^h(w) = \left\{ z : j(z; w) > 0 \text{ or } e^z - e^w \geq 0 \right\}.$$

I.2 Sequential and Recursive Formulation of the Model

Here, we present the sequential formulation of the problem and show the equivalence to our recursive formulation.

Environment. The environment—i.e., preferences, technology, shocks, and frictions—is the same as in Section 2. To focus on the novel component of the paper and to simplify the notation, we assume that a recursive representation holds across employment and unemployment spells.

An unemployed worker's choice of submarket $(z; w)$ is associated with a job-finding rate $f(\theta(z; w))$, which induces a stochastic job offer arrival time τ^u . The value of an unemployed worker with productivity z is

$$U(z) = \max_{\{w_t\}_{t=0}^{\tau^u}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\tau^u} e^{-\rho t} B e^{z_t} dt + e^{-\rho \tau^u} H(z_{\tau^u}; w_{\tau^u}; \vec{\tau}^m(w_{\tau^u}, z_{\tau^u})) \right]. \quad (\text{I.6})$$

That is, an unemployed worker searches for a job in submarket $(z_t; w_t)$ at time $t \leq \tau^u$ until becoming employed at wage w_{τ^u} and receiving the value of employment $H(z_{\tau^u}; w_{\tau^u}; \vec{\tau}^m(w_{\tau^u}, z_{\tau^u}))$ at time τ^u .

Given the (fixed) wage w and current productivity z , a matched worker chooses when to quit, which induces a stopping time τ^h . Based on the same (w, z) pair, a matched firm chooses when to lay off the worker, which induces a stopping time τ^j . Given the choices by workers and firms in addition to the exogenous stopping time τ^δ , the actual match duration is the minimum stopping time in the vector $\vec{\tau}^m = (\tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta)$, denoted $\tau^m = \min\{\tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta\}$. Given a vector of stopping times $\vec{\tau}^m$, the value of a worker employed at wage w with productivity z is

$$H(z; w, \vec{\tau}^m) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\rho t} e^{zw} dt + e^{-\rho \tau^m} U(z_{\tau^m}) \right]. \quad (\text{I.7})$$

That is, an employed worker consumes a constant wage w until time τ^m when she either endogenously or exogenously transitions to unemployment. Similarly, given a vector of stopping times $\vec{\tau}^m$, the value of a firm matched with a worker with wage w and productivity z is

$$J(z; w, \vec{\tau}^m) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\rho t} [e^{z_t} - e^{zw}] dt \right]. \quad (\text{I.8})$$

That is, the match produces e^{z_t} , of which e^{zw} is paid to the worker until it gets dissolved at time τ^m .

Free Entry. In choosing the number of vacancies to post in each submarket, firms trade off the expected benefit—i.e., the product of the filling rate $q(\theta(z; w))$ and the value of a filled job $J(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m(z; w))$ —with the flow cost Ke^z of posting a vacancy. In each submarket, firms post vacancies up to the point at which the marginal vacancy posting cost exceeds its expected benefits. Thus, free entry requires that, for all $(z; w)$:

$$\min \{Ke^z - q(\theta(z; w))J(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m(z; w)), \theta(z; w)\} = 0. \quad (\text{I.9})$$

Equilibrium Definition. We are now ready to define an equilibrium. Let \mathcal{T} be the set of all stopping times for a given match. Given the state $(z; w)$, staying in the match is a *weakly dominant strategy* for the worker if there exists a stopping time $\tau^{h*}(z; w) \in \mathcal{T}$ such that $\Pr(\tau^{h*}(z; w) > 0) = 1$ and

$$H(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^j, \tau^\delta) \geq H(z; w, \tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta), \quad \forall \tau^h, \tau^j \in \mathcal{T},$$

with strict inequality for some τ^j . Similarly, given $(z; w)$, staying in the match is a weakly dominant strategy for the firm if there exists a stopping time $\tau^{j*}(z; w) \in \mathcal{T}$ such that $\Pr(\tau^{j*}(z; w) > 0) = 1$ and

$$J(z; w, \tau^h, \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta) \geq J(z; w, \tau^h, \tau^j, \tau^\delta), \quad \forall \tau^h, \tau^j \in \mathcal{T},$$

with strict inequality for some τ^h .

Definition I.3. An equilibrium consists of a set of value functions $\{H(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m), J(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m), U(z)\}$, a market tightness function $\theta(z; w)$, and policy functions $\{\tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w), w^*(z_t)\}$, such that:

1. Given $H(z; w, \bar{\tau}^{m*}(z; w))$, $U(z)$, and $\theta(z; w)$, the search strategy $\{w^*(z_t)\}_{t=0}^{\tau^{u*}}$ solves equation (I.6).
2. Given $J(z; w, \bar{\tau}^{m*}(z; w))$, market tightness $\theta(z; w)$ solves the free-entry condition (I.9).
3. Given $U(z)$, $(\tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w))$ is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium with stopping times (τ^h, τ^j) that satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} H(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta) &\geq H(z; w, \tau^h, \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta), \quad \forall (z; w) \\ J(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta) &\geq J(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^j, \tau^\delta), \quad \forall (z; w) \end{aligned}$$

and $\Pr(\tau^{h*}(z; w) > 0) = 1$ (resp. $\Pr(\tau^{j*}(z; w) > 0) = 1$) whenever staying in the match is a weakly dominant strategy for the worker (resp. the firm) given the state $(z; w)$.

Recursive Equilibrium Conditions. Define the recursive equilibrium conditions:

$$\rho u(z) = Be^z + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} + \max_w f(\theta(z; w)) [h(z; w) - u(z)], \quad \forall z \in \mathbb{R} \quad (\text{I.10})$$

$$0 = \min \{ Ke^z - q(\theta(z; w))j(z; w), \theta(z; w) \}, \quad \forall (z; w) \in \mathbb{R}^2$$

$$z \in (\mathcal{Z}^j(w))^c \Rightarrow h(z; w) = u(z), \quad (\text{I.11})$$

$$z \in (\mathcal{Z}^h(w))^c \Rightarrow j(z; w) = 0, \quad (\text{I.12})$$

$$0 = \max \{ u(z) - h(z; w), \mathcal{A}^h h(z; w) + e^w \}, \quad \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}^j(w), h(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^j(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}), \quad (\text{I.13})$$

$$0 = \max \{ -j(z; w), \mathcal{A}^j j(z; w) + e^z - e^w \}, \quad \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}^h(w), j(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^h(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}), \quad (\text{I.14})$$

$$\mathcal{Z}^h(w) := \text{int} \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R} : h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } \mathcal{A}^h u(z) + e^w > 0 \right\}, \quad (\text{I.15})$$

$$\mathcal{Z}^j(w) := \text{int} \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R} : j(z; w) > 0 \text{ or } e^z - e^w > 0 \right\}, \quad (\text{I.16})$$

where we define the characteristic operator for any function $v(z)$ for the firm and the worker as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{A}^h(v(z)) &:= -\rho v + \delta(u(z) - v(z)) + \gamma \frac{\partial v(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 v(z)}{\partial z^2} \\ \mathcal{A}^j(v(z)) &:= -\rho v + \delta(0 - v(z)) + \gamma \frac{\partial v(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 v(z)}{\partial z^2}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemma I.1. *The policy functions $\{\tau^{h*}, \tau^{j*}, w^*(z)\}$ and the value functions $\{U(z), H(z; w), J(z; w, \vec{\tau}^m)\}$ given by (I.6), (I.7) and (I.8) and the market tightness function $\theta(z; w)$ form a BRE iff. $\{u(z), h(z; w), j(z; w)\}$ satisfy equations (I.10)–(I.16) and*

$$\begin{aligned} u(z) &= U(z), \\ h(z; w) &= H(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta), \\ j(z; w) &= J(z; w, \tau^{h*}(z; w), \tau^{j*}(z; w), \tau^\delta). \end{aligned}$$

To simplify the exposition, we divide the proof into a sequence of steps.

Proposition I.1. *Let $x := (z; w)$. If there exist two functions $h(z; w)$ and $j(z; w)$ satisfying (I.11), (I.12), (I.13) and (I.14) given the continuation sets (I.15) and (I.16), then*

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^{h*}(x) &= \inf \left\{ t \geq 0 : z_t \notin \mathcal{Z}^h(w) \right\}, \\ \tau^{j*}(x) &= \inf \left\{ t \geq 0 : z_t \notin \mathcal{Z}^j(w) \right\} \end{aligned}$$

form a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and

$$h(z; w) = H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta), \quad j(z; w) = J(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta).$$

Moreover, if $(\tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x))$ is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium, then $h(z; w)$ and $j(z; w)$ satisfy (I.11) to (I.14).

Proof. Variational inequalities as sufficient conditions for Nash Equilibrium. First, we prove that if $h(z; w)$ and $j(z; w)$ satisfy (I.11) to (I.14), then $h(z; w) = H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta) \geq H(x, \tau^h(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta)$ for any $\tau^h \in \mathcal{T}$. The proof of the statement that $j(z; w) = J(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta) \geq J(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^j(x), \tau^\delta)$, for any $\tau^j \in \mathcal{T}$, follows the same arguments.

Step 1: Here, we show that $h(z; w) \geq H(x, \tau^h(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta)$. Let τ^h be any stopping time (not necessarily the optimal). Without loss of generality, we restrict the attention to $\tau^h \leq \tau_{(-\infty, a)}$, where $\tau_{(-\infty, a)} = \inf\{t > 0 : z_t \notin (-\infty, a)\}$. Intuitively, it is never optimal for the worker to stay in the job at wage w when productivity is sufficiently large. Let $U_k \subset \mathbb{R}$ be an increasing sequence of bounded sets s.t. $\cup_{k=1}^\infty U_k = \mathbb{R}$. Let $\tau_k = \inf\{t > 0 : z_t \notin U_k\}$. Since each U_k is bounded, we do not need to assume compact support of the function to apply Proposition I.3. Applying Dynkin's Lemma to the stopping time $\tau_k^h = \tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta \wedge \tau_k$,

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{-\rho\tau_k^h} h(z_{\tau_k^h}) | z_0 = z] = h(z; w) + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_k^h} \mathcal{A}^h h(z_t; w) dt | z_0 = z \right].$$

Using condition (I.13), we have that $h(z; w) \geq u(z)$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}^j(w)$. Moreover, $h(z; w) = u(z)$ for all $z \in (\mathcal{Z}^j(w))^c$. Therefore, $h(z; w) \geq u(z)$ for all $z \in \mathbb{R}$. Thus, we have that $\mathbb{E}[e^{-\rho\tau_k^h} h(z_{\tau_k^h}; w) | z_0 = z] \geq \mathbb{E}[e^{-\rho\tau_k^h} u(z_{\tau_k^h}) | z_0 = z]$. Thus,

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{-\rho\tau_k^h} u(z_{\tau_k^h}) | z_0 = z] - \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_k^h} \mathcal{A}^h h(z_t; w) dt | z_0 = z \right] \leq h(z; w).$$

From condition (I.13), we have $\mathcal{A}^h h(z; w) + e^w \leq 0$ for all z . Thus,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_k^h} e^{-\rho t} e^w dt | z_0 = z \right] \leq -\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_k^h} \mathcal{A}^h h(z_t; w) dt | z_0 = z \right].$$

Using this result

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\rho\tau_k^h} u(z_{\tau_k^h}) + \int_0^{\tau_k^h} e^{-\rho t} e^w dt | z_0 = z \right] \leq h(z; w)$$

Now, we take the limit $k \rightarrow \infty$. It is easy to see that $\int_0^{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta \wedge \tau_k} e^{-\rho t + w} dt \leq \frac{1}{\rho} e^w$ a.e., so using the dominated convergence theorem $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta \wedge \tau_k} e^{-\rho t + w} dt | z_0 = z \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\rho t + w} dt | z_0 = z \right]$.

As we show below, $u(z) \propto e^z$ and since $e^{zt} \leq e^a$ for all $t \leq \tau^h \leq \tau_{(-\infty, a)}$, we have that $0 \leq e^{-\rho t} u(z_t) \leq e^a$. Applying the monotone convergence theorem, we have that

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\rho(\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta \wedge \tau_k)} u(z_{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta \wedge \tau_k}) | z_0 = z \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\rho(\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta)} u(z_{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta}) | z_0 = z \right].$$

Therefore, taking the limit $k \rightarrow \infty$, we finally obtain

$$h(z; w) \geq H(x, \tau^h(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta).$$

Step 2: Now, we show that $h(z; w) = H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta)$. Applying Proposition I.3 to the stopping time $\tau_k^{h^*} = \tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau_k \wedge \tau^\delta$ we obtain

$$\mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau_k^{h^*}} h(z_{\tau_k^{h^*}}; w) | z_0 = z] = h(z; w) + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_k^{h^*}} \mathcal{A}^h h(z_t; w) dt | z_0 = z \right].$$

For all $t < \tau_k^{h^*}$, we have that $u(z_t) < h(z_t; w)$. Therefore, by (I.13), $\mathcal{A}^h h(z; w) + e^w = 0$ for all z . Thus,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\rho\tau_k^{h^*}} h(z_{\tau_k^{h^*}}; w) + \int_0^{\tau_k^{h^*}} e^{-\rho t} e^w dt | z_0 = z \right] = h(z; w).$$

Taking the limit $k \rightarrow \infty$ and following similar arguments as above, we obtain

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{-\rho(\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta)} h(z_{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta}; w) + \int_0^{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\rho t} e^w dt | z_0 = z \right] = h(z; w).$$

which, given Proposition I.4, is equivalent to

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{-(\rho+\delta)(\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*})} h(z_{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*}}; w) + \int_0^{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*}} e^{-(\rho+\delta)t} (\delta u(z_t) + e^w) dt | z_0 = z \right] = h(z; w).$$

Since $z_{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*}} \in \partial(\mathcal{Z}^h(w) \cap \mathcal{Z}^j(w))$ and $h(\cdot; w)$ is continuous, we have that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{-(\rho+\delta)(\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*})} u(z_{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*}}) + \int_0^{\tau^{h^*} \wedge \tau^{j^*}} e^{-(\rho+\delta)t} (\delta u(z_t) + e^w) dt | z_0 = z \right] = h(z; w).$$

and $h(z; w) = H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta)$.

Variational inequalities as sufficient conditions for Nontrivial Nash Equilibrium.

This part of the proof is constructive. Define $\text{WID}^h(w) = \{z \in \mathbb{R} : 0 < e^w + \mathcal{A}^h u(z)\}$ and $\tau^*(z; w) = \inf\{t \geq 0 : z_t \notin \text{WID}^h(w), z_0 = z\}$. Now, we check that this set is where continuation is a weakly dominating strategy. Applying Dynkin's Lemma (and using similar arguments as before), for any stopping time τ we obtain

$$\mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau} u(z_\tau) | z_0 = z] = u(z) + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau(z; w)} \mathcal{A}^h u(z_t) dt | z_0 = z \right].$$

Using $\tau(z; w) = \min\{\tau^*(z; w), \tau^j(z; w), \tau^\delta(z; w)\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} u(z) &= \mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau(z; w)} u(z_{\tau(z; w)}) | z_0 = z] - \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau(z; w)} \mathcal{A}^h u(z_t) dt | z_0 = z \right] \\ &\leq \mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau(z; w)} u(z_{\tau(z; w)}) | z_0 = z] + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau(z; w)} e^{-\rho t + w} dt | z_0 = z \right]. \end{aligned}$$

with strict inequality, if $\Pr(\tau(z; w) > 0) = 1$. Thus, staying in the match weakly dominates dissolving the match.

Variational inequalities as necessary conditions. Now, we prove that if $\tau^{h^*}(x)$ and $\tau^{j^*}(x)$ is a nontrivial Nash equilibrium, then $h(z; w)$, $j(z; w)$ satisfy (I.11) to (I.16). Notice that under the assumption that τ^j and τ^h are characterized by continuation sets, we can focus on these sets to prove conditions (I.11) to (I.16). By definition, we have that

$$h(z; w) = \max_{\tau^h} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\rho t + w} dt + e^{-\rho(\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta)} u(z_{\tau^h \wedge \tau^{j^*} \wedge \tau^\delta}) | z_0 = z \right]. \quad (\text{I.17})$$

- Condition (I.11): If $z \in (\mathcal{Z}^j(w))^c$, then $\tau^{j^*}(x) = 0$ and $\Pr[\min\{\tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta(x)\} \leq \tau^{j^*}(x)] = 1$, and $h(z; w) = u(z)$. A similar argument holds for the firm.
- Condition (I.13): Observe that this condition is the best response of the worker, given that the firm continues. See Øksendal (2007) and Brekke and Øksendal (1990) for a discussion of the necessity of the smooth pasting condition.

- Condition (I.15): For this part, we will assume that u is \mathbb{C}^2 and the set of productivities for which $e^w + \mathcal{A}^h u(z) = 0$ has measure zero (we show this property in Lemma 1). To show this, we need to characterize the continuation set in the Nash equilibrium that survives the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. First, from the problem (I.17), if $\Pr(\tau^{j^*}(x) > 0) = 1$, then $\Pr(\tau^{h^*}(x) > 0) = 1$ iff.

$$z \in \text{int} \{z \in \mathbb{R} : h(z; w) > u(z)\}.$$

Next, by way of contradiction, assume that staying in the match weakly dominates leaving in the state $(z; w)$ and

$$0 > e^w + \mathcal{A}^h u(z). \quad (\text{I.18})$$

Notice that here we are ignoring the case $e^w + \mathcal{A}^h u(z) = 0$ since it has measure 0. If $u(z) \in \mathbb{C}^2$, define an open set \mathcal{U} , containing the chosen $(z; w)$, where $e^w + \mathcal{A}^h u(z) > 0$ and take any stopping time $\tau_{\mathcal{U}}$. Then, applying Dynkin's Lemma, we obtain

$$\mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} u(z_{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}}) | z_0 = z] = u(z) + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} \mathcal{A}^h u(z_t) dt | z_0 = z \right].$$

Using the inequality in (I.18),

$$\begin{aligned} u(z) &= \mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} u(z_{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}}) | z_0 = z] - \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} \mathcal{A}^h u(z_t) dt | z_0 = z \right] \\ &< \mathbb{E} [e^{-\rho\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} u(z_{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}}) | z_0 = z] + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{\mathcal{U}}} e^{-\rho t + w} dt | z_0 = z \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, staying in the match is dominated for $\tau_{\mathcal{U}}$, arriving at a contradiction. □

Proposition I.2. *Define*

$$w^*(z) = \arg \max_w f(\theta(z; w))(h(z; w) - u(z)).$$

and $\tau^{u^*} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \Delta N_t^{f(\theta(z_t; w^*(z_t)))} = 1\}$ where $N_t^{f(\theta(z_t; w^*(z_t)))}$ is a Poisson counter with arrival rate $f(\theta(z_t; w^*(z_t)))$. The function $u(z)$ satisfies $u(z) \in \mathbb{C}^2(\mathbb{R})$ and (I.10) iff.

$$u(z) = \max_{\{w_t\}_{t=0}^{\tau^u}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^u} e^{-\rho t} B e^{z_t} dt + e^{-\rho\tau^u} h(z_{\tau^u}; w) \right].$$

Proof. The proof is the standard optimality conditions in the HJB (see Øksendal, 2007). \square

Lemma I.1. Assume $u(z)$, $h(z; w)$, $j(z; w)$, $\theta(z; w)$ satisfy (I.10)–(I.14) given the continuation sets (I.15) and (I.16). Then $\{\tau^{h^*}, \tau^{j^*}, \{w_t^*\}_{t=0}^{\tau^u}\}$ with $\tau^{h^*}(x) = \inf \{t \geq 0 : z_t \notin \mathcal{Z}^h(w)\}$, $\tau^{j^*}(x) = \inf \{t \geq 0 : z_t \notin \mathcal{Z}^j(w)\}$, and $w^*(z) = \arg \max_w f(\theta(z; w))(h(z; w) - u(z))$ is a BRE with

$$\begin{aligned} h(z; w) &= H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta), \\ j(z; w) &= J(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta), \\ u(z) &= U(z). \end{aligned}$$

If $\{H(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m), J(z; w, \bar{\tau}^m), U(z)\}$, market tightness $\theta(z; w)$, and policy functions $\{\tau^{h^*}(z; w), \tau^{j^*}(z; w), w^*(z_t)\}$ is a BRE with

$$\begin{aligned} h(z; w) &= H(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta), \\ j(z; w) &= J(x, \tau^{h^*}(x), \tau^{j^*}(x), \tau^\delta), \\ u(z) &= U(z), \end{aligned}$$

then $u(z)$, $h(z; w)$, $j(z; w)$, $\theta(z; w)$ satisfy (I.10)–(I.14) given the continuation sets (I.15) and (I.16).

Proof. The proof is a combination of Propositions I.1 and I.2. \square

I.3 Proof of Lemma 1

The equilibrium conditions are:

$$\rho u(z) = Be^z + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} + \max_w f(\theta(z; w)) [h(z; w) - u(z)], \quad (\text{I.19})$$

$$0 = \min \{ Ke^z - q(\theta(z; w))j(z; w), \theta(z; w) \}, \quad (\text{I.20})$$

$$\rho h(z; w) = \begin{cases} \max \left\{ e^{zw} + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta [u(z) - h(z; w)] \right\}, & \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w), \\ \rho u(z) & \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w))^c, \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.21})$$

$$\rho j(z; w) = \begin{cases} \max \left\{ e^z - e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial j(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 j(z; w)}{\partial z^2} - \delta j(z; w) \right\}, & \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w), \\ 0 & \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w))^c, \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.22})$$

$$\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w) = \text{int} \{ z \in \mathbb{R} : j(z; w) > 0 \text{ or } e^z - e^w > 0 \}, \quad (\text{I.23})$$

$$\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w) = \text{int} \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R} : h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } 0 < e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} \right\}, \quad (\text{I.24})$$

$$j(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}), \quad h(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}). \quad (\text{I.25})$$

The equilibrium conditions in the normalized state space \hat{w} are:

$$\hat{\rho} \hat{U} = B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})) \hat{W}(\hat{w}), \quad (\text{I.26})$$

$$0 = \min \{ K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})) \hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) \}, \quad (\text{I.27})$$

$$\hat{\rho} \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \begin{cases} \max \{ 0, e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \hat{\gamma} \frac{\partial \hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 \hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}^2} - \delta \hat{W}(\hat{w}) \} & \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*} \\ 0 & \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*})^c \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.28})$$

$$\hat{\rho} \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \begin{cases} \max \{ 0, 1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma} \frac{\partial \hat{J}(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 \hat{J}(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}^2} - \delta \hat{J}(\hat{w}) \} & \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*} \\ 0 & \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*})^c \end{cases} \quad (\text{I.29})$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*} := \text{int} \left\{ \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}) > 0 \right\}, \quad (\text{I.30})$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*} := \text{int} \left\{ \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) > 0 \right\}, \quad (\text{I.31})$$

$$\hat{J} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{h^*}) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}), \quad \hat{W} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^{j^*}) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}), \quad (\text{I.32})$$

where $\hat{w} = w - z$, $\hat{\rho} = \rho - \gamma - \sigma^2/2$ and $\hat{\gamma} = \gamma + \sigma^2$.

Lemma 1. Assume that values $(u(z), h(z; w), j(z; w), \theta(z; w))$ and policies $(w^*(z), \mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w), \mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w))$

are a recursive equilibrium, i.e., they satisfy conditions (I.19)–(I.25), then

$$(\hat{U}, \hat{f}(w-z), \hat{W}(w-z), \hat{\theta}(w-z), \hat{w}^*) = \left(\frac{u(z)}{e^z}, \frac{j(z;w)}{e^z}, \frac{h(z;w) - u(z)}{e^z}, \theta(z;w), w^*(z) - z \right).$$

satisfy (I.26)–(I.32) with continuation sets \hat{Z}^{h^*} and \hat{Z}^{j^*} given by (I.30)–(I.31). Moreover, if $(\hat{U}, \hat{f}(\hat{w}), \hat{W}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))$ and policies $(\hat{w}^*, \hat{Z}^{j^*}, \hat{Z}^{h^*})$ satisfy (I.26)–(I.32), then

$$(u(z), j(z;w), h(z;w), \theta(z;w), w^*(z)) = (\hat{U}e^z, \hat{f}(w-z)e^z, (\hat{W}(w-z) + \hat{U})e^z, \hat{\theta}(w-z), \hat{w}^* + z)$$

satisfy (I.19)–(I.25) with continuation sets $Z^{h^*}(w)$ and $Z^{j^*}(w)$ given by (I.23)–(I.24).

Proof. We use a guess-and-verify strategy for each equilibrium condition.

Condition (I.19) holds iff. (I.26) is satisfied: If $\hat{U} = \frac{u(z)}{e^z}$, then $\hat{U}e^z = u'(z)$, $\hat{U}e^z = u''(z)$. Together with $\theta(z;w) = \hat{\theta}(w-z)$ and $\hat{W}(w-z) = \frac{h(z;w) - u(z)}{e^z}$, then

$$\begin{aligned} \rho u(z) &= Be^z + \gamma u'(z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} u''(z) + \max_w f(\theta(z;w)) [h(z;w) - u(z)] \\ \iff \rho \hat{U} &= B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})) \hat{W}(\hat{w}). \end{aligned}$$

Condition (I.20) holds iff. (I.27) is satisfied: Using $\hat{f}(w-z) = \frac{j(z;w)}{e^z}$ and $\theta(z;w) = \hat{\theta}(w-z)$, we have

$$0 = \min \{ Ke^z - q(\theta(z;w))j(z;w), \theta(z;w) \} \iff 0 = \min \{ K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{f}(\hat{w}), \frac{\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})}{e^z} \}.$$

Now, we show that $0 = \min \left\{ K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{f}(\hat{w}), \frac{\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})}{e^z} \right\}$ iff. $0 = \min \{ K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{f}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) \}$.

Assume that $K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{f}(\hat{w}) = 0$. Then $\frac{\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})}{e^z} \geq 0$ which implies that $\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$. Now, assume that $\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) = 0$, then $\frac{\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})}{e^z} = 0$.

Condition (I.21) holds iff. (I.28) is satisfied: Assume $h(z;w)$ satisfies (I.21) and $z \in Z^j(w)$. Then,

$$0 = \max \{ u(z) - h(z;w), -\rho h(z;w) + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z;w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z;w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta(u(z) - h(z;w)) + e^w \}.$$

Using that $\hat{U} = \frac{u(z)}{e^z}$ and $\hat{W}(w-z) = \frac{h(z;w) - u(z)}{e^z}$, we have $h(z;w) = \hat{W}(w-z)e^z + \hat{U}e^z$, $\frac{\partial h(z;w)}{\partial z} = \hat{W}(w-z)e^z - \hat{W}'(w-z)e^z + \hat{U}e^z$, and $\frac{\partial^2 h(z;w)}{\partial z^2} = \hat{W}(w-z)e^z - 2\hat{W}'(w-z)e^z +$

$\hat{W}''(w-z)e^z + \hat{U}e^z$. Thus, since $e^z > 0$, we have

$$0 = \max \left\{ -\hat{W}(\hat{w}), -(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + e^{\hat{w}} \right\},$$

or

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \max \left\{ 0, e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) - \delta\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \right\}.$$

Now, assume that $z \in (\mathcal{Z}^j(w))^c$.

$$u(z) - h(z; w) = 0 \iff \frac{u(z) - h(z; w)}{e^z} = 0 \iff \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0.$$

Equivalence between (I.22) and (I.29) can be established following similar steps. Note that for j , dividing by e^z yields $-\rho\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ (rather than $-\hat{J}(\hat{w})$) as the second argument of the max; the equivalence still holds since $\rho > 0$ implies $-\rho\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0 \iff \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0$.

Condition (I.24) holds iff. (I.30) is satisfied: Assume $z \in \mathcal{Z}^h(w)$. Then,

$$h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } -\rho u(z) + \gamma u'(z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}u''(z) + e^w > 0$$

Using that $\hat{U} = \frac{u(z)}{e^z}$ and $\hat{W}(w-z) = \frac{h(z; w) - u(z)}{e^z}$, with $e^z > 0$

$$\hat{W}(w-z) > 0 \text{ or } -\rho\hat{U}e^z + \gamma\hat{U}e^z + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{U}e^z + e^w > 0 \iff$$

$$\hat{W}(w-z) > 0 \text{ or } e^{w-z} - (\rho - \gamma - \sigma^2/2)\hat{U} > 0 \iff \hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} > 0.$$

Thus, $z \in \mathcal{Z}^h(w)$ iff. $w-z \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$. Equivalence between (I.24) and (I.31) follows from similar steps.

Remaining conditions: Equivalence between (I.25) and (I.32) is trivial. □

I.4 Proof of Proposition 1

Our mathematical arguments will make extensive use of the following useful and known results.

Proposition I.3. *Let \mathcal{A} be the characteristic operator of $\{X_t\}$ with $X_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Let $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a twice differentiable function with compact (i.e., bounded and closed in \mathbb{R}) support, $\text{support}(f) = \{x : f(x) \neq 0\}$. If τ is a stopping time with $\mathbb{E}_x[\tau] < \infty$, then*

$$\mathbb{E}_x[f(x_\tau)] = f(x) + \mathbb{E}_x \left[\int_0^\tau \mathcal{A}f(X_t) dt \right]. \quad (\text{I.33})$$

Moreover, if τ is the first exit time of a bounded set, then (I.33) holds for any twice differentiable function.

Proof. This is Dynkin's formula, the proof of which can be found in Øksendal (2007). \square

Proposition I.4. *Let x_t be a strong Markov process, τ be a stopping time measurable with the filtration generated by x_t , and τ^δ an exponential random variable independent of τ . Then*

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\rho t} f(x_t) dt + e^{-\rho(\tau \wedge \tau^\delta)} g(x_{\tau \wedge \tau^\delta}) \middle| x_0 = x \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\tau e^{-(\rho+\delta)t} [f(x_t) + \delta g(x_t)] dt + e^{-(\rho+\delta)\tau} g(x_\tau) \middle| x_0 = x \right].$$

Proposition I.5. *Let V be a Hilbert space and H a closed convex set. Assume that $a(u, v)$ with $u, v \in V$ is a coercive bilinear continuous form. Then, there exists a unique solution to $a(u, v - u) \geq (f, v - u), \forall v \in H, u \in H$, where f belongs to the dual of V .*

Proof. See Lions and Stampacchia (1967). \square

Proposition I.6 (Birkhoff-Tartar Fixed-Point Theorem). *Let $(V, (\cdot, \cdot))$ be a Hilbert space and $V_+ \subset V$ a closed convex cone satisfying $V_+ = \{x \in V \text{ such that } (x, y) \geq 0 \forall y \in V_+\}$. We say that $x \geq y$ according to the vector ordering \geq if and only if $x - y \in V_+$ with $x, y \in V$. Let $T : V \rightarrow V$ be an increasing map from V into itself. Suppose that there exists a $\underline{x}, \bar{x} \in V$ with $\underline{x} \leq \bar{x}$, $\underline{x} \leq T(\underline{x})$, $T(\bar{x}) \leq \bar{x}$. Then, the subset of fixed points x^* of T satisfying $\underline{x} \leq x^* \leq \bar{x}$ is nonempty and has a largest and smallest element.*

Proof. See the proof of Proposition 2 of Chapter 15 on page 539 of Aubin (2007). \square

We will use Propositions I.5 and I.6 in the proof of Proposition 1. Proposition I.5 is used to show the existence of the best response function and its associated value function for each agent. Notice that we are solving the differential equations associated with the HJB equations using a quasi-variational approach—i.e., we are after the weak solution of the differential equation. Proposition I.6 is our main tool to show the existence of the nontrivial

Nash equilibrium. Notice that while we impose monotonicity from the order generated with the positive cone, we do not impose that the set V is a complete lattice. Thus, we are not invoking an order-theoretical approach to showing the existence of a fixed point. The reason is that the completeness property (i.e., all subsets of V have both a supremum and an infimum) is hard to satisfy in the space of functions. The best examples of V and V_+ are $L^2(\mathbb{R})$ —integrable functions using the Lebesgue measure—and the nonnegative function subset of this Hilbert space.

Proposition 1. *Let $\hat{W}(\hat{w}), \hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w})$ be the solution of the functional equations:*

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}),$$

$$0 = \min \{K - q(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{\theta}(\hat{w})\},$$

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \tag{I.34}$$

$$\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \tag{I.35}$$

$$\text{if } \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c \Rightarrow \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0, \tag{I.36}$$

$$\text{if } \hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j)^c \Rightarrow \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0, \tag{I.37}$$

$$0 = \max\{-\hat{W}(\hat{w}), \hat{A}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) + e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\}, \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j, \hat{W} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}) \tag{I.38}$$

$$0 = \max\{-\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{A}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + 1 - e^{\hat{w}}\}, \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h, \hat{J} \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R}) \tag{I.39}$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h := \text{int} \left\{ \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) > 0 \right\}, \tag{I.40}$$

$$\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j := \text{int} \left\{ \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0 \text{ or } (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) > 0 \right\}, \tag{I.41}$$

$$\hat{A}(v) := -(\hat{\rho} + \delta)v - \hat{\gamma} \frac{\partial v(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 v(\hat{w})}{\partial \hat{w}^2}.$$

Then, there exists a unique solution within the class of bounded functions with compact support.

Before going to the proof, observe that conditions (I.34)–(I.35) are implied by conditions (I.36)–(I.39) and, therefore, they are redundant. Nevertheless, they will help with the proof of existence.

The proof uses results from a branch of mathematics that many economists may not be familiar with. For this reason, before presenting the proof, we provide some intuition about the steps we show below. In a nutshell, there are two steps in the proof. First, we need to show that, for a given value of unemployment \hat{U} , there is a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the game played by the matched worker-firm pair. To understand the intuition behind this step, define $\hat{w}^q(\hat{w}^l; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ as the best response function of the worker in terms of the layoff threshold, and $\hat{w}^l(\hat{w}^q; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ as the best response function of the firm in terms of the quit threshold. It is easy to show that optimal policies are given by markdown

thresholds. $\hat{w}^l(\hat{w}^q; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is the solution to the differential equation

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)$$

with border conditions $\hat{J}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^l) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^l) = 0$. Notice that the smooth pasting condition $\hat{J}'(\hat{w}^l) = 0$ determines \hat{w}^l . In the same way, $\hat{w}^q(\hat{w}^l; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is the solution to the differential equation

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)$$

with border conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^l) = \hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = 0$, where $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = 0$ determines \hat{w}^q . Let $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ be the values associated with the nontrivial equilibrium policies.


Second, we need to find the equilibrium value of unemployment. This value satisfies

$$\mathbb{P}(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) = B + \max_{\hat{w}} \frac{1}{K^{(1-\alpha)/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}).$$

Panel A of Figure [II](#) shows the composition of $\mathbf{Q}(\hat{w}) := \hat{w}^q(\hat{w}^l(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}))$ and Figure [II](#)-Panel B shows $\mathbb{P}(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. As we can see in the figure, the composition of the best response functions satisfies two properties: (i) monotonicity (i.e., $\mathbf{Q}'(\hat{w}) > 0$) and (ii) concavity (i.e., $\mathbf{Q}''(\hat{w}) < 0$). Intuitively, the monotonicity property arises from the fact that if one agent prefers to stay in the match for longer, then the incentives for the other agent to stay in the match are larger; thus, the other agent also prefers to stay longer. Concavity arises from the fact that there is a decreasing value of delaying the separation. As the figure clearly shows, a unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists under these two properties. Equipped with the values from the nontrivial Nash equilibrium as a function of \hat{U} , we can then characterize the decision problem of the unemployed worker. The mapping $\mathbb{P}(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ satisfies three properties: (i) $\mathbb{P}(B) > B$ with $\mathbb{P}(1) = B$, (ii) it is continuous and (iii) it is decreasing. Intuitively, if the flow value of unemployment is equal to B , then the surplus of the match is positive, and the unemployed worker obtains a positive continuation value from searching for a job. If, instead, the flow value of unemployment equals the value of (normalized) output, then the surplus is zero, and the unemployed worker does not benefit from finding a job. Also, the larger the unemployment value, the lower the value of the match, and, therefore, the value of searching for a job. As the figure clearly shows, a unique equilibrium exists under these three properties of $\mathbb{P}(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$.

Proof. We divide the proof into four steps. Step 1 shows the existence of a nontrivial

FIGURE I1. INTUITION



Notes: The figure illustrates the properties of the policy and value functions. Panel A shows the composition of $Q(\hat{w}) := \hat{w}^a(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and the 45 degree line. The nontrivial Nash equilibrium is given by the intersection between these two lines. Panel B shows the composition of the individual best response functions and the fixed point in the equilibrium $\mathbb{P}(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$.

Nash equilibrium for a given \hat{U} . In this step, we show the existence of a solution to conditions (I.34) to (I.41). To simplify the exposure, we divide step 1 into three propositions. Proposition I.7 shows the equivalence between the equilibrium conditions and the *quasi-variational inequalities* (i.e., a generalization of variational inequalities to the case when the feasible set is a function of the state variables), which is required to apply known fixed-point theorems. Proposition I.8 shows the existence and uniqueness of the agents’ best responses. Proposition I.9 shows the existence of equilibrium by invoking Birkhoff-Tartar’s fixed-point theorem from Proposition I.6. Observe that we restrict the functions $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ to have bounded support. This restriction is without loss of generality since it is a result of Proposition 2—i.e., the match’s continuation region is bounded.

Step 2 shows the uniqueness of the solution to conditions (I.34) to (I.41). We divide this proof into two propositions. Proposition I.10 shows that the operator defined in step 1 is strong order concave. Using concavity and techniques in the spirit of Marinacci and Montrucchio (2019) applied to our own problem, we show uniqueness in Proposition I.11.

Step 3 shows that value functions are continuous and decreasing. We divide this step into two propositions. First, we show in Proposition I.12 that the value associated with the worker’s “best response” is continuous and decreasing in \hat{U} . Proposition I.13 shows

these properties for the nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Finally, step 4 proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium by showing the existence of the unique fixed point in the unemployed worker's value \hat{U} .

Step 1. We begin by defining a continuous bilinear form in a more general space of functions. The objective here is to find the weak solution of the nontrivial Nash equilibrium. Since the bilinear form uses the first derivative, we work in $H_0^1(\mathbb{R})$ —i.e., the Sobolev space of order 1 with bounded support. Let $V := H_0^1(\mathbb{R})$ be a Hilbert space and define the bilinear continuous form $a : V \times V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$a(v_1, v_2) := \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_1}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv_2}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_1}{d\hat{w}} v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} v_1(\hat{w}) v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w}.$$

Notice that $a(v_1, v_2)$ is a bilinear form since it satisfies two properties for all $v_1, v_2, v_3 \in H_0^1(\mathbb{R})$: (i) $a(v_1 + v_3, v_2) = a(v_1, v_2) + a(v_3, v_2)$ and $a(v_1, v_2 + v_3) = a(v_1, v_2) + a(v_1, v_3)$; and (ii) $a(v_1\alpha, v_2) = \alpha a(v_1, v_2)$ and $a(v_1, v_2\alpha) = \alpha a(v_1, v_2)$ with $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$. To show these properties notice that the derivative and the integral of functions are linear operators. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} a(v_1 + v_3, v_2) &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{d(v_1 + v_3)}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv_2}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{d(v_1 + v_3)}{d\hat{w}} v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} (v_1(\hat{w}) + v_3(\hat{w})) v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} \\ &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left(\int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_1}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv_2}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_3}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv_2}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} \right) + \hat{\gamma} \left(\int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_1}{d\hat{w}} v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv_3}{d\hat{w}} v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} \right) \\ &\quad + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \left(\int_{\mathbb{R}} v_1(\hat{w}) v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R}} v_3(\hat{w}) v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} \right) = a(v_1, v_2) + a(v_3, v_2). \\ a(v_1\alpha, v_2) &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{d(\alpha v_1)}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv_2}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{d(\alpha v_1)}{d\hat{w}} v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} (\alpha v_1(\hat{w})) v_2(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} = \alpha a(v_1, v_2). \end{aligned}$$

The proofs for $a(v_1, v_2 + v_3) = a(v_1, v_2) + a(v_1, v_3)$ and $a(v_1, v_2\alpha) = \alpha a(v_1, v_2)$ are similar. To show it is continuous, we need to show that $a(v_1, v_2) \leq \alpha \|v_1\| \|v_2\|$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$. It is easy to verify that the bilinear form is continuous using the inner product of the Sobolev space, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and compact support.

Now, we define the boundary conditions imposed by the other agent. Define $K^h(\hat{f})$ and $K^j(\hat{W})$ as

$$\begin{aligned} K^h(\hat{f}) &:= \{ \hat{W} \in V : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0 \text{ \& if } \hat{f}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \geq 0 \Rightarrow \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \}, \\ K^j(\hat{W}) &:= \{ \hat{f} \in V : \hat{f}(\hat{w}) \geq 0 \text{ \& if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \Rightarrow \hat{f}(\hat{w}) = 0 \}. \end{aligned}$$

From now on, we look for solutions satisfying the variational approach within these sets.

Proposition I.7. Assume $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$ bounded with compact support, where $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ and $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j$ are constructed with \hat{W} and \hat{J} following (I.40) and (I.41). Then, $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ solve

$$\hat{W} \in K^h(\hat{J}), \quad \hat{J} \in K^j(\hat{W})$$

$$a(\hat{J}, v - \hat{J}) \geq \int_{\mathbb{R}} (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (v - \hat{J}) \, d\hat{w}, \quad \forall v \in K^j(\hat{W}) \quad (\text{I.42})$$

$$a(\hat{W}, v - \hat{W}) \geq \int_{\mathbb{R}} (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) (v - \hat{W}) \, d\hat{w}, \quad \forall v \in K^h(\hat{J}). \quad (\text{I.43})$$

iff. $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ solve (I.34), (I.35), (I.36), (I.37), (I.38), and (I.39).

Before going to the proof, it is worth making some remarks. First, conditions (I.42) and (I.43) provide a weak solution to the differential equations and not a classical solution. For the same reason, we did not define the sets $K^h(\hat{J})$ and $K^j(\hat{W})$ in terms of conditions holding almost everywhere. We come back to this issue below.

Proof of Step 1—Proposition I.7. We verify conditions (I.34), (I.35), (I.36), (I.37), (I.38), and (I.39) focusing on the firm (the worker's conditions are verified following similar steps). It is easy to show the converse.

Conditions (I.34) and (I.35) are satisfied. Since $\hat{J} \in K^j(\hat{W})$, we have $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$.

Conditions (I.36) and (I.37) are satisfied. Define $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ with \hat{W} . Then, $(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c = cl\{\hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ and } (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \leq 0\}$. Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$, we have $(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c = cl\{\hat{w} \in \mathbb{R} : \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}$. Since $\hat{J} \in K^j(\hat{W})$, if $\hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c$, then $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0$.

Conditions (I.38) and (I.39) are satisfied. Take any $v \in K^j(\hat{W})$. Then, if $\hat{w} \in (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c$, we have $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = v(\hat{w}) = 0$. Therefore, we have that, for every $v, \hat{J} \in K^j(\hat{W})$,

$$a(\hat{J}, v - \hat{J}) \geq \int_{\mathbb{R}} (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (v - \hat{J}) \, d\hat{w} \iff$$

$$\underbrace{\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \, d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c} \hat{J}(\hat{w}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w}}_{=0} +$$

$$\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \, d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \hat{J}(\hat{w}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} \geq$$

$$\int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} + \underbrace{\int_{(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c} (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w}}_{=0} \iff$$

$$\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \, d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \hat{J}(\hat{w}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w} \geq$$

$$\int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} (1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \, d\hat{w}.$$

Using integration by parts, we obtain

$$\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} \stackrel{(1)}{=} \underbrace{\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) \Big|_{\hat{w} \in \partial \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h}}_{=0} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} \frac{d^2\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}^2} (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) d\hat{w}.$$

In (1), there could be two cases for the first term. The first case is a finite limit of integration (i.e., $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ is bounded). In this case, we use the continuity of the functions and the fact that if $\hat{w} \rightarrow \partial \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ ($\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ is open), then $\hat{w} \rightarrow (\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)^c$ and, therefore, $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = v(\hat{w}) = 0$. The second case is an infinite limit of integration. In this case, the assumption of bounded support implies $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0$ for sufficiently large or small \hat{w} , thus $\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) = 0$. In conclusion, $\int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) (v(\hat{w}) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) d\hat{w} \leq 0$.

Before continuing, we remark that the previous equality holds for all $v(\hat{w}) \in K^j(\hat{W})$. Let \mathcal{O} be an open ball in $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$ that covers an arbitrary point $\hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$. Then, we can find a family of smooth functions indexed by n with $o_{\hat{w}}(n) \in [0, 1]$, s.t. $o_{\hat{w}}(n) = 0$ outside $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$, $o_{\hat{w}}(n) \rightarrow 1$ in \mathcal{O} , and $o_{\hat{w}}(n) \rightarrow 0$ outside \mathcal{O} . Since $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + o_{\hat{w}}(n) \geq 0$, $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + o_{\hat{w}}(n) \in K^j(\hat{W})$ and

$$\int_{\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) o_{\hat{w}}(n) d\hat{w} + \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h/\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) o_{\hat{w}}(n) d\hat{w} \leq 0.$$

Taking the limit $n \rightarrow \infty$, we have that $\int_{\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) d\hat{w} \leq 0$. Since \mathcal{O} is arbitrary, $\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + 1 - e^{\hat{w}} \leq 0$ a.e. in $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$. Since $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)$, then $\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + 1 - e^{\hat{w}} \leq 0$ for all \hat{w} whenever the second derivative is defined. To obtain the other inequality, consider $\hat{J}(\hat{w})(1 - o_{\hat{w}}(n)) + 0o_{\hat{w}}(n) \in K^j(\hat{W})$ and we have

$$- \int_{\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) \hat{J}(\hat{w}) o_{\hat{w}}(n) d\hat{w} - \int_{\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h/\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) \hat{J}(\hat{w}) o_{\hat{w}}(n) d\hat{w} \leq 0$$

Taking the limit $n \rightarrow \infty$, we have that $\int_{\mathcal{O}} (\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) (-\hat{J}(\hat{w})) d\hat{w} \leq 0$ almost everywhere. Since $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h)$, we have that for all $\hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$

$$(\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) (-\hat{J}(\hat{w})) \leq 0.$$

Since $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$ and $(\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) \leq 0$, we have that $(\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + (1 - e^{\hat{w}})) (-\hat{J}(\hat{w})) \geq 0$. Thus, $(\hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + 1 - e^{\hat{w}}) (-\hat{J}(\hat{w})) = 0$ or written more compactly $0 = \max\{-\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{\mathcal{A}}\hat{J}(\hat{w}) + 1 - e^{\hat{w}}\}$, $\forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h$, with $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}^h) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$. \square

Proposition I.8. Define the value functions that are obtained from the best responses as BR^h :

$H^1(\mathbb{R}) \rightarrow H^1(\mathbb{R})$ and $BR^j : H_0^1(\mathbb{R}) \rightarrow H_0^1(\mathbb{R})$ such that

$$BR^h(\hat{f}) = \{\hat{W} \in H^1(\mathbb{R}) : a(\hat{W}, v - \hat{W}) \geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}, v - \hat{W}), \forall v \in K^h(\hat{f}), \hat{W} \in K^h(\hat{f})\},$$

$$BR^j(\hat{W}) = \{\hat{f} \in H^1(\mathbb{R}) : a(\hat{f}, v - \hat{f}) \geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, v - \hat{f}), \forall v \in K^j(\hat{W}), \hat{f} \in K^j(\hat{W})\}.$$

Then, $BR^h(\hat{f})$ and $BR^j(\hat{W})$ exist and are unique.

Proof of Step 1—Proposition 1.8. Here, we show that the value functions that are obtained from the best responses are well-defined. For this, we need to verify the conditions in Proposition 1.5. Basically, we need to show that $K^j(\hat{W})$ is closed and convex, and that $a(\cdot, \cdot)$ is coercive.

$K^j(\hat{W})$ is closed and convex. First, we show that $K^j(\hat{W})$ is closed. Take a sequence $\hat{f}^n \in K^j(\hat{W})$ s.t. \hat{f}^n converges to some \hat{f}^* . Since $\hat{f}^n \in K^j(\hat{W})$,

$$\hat{f}^n(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \text{ if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), \text{ then } \hat{f}^n(\hat{w}) = 0$$

for all n and all \hat{w} . Taking the limit in the real numbers,

$$\hat{f}^*(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \text{ if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), \text{ then } \hat{f}^*(\hat{w}) = 0$$

where we use the fixed domain in the second limit. Thus, $K^j(\hat{W})$ is closed.

To show that $K^j(\hat{W})$ is convex, take $\hat{f}^1, \hat{f}^2 \in K^j(\hat{W})$, then

$$\hat{f}^1(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \text{ if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), \text{ then } \hat{f}^1(\hat{w}) = 0,$$

$$\hat{f}^2(\hat{w}) \geq 0, \text{ if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), \text{ then } \hat{f}^2(\hat{w}) = 0,$$

all \hat{w} . Taking the convex combination with $\lambda \in [0, 1]$

$$\lambda \hat{f}^1 + (1 - \lambda) \hat{f}^2 \geq 0, \text{ if } \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), \text{ then } \lambda \hat{f}^1 + (1 - \lambda) \hat{f}^2 = 0.$$

Thus, $K^j(\hat{W})$ is convex.

$a(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})$ is coercive. This requires $\hat{\rho} + \delta > 0$, i.e., $\rho - \gamma - \sigma^2/2 + \delta > 0$, which is a standard regularity condition ensuring value functions are finite. Operating over the bilinear operator

$$a(v, v) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{dv(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} v(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} v(\hat{w})^2 d\hat{w}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&=^{(1)} \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \underbrace{\int_{\mathbb{R}} \left(\frac{dv(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \right)^2 d\hat{w}}_{\geq 0} + \frac{\hat{\gamma}}{2} \underbrace{v(\hat{w})^2 \Big|_{-\infty}^{\infty}}_{=0} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} v(\hat{w})^2 d\hat{w} \\
&\geq^{(2)} (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \int_{\mathbb{R}} v(\hat{w})^2 d\hat{w} = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \|v\|^2
\end{aligned}$$

Step (1) integrates $\int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{dv(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} v(\hat{w}) d\hat{w} = \frac{1}{2} v(\hat{w})^2 \Big|_{-\infty}^{\infty}$ and uses compact support. Step (2) uses the nonnegativity of the squared derivative term.

With the properties verified, we can apply Proposition I.5. Thus, the best response exists, and it is unique. \square

Proposition I.9. Define $Q(\hat{W}) = (BR^h \circ BR^j)(\hat{W})$, then there exists a fixed point $Q(\hat{W}^*) = \hat{W}^*$ and $\hat{J}^* = BR^j(\hat{W}^*)$. The set of fixed points is bounded above and below by

$$\begin{aligned}
0 &\leq \underline{\hat{W}} \leq \hat{W}^* \leq \overline{\hat{W}}, \\
0 &\leq \underline{\hat{J}} \leq \hat{J}^* \leq \overline{\hat{J}},
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
a(\underline{\hat{W}}, v - \underline{\hat{W}}) &\geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}, \underline{\hat{W}}), \forall v \in K^{small}, \underline{\hat{W}} \in K^{small}, \\
a(\underline{\hat{J}}, v - \underline{\hat{J}}) &\geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, \underline{\hat{J}}), \forall v \in K^{small}, \underline{\hat{J}} \in K^{small}, \\
a(\overline{\hat{W}}, v - \overline{\hat{W}}) &\geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}, \overline{\hat{W}}), \forall v \in K^{big}, \overline{\hat{W}} \in K^{big}, \\
a(\overline{\hat{J}}, v - \overline{\hat{J}}) &\geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, \overline{\hat{J}}), \forall v \in K^{big}, \overline{\hat{J}} \in K^{big},
\end{aligned}$$

with

$$\begin{aligned}
K^{small} &:= \{v \in V : v(\hat{w}) \geq 0 \text{ \& if } \hat{w} \notin (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0) \Rightarrow v(\hat{w}) = 0\}, \\
K^{big} &:= \{v \in V : v(\hat{w}) \geq 0\},
\end{aligned}$$

with a maximum and minimum element.

Proof of Step 1—Proposition I.9. The first step consists in showing that the function $Q(W)$ is monotonically increasing—i.e., if $\hat{W}_1 \geq \hat{W}_2$, then $Q(\hat{W}_1) \geq Q(\hat{W}_2)$. To show this result, first, we need to prove that $K^j(\hat{W})$ is increasing—i.e., if $\hat{W}_1 \geq \hat{W}_2$, then $K^j(\hat{W}_2) \subset K^j(\hat{W}_1)$. Take $\hat{J}_2 \in K^j(\hat{W}_2)$, then

$$\hat{J}_2 \geq 0, \text{ \& if } \hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \Rightarrow \hat{J}_2(\hat{w}) = 0.$$

Since $\hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \geq 0$, we have

$$\hat{J}_2 \geq 0, \text{ \& } \hat{J}_2(\hat{w}) = 0 \forall \hat{w} \in \{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}.$$

Now, we show that $\{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\} \subset \{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}$. Take $\hat{w} \in \{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}$. Then, $\hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \leq 0$ and, since $\hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \geq \hat{W}_2(\hat{w})$, we have that $\hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \leq 0$. Since $\{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\} \subset \{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}$, the previous condition holds for the larger set, so it will also hold for the smaller set

$$\hat{J}_2 \geq 0, \text{ \& } \hat{J}_2(\hat{w}) = 0, \forall \hat{w} \in \{\hat{w} : \hat{W}_1(\hat{w}) \leq 0 \text{ \& } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})\}.$$

Thus, $\hat{J}_2 \in K^j(W_1)$ and $K^j(\hat{W}_2) \subset K^j(W_1)$.

Now, let $\hat{W}_1 \geq \hat{W}_2$. We need to show that $\hat{J}_1 = BR^j(\hat{W}_1) \geq BR^j(\hat{W}_2) = \hat{J}_2$. Since $K^j(\hat{W})$ is increasing—i.e., $K^j(\hat{W}_2) \subset K^j(\hat{W}_1)$ — $\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2 \in K^j(\hat{W}_1)$ and the envelope $\max\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} \in K^j(\hat{W}_1)$. Now, we show that $\min\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} \in K^j(\hat{W}_2)$. Since $\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2 \geq 0$, we have that $\min\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} \geq 0$. Moreover, take a \hat{w} s.t. $\hat{W}_2(\hat{w}) \leq 0$ and $\hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$, then $0 = \hat{J}_2 = \min\{\hat{J}_2, \hat{J}_1\}$. Thus, $\min\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} \in K^j(\hat{W}_2)$. In conclusion, we can use $\max\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\}$ as a test function for $K^j(\hat{W}_1)$ and $\min\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\}$ as a test function for $K^j(\hat{W}_2)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \min\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} &= \hat{J}_2 - \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\} \text{ for test function for } K^j(\hat{W}_2) \\ \max\{\hat{J}_1, \hat{J}_2\} &= \hat{J}_1 + \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\} \text{ for test function for } K^j(\hat{W}_1) \end{aligned}$$

Using the quasi-variational inequality

$$\begin{aligned} a(\hat{J}_2, -\max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) &\geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, -\max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) \\ a(\hat{J}_1, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) &\geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, since $a(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a bilinear form

$$\begin{aligned} -a(\hat{J}_2, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) &\geq -(1 - e^{\hat{w}}, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) \\ a(\hat{J}_1, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) &\geq (1 - e^{\hat{w}}, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}). \end{aligned}$$

Summing these two equalities, we obtain

$$a(\hat{J}_1, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) - a(\hat{J}_2, \max\{\hat{J}_2 - \hat{J}_1, 0\}) \geq 0$$

or equivalently,

$$a(\hat{f}_2, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) - a(\hat{f}_1, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) \leq 0.$$

Next, we show that the previous inequality implies $a(\max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) \leq 0$. Define the set $\mathbb{X} = \{\hat{w} : \hat{f}_2(\hat{w}) > \hat{f}_1(\hat{w})\}$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} & a(\hat{f}_2, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) - a(\hat{f}_1, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) \\ &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left(\int_{\mathbb{X}} \frac{d\hat{f}_2(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1)}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} - \int_{\mathbb{X}} \frac{d\hat{f}_1(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} \frac{d(\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1)}{d\hat{w}} d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{X}} 0 dx \right) \\ & \cdots + \hat{\gamma} \left(\int_{\mathbb{X}} \frac{d\hat{f}_2(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1) d\hat{w} - \int_{\mathbb{X}} \frac{d\hat{f}_1(\hat{w})}{d\hat{w}} (\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1) d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{X}} 0 dx \right) \\ & \cdots + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \left(\int_{\mathbb{X}} \hat{f}_2(\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1) d\hat{w} - \int_{\mathbb{X}} \hat{f}_1(\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1) d\hat{w} + \int_{\mathbb{R} \setminus \mathbb{X}} 0 d\hat{w} \right) \\ &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{\mathbb{X}} \left(\frac{d(\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1)}{d\hat{w}} \right)^2 d\hat{w} + \hat{\gamma} \int_{\mathbb{X}} \frac{d(\hat{f}_2(\hat{w}) - \hat{f}_1)}{d\hat{w}} (\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1) d\hat{w} + (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \left(\int_{\mathbb{X}} (\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1)^2 d\hat{w} \right) \\ &= a(\max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}). \end{aligned}$$

Since $a(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a coercive bilinear form, $0 \geq a(\max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}, \max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}) \geq K \|\max\{\hat{f}_2 - \hat{f}_1, 0\}\|^2$. Thus, $\hat{f}_1 \geq \hat{f}_2$ a.e., and by continuity $\hat{f}_1 \geq \hat{f}_2$ for all \hat{w} . Applying similar arguments to $BR^h(\hat{f})$, we have that $\hat{W}_1 \geq \hat{W}_2$ implies $Q(\hat{W}_1) \geq Q(\hat{W}_2)$, so by Proposition I.6 (Birkhoff-Tartar's fixed-point theorem), there exists a fixed point. Moreover, the set of fixed points has a maximum and a minimum—i.e., $\{\hat{W} \in H_0^1(\mathbb{R}) : \hat{W} = Q(\hat{W})\}$ has a \hat{W}^{\min} and \hat{W}^{\max} s.t. $\hat{W}^{\min} \leq \hat{W}^* \leq \hat{W}^{\max}$ for all $\hat{W}^* \in \{\hat{W} \in H_0^1(\mathbb{R}) : \hat{W} = Q(\hat{W})\}$.

Observe that since the flow payoff function and the coefficient of the characteristic operator are infinitely differentiable and the continuation set is bounded, by Theorems 3 and 6 of Chapter 6 of Evans (2022), we have that \hat{W}, \hat{f} are infinitely differentiable in the continuation set of the game and differentiable in the continuation set of the other agent.

To find the upper and lower bound, observe that we can write the nontrivial Nash equilibrium policies as $\hat{f}^*(w) = \max_{\{\tau^j \in \mathcal{T} : \tau^j \leq \tau^{h*}\}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^j} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta)t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}_t}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right]$. Since

$\infty > \tau^{h*} \geq \tau_{(\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U},0))}$,²¹ we have

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \leq \underline{\hat{J}} &= \max_{\{\tau^j \in \mathcal{T} : \tau^j \leq \tau_{(\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U},0))}\}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^j} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}_t}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] \\ &\leq \max_{\{\tau^j \in \mathcal{T} : \tau^j \leq \tau^{h*}\}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^j} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}_t}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] = \hat{J}^*(w) \\ &\leq \max_{\{\tau^j \in \mathcal{T}\}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^j} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}_t}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] = \bar{\hat{J}}. \end{aligned}$$

□

Step 2. This step proves the uniqueness of the fixed point. The first proposition shows that $Q : H_0^1(\mathbb{R}) \rightarrow H_0^1(\mathbb{R})$ is concave. Since the Q operator is only defined for nonnegative functions, we assume that the domain is restricted to nonnegative functions without loss of generality. Since the game's continuation region is bounded, flow payoffs are bounded. Therefore, the equilibrium value functions are also bounded. Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict the $Q : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ operator in $\mathcal{A} = \{v \in H_0^1(\mathbb{R}) : v(\hat{w}) \in [0, \bar{v}], \forall \hat{w}\}$. Observe that \mathcal{A} is order convex—i.e., if $a, b \in \mathcal{A}$ with $a \leq c \leq b$, then $c \in \mathcal{A}$. Define the operator $\alpha : \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$, where $\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'') = \alpha(\hat{w})\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + (1 - \alpha(\hat{w}))\hat{W}''(\hat{w})$, with $\alpha(\hat{w}) \in [0, 1]$.

Proposition I.10. $Q : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ is strongly order concave—i.e., $Q(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) \geq \alpha(Q(\hat{W}'), Q(\hat{W}''))$ for all $\hat{W}' \leq \hat{W}''$.

Proof of Step 2—Proposition I.10. Take $\hat{W}' \leq \hat{W}''$. The proof has three arguments. First, we show that $K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) = K^j(\hat{W}'')$. With this result, we show that the $BR^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) \geq \alpha(BR^j(\hat{W}'), BR^j(\hat{W}''))$. Finally, we show that $Q(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) \geq \alpha(Q(\hat{W}'), Q(\hat{W}''))$.

To see that $K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) = K^j(\hat{W}'')$, observe that since $\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'') \leq \hat{W}''$ and $K^j(\cdot)$ is increasing, we have $K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) \subset K^j(\hat{W}'')$. Now, we show that $K^j(\hat{W}'') \subset K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}''))$. For any $\hat{J} \in K^j(\hat{W}'')$,

$$\hat{J} \geq 0, \text{ \& if } \hat{W}''(\hat{w}) = 0 \text{ and } \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \Rightarrow \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0.$$

If $\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) = 0$, then $\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) \geq \hat{W}'(\hat{w}) = 0$, which is then also true for any convex combination. Thus, $\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'') \leq \hat{W}'' = 0$ and

$$\hat{J} \geq 0, \text{ \& } (\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'') = 0 \wedge \hat{w} \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})) \Rightarrow \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0.$$

²¹ $\tau_{(\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U},0))} := \inf \{t \geq 0 : \hat{w}_t \notin (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U},0))\}$.

In conclusion, $\hat{f} \in K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}''))$ and $K^j(\hat{W}'') \subset K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}''))$. Therefore, $K^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) = K^j(\hat{W}'')$.

Since the constraint set—i.e., \hat{W} and any test function v in $K^j(\cdot)$ —is the same for $\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')$ and \hat{W}'' :

$$\begin{aligned} BR^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) &= BR^j(\hat{W}''), \\ &= \alpha(BR^j(\hat{W}''), BR^j(\hat{W}'')), \\ &\geq \alpha(BR^j(\hat{W}'), BR^j(\hat{W}')), \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality uses monotonicity of $BR^j(\hat{W})$. A similar property holds for $BR^h(\hat{f})$. In conclusion, $BR^j(\hat{W})$ and $BR^h(\hat{f})$ are increasing and strongly order concave. Using this result, for $\hat{W}' \leq \hat{W}''$:

$$\begin{aligned} Q(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}'')) &= BR^h(BR^j(\alpha(\hat{W}', \hat{W}''))) \\ &\geq^{(1)} BR^h(\alpha(BR^j(\hat{W}'), BR^j(\hat{W}''))) \\ &\geq^{(2)} \alpha(BR^h(BR^j(\hat{W}')), BR^h(BR^j(\hat{W}''))) \\ &= \alpha(Q(\hat{W}'), Q(\hat{W}'')). \end{aligned}$$

Step (1) uses the monotonicity of $BR^h(\hat{f})$ and the strong order concavity of $BR^j(\hat{W})$. Step (2) uses the strong order concavity of $BR^h(\hat{f})$. \square

Proposition I.11. $Q : A \rightarrow A$ has a unique fixed point.

Proof of Step 2—Proposition I.11. We have shown that $Q(\hat{W})$ is monotone and order concave defined in an order convex set. Now, we prove the result by contradiction. Let $\underline{\hat{W}}$ be the minimum fixed-point and let \hat{W}^* be another fixed point with $\hat{W}^* > \underline{\hat{W}}$ (here, $>$ stands for $\hat{W}^*(\hat{w}) \geq \underline{\hat{W}}(\hat{w})$ for \hat{w} and with strict inequality for some \hat{w}). Then, we can write $\underline{\hat{W}} = \alpha^*(0, \hat{W}^*)$ for some $\alpha^*(\hat{w})$ function, where zero is the lower bound in the domain. Importantly, it is easy to see that $\alpha^*(\hat{w}) \in [0, 1]$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0)$ and open interval for some \hat{w} . Thus,

$$\underline{\hat{W}} =^{(1)} Q(\underline{\hat{W}}) =^{(2)} Q(\alpha^*(0, \hat{W}^*)) \geq^{(3)} \alpha^*(Q(0), Q(\hat{W}^*)) =^{(4)} \alpha^*(Q(0), \hat{W}^*) >^{(5)} \alpha^*(0, \hat{W}^*) =^{(6)} \underline{\hat{W}}$$

Step (1) uses the fact that $\underline{\hat{W}}$ is a fixed point and step (2) uses the fact that $\underline{\hat{W}} = \alpha^*(0, \hat{W}^*)$. Step (3) uses the strong order concavity of Q . Step (4) uses the fact that \hat{W}^* is a fixed point. Step (5) uses that $Q(0) > 0$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0)$. Since it cannot be that $\underline{\hat{W}} > \underline{\hat{W}}$, we

have a contradiction. \square

Step 3. Let $\hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and $\hat{J}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ be the value functions from the unique nontrivial Nash equilibrium. We now show that they are continuous and decreasing in \hat{U} .

Proposition I.12. Fix \hat{J} . Let $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) = BR^h(\hat{J}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ be the solution of

$$a(\hat{W}, v - \hat{W}) \geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}, v - \hat{W}), \quad \forall v \in K^h(\hat{J}), \quad \hat{W} \in K^h(\hat{J})$$

Then, $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is continuous and decreasing in $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$.

Proof of Step 3—Proposition I.12. First, we prove continuity. Take \hat{U}_1 and \hat{U}_2 and define $\hat{W}_1 = BR^h(\hat{J}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1)$ and $\hat{W}_2 = BR^h(\hat{J}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$. Then,

$$a(\hat{W}_1, v - \hat{W}_1) \geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1, v - \hat{W}_1), \quad (\text{I.44})$$

$$a(\hat{W}_2, v - \hat{W}_2) \geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2, v - \hat{W}_2). \quad (\text{I.45})$$

Let \hat{W}_2 be the test function for (I.44) and let \hat{W}_1 be the test function for (I.45). Summing both equations

$$a(\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) + a(\hat{W}_2, \hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2) \geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) + (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2, \hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2)$$

or equivalently

$$a(\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) \geq (\hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1), \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1).$$

Multiplying by -1 on both sides and under the observation that $(\hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1), \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) = \hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1)(1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1)$, we obtain

$$a(\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) \leq \hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2)(1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1).$$

Given that the operator is coercive and that

$$(1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) = \int_{\mathbb{R}} (\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2) - \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1)) d\hat{w} \leq \mathcal{C} \left(\int_{\mathbb{R}} (\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2) - \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1))^2 d\hat{w} \right)^{1/2},$$

we have for some $\mathcal{C} > 0$

$$\beta \|\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1\|^2 \leq a(\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) \leq \hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2)(1, \hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1) \leq \hat{\rho}\mathcal{C}|\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2| \|\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1\|$$

for some $\beta > 0$. Thus, $\|\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1\| \leq \frac{\hat{\rho}\mathcal{C}}{\beta} |\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2|$. With this inequality, we can verify the continuity of $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. Let $\epsilon > 0$ and choose $|\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2| < \epsilon \frac{\beta}{\hat{\rho}\mathcal{C}}$. Then, $\|\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1\| < \epsilon$.

Thus, $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is continuous.

Now, we prove that $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is decreasing in the second argument. Let $\hat{U}_1 > \hat{U}_2$ and define $\hat{W}_1 = BR^h(\hat{f}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1)$ and $\hat{W}_2 = BR^h(\hat{f}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$. Observe that $\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2 \in K^h(\hat{f})$. Thus, $\min\{\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2\}$ and $\max\{\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2\} \in K^h(\hat{f})$. Therefore, we can use $\min\{\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2\} = \hat{W}_1 - \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}$ as a test function with \hat{U}_1 and $\max\{\hat{W}_1, \hat{W}_2\} = \hat{W}_2 + \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}$ as a test function with \hat{U}_2 . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} -a(\hat{W}_1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}) &\geq -(e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}), \\ a(\hat{W}_2, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}) &\geq (e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}). \end{aligned}$$

Adding both inequalities, we obtain

$$a(\hat{W}_2 - \hat{W}_1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}) \geq \hat{\rho}(\hat{U}_1 - \hat{U}_2)(1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}).$$

Multiplying by -1 and under the observation that $a(\hat{W}^1 - \hat{W}^2, \max\{\hat{W}^1 - \hat{W}^2, 0\}) = a(\max\{\hat{W}^1 - \hat{W}^2, 0\}, \max\{\hat{W}^1 - \hat{W}^2, 0\}) \geq \beta \|\max\{\hat{W}^1 - \hat{W}^2, 0\}\|^2$ for some $\beta > 0$, we have

$$\|\max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}\|^2 \leq \frac{\hat{\rho}}{\beta}(\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1)(1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}).$$

Since $\hat{U}_1 > \hat{U}_2$, we have that $\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1 < 0$. Assume, by contradiction, that $\hat{W}_1 > \hat{W}_2$, then $(1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}) > 0$. Operating,

$$0 < \|\max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}\|^2 \leq \frac{\hat{\rho}}{\beta}(\hat{U}_2 - \hat{U}_1)(1, \max\{\hat{W}_1 - \hat{W}_2, 0\}) < 0.$$

Thus, we have a contradiction. In conclusion, $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is decreasing in the second argument. Observe that $\hat{f}(\hat{w}) = BR^j(\hat{W})$ is independent of $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$. \square

Proposition I.13. *Let $\hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ be the nontrivial Nash equilibrium, then it is continuous and decreasing in the second argument.*

Proof of Step 3—Proposition I.13. First, we show that the value function in the nontrivial Nash equilibrium is decreasing in \hat{U} . If $\hat{U}_1 > \hat{U}_2$, we have, by the previous step, that $Q(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) \leq Q(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$. Define recursively $Q^n(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) = Q \circ Q^{n-1}(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1)$. By monotonicity, $Q^n(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) \leq Q^n(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$ holds for all n . By Theorem 18 of [Marinacci and Montrucchio \(2019\)](#), $Q^n(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) \rightarrow \hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1)$ and $Q^n(\hat{W}, \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2) \rightarrow \hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$. Thus, $\hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) \leq \hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$. In conclusion, the nontrivial Nash equilibrium is decreasing in \hat{U} .

More formally, fix $\hat{U}^* \in [B/\hat{\rho}, 1/\hat{\rho}]$ and take $\hat{U}_n \uparrow \hat{U}^*$ (the case $\hat{U}_n \downarrow \hat{U}^*$ is analogous). By the monotonicity established above, $\hat{W}^*(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_n)$ is a monotone (decreasing in n) sequence in $K^h(\hat{f})$, and it is uniformly bounded since $\hat{U}_n \in [B/\hat{\rho}, 1/\hat{\rho}]$. By the monotone convergence theorem in $L^2(\mathbb{R})$, $\hat{W}^*(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_n) \rightarrow \hat{W}^\infty$ in L^2 for some $\hat{W}^\infty \in K^h(\hat{f})$. Passing to the limit in the variational inequality satisfied by each $\hat{W}^*(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_n)$ —using continuity of $a(\cdot, \cdot)$ and of the right-hand side in \hat{U} —shows that \hat{W}^∞ solves the variational inequality at \hat{U}^* . By the uniqueness of the nontrivial Nash equilibrium (Step 2), $\hat{W}^\infty = \hat{W}^*(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}^*)$. Therefore, $\hat{W}^*(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is continuous in \hat{U} in the L^2 norm. \square

Step 4. We now show the existence of the unique fixed point in $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$. Using the free entry condition, we can define the value of the unemployed worker as

$$P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) := B + \max_{\hat{w}} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}).$$

We now show two propositions: (i) we show relevant properties of $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$, (ii) we use these properties to show the existence of a unique fixed point $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}^*) = \hat{\rho}\hat{U}^*$.

Proposition I.14. *The following properties hold for $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$:*

- $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ exists and is unique.
- $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is continuous.
- $P : [B, \bar{P}] \rightarrow [B, \bar{P}]$ and it is decreasing.

Proof of Step 4—Proposition I.14. From Proposition 2, $\hat{Z}^h \cap \hat{Z}^j$ is bounded, so

$$\max_{\hat{w}} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) = \max_{\hat{w} \in \text{cl}\{\hat{Z}^j \cap \hat{Z}^h\}} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U}).$$

Since $\hat{J}(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and $\hat{W}(\cdot; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ are continuous and the optimization is over a compact support, by the extreme value theorem there exists a maximum value.

Since $\hat{J}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and $\hat{W}(\hat{w}; \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ are continuous in both arguments, by the maximum theorem, the maximal value is continuous.

Let $\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ be the solution to the optimization problem. Then, if $\hat{U} < \hat{U}'$,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}); \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}); \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) &\geq^{(1)} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}'); \hat{\rho}\hat{U})^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}'), \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \\ &\geq^{(2)} \frac{1}{K^{1/\alpha}} \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}'), \hat{\rho}\hat{U}')^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}'), \hat{\rho}\hat{U}'). \end{aligned}$$

Step (1) uses the optimality of $\hat{w}^*(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ and step (2) uses the fact that \hat{J} and \hat{W} are decreasing in the second argument. Thus, $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ is decreasing. By Proposition 2, we have that $\bar{P} =: P(B) > B$. Since $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \geq B$ ($\hat{J}(\cdot)$ and $\hat{W}(\cdot)$ are nonnegative), we have that $P : [B, \bar{P}] \rightarrow [B, \bar{P}]$. \square

Proposition I.15. $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ has a unique fixed point.

Proof of Step 4—Proposition I.15. The existence of the fixed point follows directly from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem. To show uniqueness, observe that if there were two fixed points $\hat{U}_1 < \hat{U}_2$, by definition, we would have that $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1) = \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_1 < \hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2 = P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}_2)$ and $P(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$ would be strictly increasing. By the third bullet of Proposition I.14, this is a contradiction. \square

I.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. We prove each equilibrium property separately.

1. Using the recursive definition of the value function, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (e^{\hat{w}t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] \\ \hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}t}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right]\end{aligned}$$

where τ^{m*} is the nontrivial Nash equilibrium of the game between the firm and the worker. Summing the previous two equations, we have

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}) := \hat{W}(\hat{w}) + \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \right] = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}).$$

Now, we show that $1 > \hat{\rho}\hat{U} > B$ by contradiction. Assume that $\hat{\rho}\hat{U} \leq B < 1$. Using the free entry condition and worker optimality, we have that $\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$ and $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$ for all \hat{w} ; thus, the product is also nonnegative at \hat{w}^* and

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq B \implies \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \geq B,$$

So, we have that $\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B < 1$. Then, we have that $\max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0$ and, therefore, $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0 \forall \hat{w}$. By weakly dominated strategies, we have that $(\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0) = (\log(B), 0) \subset \mathcal{Z}^j \cap \mathcal{Z}^h$. Thus, for any $\hat{w} \in (\log(B), 0)$, we have that $(\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{W}(\hat{w})) > (0, 0)$ and using the free entry condition $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0$. Thus, a contradiction. Assume instead that $\hat{\rho}\hat{U} \geq 1$. Then, $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) = 0$ for all \hat{w} since $\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ is nonnegative and $(0, 0) = (\hat{S}(\hat{w}), \hat{S}(\hat{w})) \geq (\hat{J}(\hat{w}), \hat{W}(\hat{w})) \geq 0 \forall \hat{w}$ and $\max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0$ with the free entry condition. With these argument, we have that $\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = B < 1$, and we have the contradiction.

2. To show this, we first show that $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0)$. Let

$$\tau_{(\hat{w}, 0)} = \inf_t \{t : \hat{w}_t \notin (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0)\}.$$

By optimality of the firm,

$$\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m^*}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}t}) dt \right] \geq \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\min\{\tau(\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0), \tau^{m^*}\}} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}t}) dt \right] > 0.$$

Thus, there is an open set around the optimally chosen starting wage \hat{w} that lies entirely within the continuation region s.t. $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0$, $\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}) > 0$, and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) - \hat{K}\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})^\alpha = 0$. Therefore,

$$\arg \max_{\hat{w}} \{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w})\} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \left\{ \left(\frac{\hat{J}(\hat{w})}{K} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}) \right\} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \{ \hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \}.$$

Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = (1 - \eta(\hat{w}))\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$,

$$\arg \max_{\hat{w}} \{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w})\} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \{ \hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \{ (1 - \eta(\hat{w}))^{1-\alpha} \eta(\hat{w})^\alpha \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) \}.$$

Taking first-order conditions, $\eta'(\hat{w}^*) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} - \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\eta(\hat{w}^*)} \right) = -\frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}$. We now show the following claim: There exists a unique solution to

$$\max_{\hat{w}} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha}. \quad (\text{I.46})$$

We divide this proof into 4 steps.

• **The following result holds:**

$$\arg \max_{\hat{w}} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} = \arg \max_{\hat{w} \in [\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l]} \alpha \log(\hat{W}(\hat{w})) + (1 - \alpha) \log(\hat{J}(\hat{w})).$$

As we show below, for $\sigma^2 > 0$ we have $-\infty < \hat{w}^q < \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) < 0 < \hat{w}^l < \infty$. Now, we show that there exists a $\hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)$ such that $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) > 0$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) > 0$ by contradiction. Assume the opposite inequalities hold. Then, since the values satisfy $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$, it must be the case that $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0$ or $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0$. Suppose that $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = 0$. Replacing this equality into the definition of the value, we obtain

$$(\rho + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}, \quad (\text{I.47})$$

which results in a contradiction since the value that satisfies (I.47) is positive for any $\hat{w} \in (\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U}), 0)$. Similar argument holds for the case $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 0$. Thus, we can restrict the domain of \hat{w} to $[\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l]$ in problem (I.46).

• **Problem (I.46) attains a maximum.** This result follows from the Weierstrass Theorem since the set $[\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l]$ is compact and the objective function is the composition and sum of

two continuous value functions.

• **The functions $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ have unique global maxima $\hat{w}^{*j} < \hat{w}^{*h}$.** We will show that $\hat{w}^{*j} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \hat{J}(\hat{w})$ is unique. The proof for $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ is similar. Assume, by contradiction, that there exist at least two global maxima at $\hat{w}^{*j} < \hat{w}^{**j}$ (from the argument above, we conclude that these maxima cannot occur at the boundary of the game's continuation set). Without loss of generality, assume they are consecutive. The HJB equation within the game's continuation set is given by $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w})$. Since the function is smooth, at the two optima, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{*j}) + e^{\hat{w}^{*j}} - 1 &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}^{*j}), \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{**j}) + e^{\hat{w}^{**j}} - 1 &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}^{**j}), \end{aligned}$$

with $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) \leq \hat{J}(\hat{w}^{*j})$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{**j})$. There are two cases to consider. First, $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^{*j})$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{**j})$. Here, we have a contradiction since $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ is constant in the interval, thus $\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) = \hat{J}''(\hat{w}) = 0$ for all $\hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{**j})$ and $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{*j}) + e^{\hat{w}^{*j}} - 1 = 0$, $\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{**j})$, which is not constant. Next, assume that the function is not constant. Then, since $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ is continuous and the set $[\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{**j}]$ is compact, the function has a minimum at some $\hat{w}^{\min j} < \hat{w}^{**j}$ satisfying $\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{\min j}) < \hat{J}(\hat{w}^{**j})$ and $e^{\hat{w}^{\min j}} - 1 < e^{\hat{w}^{**j}} - 1$. By definition of minimum, $\hat{J}''(\hat{w}^{\min j}) \geq 0$. Therefore, combining the previous inequalities, we have

$$0 \leq \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}^{\min j}) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{\min j}) + e^{\hat{w}^{\min j}} - 1 < (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}^{**j}) + e^{\hat{w}^{**j}} - 1 = \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}^{**j}).$$

Since the function is concave near a maximum, we have a contradiction. We can follow similar steps to rule out multiple local maxima. Finally, it is easy to show that $\hat{w}^{*j} < \hat{w}^{*h}$.

• **There exists a unique $\arg \max_{\hat{w} \in [\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{*h}]} \alpha \log(\hat{W}(\hat{w})) + (1 - \alpha) \log(\hat{J}(\hat{w}))$.** We first show that $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ is strictly log-concave $\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^{*h})$. The proof that shows that $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ is log-concave is similar. Applying L'Hôpital's rule, we have that $\lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} = \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \frac{\hat{W}''(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}$. Recall that $(\delta + \hat{\rho})\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w})$. Taking the limit $\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q$ and using the border conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = 0$, we have that $0 < \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - e^{\hat{w}^q} = \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}^q)$. Therefore, $\lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \frac{\hat{W}''(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})} = \infty$. It is easy to check that $\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}$ has a vertical asymptote when $\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q$ and, therefore, it must be decreasing near \hat{w}^q from the right. Let $\underline{\hat{w}}$ be a wage-to-productivity ratio close to \hat{w}^q such that $\frac{\hat{W}'(\underline{\hat{w}})}{\hat{W}(\underline{\hat{w}})} > 0$ and

$\left(\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}\right)' < 0$. Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ has a single maximum \hat{w}^{*h} , $\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}$ is positive for all $\hat{w} \in [\hat{w}, \hat{w}^{*h}]$ and $\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} = 0$ when evaluated at $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^{*h}$. Now, we show that $\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}$ is decreasing for all $\hat{w} \in [\hat{w}, \hat{w}^{*h}]$. Using the worker's HJB equation and the corresponding smooth-pasting and value-matching conditions, we have

$$\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \int_{\hat{w}^q}^{\hat{w}} [(\delta + \hat{\rho})\hat{W}(x) - (e^x - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})] dx + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \hat{W}(\hat{w}).$$

Dividing both sides by $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$,

$$\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \frac{\int_{\hat{w}^q}^{\hat{w}} [(\delta + \hat{\rho})\hat{W}(x) - (e^x - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})] dx}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2}.$$

Taking the derivative w.r.t. \hat{w} , we obtain

$$\left(\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}\right)' = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left[(\hat{\rho} + \delta) - \frac{(e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} \right] + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} - \left(\frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}\right)^2.$$


Define the following function $\phi(\hat{w} - \hat{w}) \equiv \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}$. Then,

$$\phi'(\hat{w} - \hat{w}) = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left[(\hat{\rho} + \delta) - \frac{(e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{W}(\hat{w})} \right] + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \phi(\hat{w} - \hat{w}) - \phi(\hat{w} - \hat{w})^2.$$

Given this, the goal is to show $\phi'(\hat{w} - \hat{w}) < 0$. Let $t \equiv \hat{w} - \hat{w}$, then $\phi'(t) = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left[(\hat{\rho} + \delta) - \frac{(e^{t+\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{W}(t+\hat{w})} \right] + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \phi(t) - \phi(t)^2$. Next, we define $F(t) \equiv \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left[(\hat{\rho} + \delta) - \frac{(e^{t+\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{W}(t+\hat{w})} \right]$. Observe that $F(t)$ is bounded from below in the interval $[\hat{w}, \hat{w}^{*h}]$. Thus, we have that the derivative of the log of the worker's value function satisfies the Riccati equation $\phi'(t) = F(t) + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \phi(t) - \phi(t)^2$, with initial condition $\phi(0) > 0$, $\phi'(0) < 0$. Define $T = \hat{w}^{*h} - \hat{w}$, then $\phi(T) = 0$ (which follows from \hat{w}^{*h} being an interior maximum). Now, we show that $\phi'(t) < 0$ for all $t \in (0, T)$. Assume that this is not the case and there exists a $t^* \in (0, T)$ s.t. $\phi'(t^*) \geq 0$. Without loss of generality, let t^* be inside the first interval s.t. $\phi'(t) \geq 0$. Then, if we plot $H_t(\phi) := F(t) + \frac{2\hat{\gamma}}{\sigma^2} \phi(t) - \phi(t)^2$, there exists a $(t^*, \phi^*) > (0, 0)$ s.t. $H_{t^*}(\phi^*) \geq 0$. From Figure I2, since $\phi'(0) < 0$ with $\phi(0)$ arbitrarily large, we can see that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \phi(t) \geq \phi^* > 0$ and, therefore, $\phi(T) > 0$, which contradicts the terminal condition $\phi(T) = 0$. Thus, $\phi'(t) < 0$ for all $t \in (0, T)$ and $\log(\hat{W}(\hat{w}))$ is a concave function $\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{*h})$.

Since $\log(\hat{W}(\hat{w}))$ and $\log(\hat{J}(\hat{w}))$ are strictly concave $\forall \hat{w} \in [\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{*h}]$ and the sum of strictly concave functions is strictly concave, $\arg \max_{\hat{w} \in [\hat{w}^{*j}, \hat{w}^{*h}]} \alpha \log(\hat{W}(\hat{w})) + (1 -$

FIGURE I2. PHASE LINE FOR $\phi(t)$



$\alpha) \log(\hat{f}(\hat{w}))$ exists and is unique.

3. This step follows directly from workers' and firms' optimality conditions.

4. To show that \hat{Z}^h and \hat{Z}^j are connected, assume they are not. Without loss of generality, assume that $\hat{Z}^h = \{\hat{w} : \hat{w} > \hat{w}^q\} \cup (a, b)$ with $a < b < \hat{w}^q$. Then, since $\hat{w}^q \leq \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$, it must be the case that for all $\hat{w} \in (a, b)$, we have $(e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) < 0$ for all $\hat{w} \in (a, b)$, and $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{\hat{Z}^h} \cap \tau_{\hat{Z}^j}} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (e^{\hat{w}_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \right] < 0$ for all $\hat{w} \in (a, b)$ due to continuity of Brownian motions. Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$, we have a contradiction. A similar argument holds for the firm's continuation set.

We prove that $-\infty < \hat{w}^q$ by contradiction. Assume that $-\infty = \hat{w}^q$, then

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}, \hat{w}^l) := \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{(-\infty, \hat{w}^l)} \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (e^{\hat{w}_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right].$$

Then, since $\hat{\rho}\hat{U} < e^{\hat{w}^l}$, it is easy to show

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{W}(\hat{w}, \hat{w}^l) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau_{(-\infty, \hat{w}^l)} \wedge \tau^\delta} e^{-\hat{\rho}t} (e^{\hat{w}_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] \\ &\leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (e^{\hat{w}_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w} \right] \\ &= \frac{e^{\hat{w}}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \hat{\gamma} - \sigma^2/2} - \frac{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \\ &= \frac{e^{\hat{w}}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} - \frac{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} - \hat{\gamma} - \sigma^2/2 + \delta} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, there exists a small enough \hat{w} s.t. $\hat{W}(\hat{w}, \hat{w}^l) < 0$, a contradiction. A similar argument

holds for the firm's separation threshold. The smooth pasting conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality ([Brekke and Øksendal, 1990](#)).

□

I.6 Proof of Propositions 3, 4, and 5

Define $\hat{\mathcal{Z}} = (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)$. From Proposition 1, when $\hat{\gamma} > 0$ or $\sigma > 0$, we can work with the HJB conditions

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}} \quad (\text{I.48})$$

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = 1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}} \quad (\text{I.49})$$

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + K^{1-\alpha} \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)$$

$$(1 - \alpha) \frac{d \log \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{d \hat{w}} = -\alpha \frac{d \log \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{d \hat{w}},$$

with the value-matching conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^l) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^l) = 0$ and smooth-pasting conditions $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^l) = 0$.

Proof of Proposition 3. If $\hat{\gamma} = \sigma = 0$, conditions (I.48) and (I.49) imply $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$.

The variational inequalities imply

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \max\{0, e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\}, \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R}, \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \max\{0, 1 - e^{\hat{w}}\}, \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \mathbb{R}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^+) = 0$, $\hat{w}^+ = 0$ and $\hat{w}^- = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$.

Since

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) = \begin{cases} (\hat{\rho} + \delta)^{-1} & \text{if } \hat{w} \in [\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+] \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and $\mathcal{T}_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$, we have that the worker's share of the surplus $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. Let us guess and verify the following solution $\hat{w}^* = \log\left(\frac{1 + \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2}\right)$ and $\hat{w}^- = \hat{w}^* - h$ and $\hat{w}^+ = \hat{w}^* + h$ for a given h . Using a Taylor approximation of the flow profits around \hat{w}^*

$$\begin{aligned} e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} &\approx e^{\hat{w}^*} (1 + (\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*)) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} + e^{\hat{w}^*} (\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*), \\ 1 - e^{\hat{w}} &\approx 1 - e^{\hat{w}^*} (1 + (\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*)) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} - e^{\hat{w}^*} (\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*). \end{aligned}$$

We can write the optimality conditions as

$$\begin{aligned}(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} + e^{\hat{w}^*}(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^* - h, \hat{w}^* + h) \\(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} - e^{\hat{w}^*}(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^* - h, \hat{w}^* + h)\end{aligned}$$

with the border conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^* - h) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^* - h) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^* + h) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^* + h) = 0$ and $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^* - h) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^* + h) = 0$.

Now, we show that we can transform $J(x) = \frac{\hat{J}(x + \hat{w}^*) - \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2(\hat{\rho} + \delta)}}{e^{\hat{w}^*}}$. A similar argument applies to the value function of the worker. Making the following transformation $J(x) = \frac{\hat{J}(x + \hat{w}^*) - \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2(\hat{\rho} + \delta)}}{e^{\hat{w}^*}}$, and using (I.49)

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)J(x) = -x + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}J''(x).$$

Thus,

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)W(x) = x + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}W''(x), \quad (\hat{\rho} + \delta)J(x) = -x + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}J''(x) \quad \forall x \in (-h, h)$$

Defining $\Phi = \frac{\frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2}}{e^{\hat{w}^*}} = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 + \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} > 0$, it is easy to show that $W(h) = J(h) = W(-h) = J(-h) = -\frac{\Phi}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$ and $W'(-h) = J'(h) = 0$. Thus, $W(x) = J(-x)$. Given that this problem is symmetric, we verify the guess of symmetry of the Ss bands and $\frac{1}{2}W'(0) = -\frac{1}{2}J'(-0)$. The latter property implies that \hat{w}^* satisfies the proposed Nash bargaining solution.

Now, we show that $h = \omega(\varphi)\Phi$ with $\varphi = \sqrt{2(\hat{\rho} + \delta)}/\sigma$. Note that $W(x) = J(-x)$. Thus, we can only focus on $W(x)$ using the smooth pasting condition evaluated at $-h$. The solution to this system of differential equations is given by $W(x) = Ae^{\varphi x} + Be^{-\varphi x} + \frac{x}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$ with border conditions $W(h) = W(-h) = -\frac{\Phi}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$ and $W'(-h) = 0$, where $\varphi = \sqrt{2(\hat{\rho} + \delta)}/\sigma$. Writing the value-matching conditions

$$Ae^{\varphi h} + Be^{-\varphi h} + \frac{h}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} = -\frac{\Phi}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}; \quad Ae^{-\varphi h} + Be^{\varphi h} - \frac{h}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} = -\frac{\Phi}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$$

Solving for A and B ,

$$A = -\frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \frac{e^{-\varphi h}(-\Phi + h) + e^{\varphi h}(h + \Phi)}{e^{2\varphi h} - e^{-2\varphi h}}; \quad B = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \frac{e^{\varphi h}(-\Phi + h) + e^{-\varphi h}(h + \Phi)}{e^{2\varphi h} - e^{-2\varphi h}}$$

Therefore,

$$W(x) = -\frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \frac{e^{-\varphi h}(-\Phi + h) + e^{\varphi h}(h + \Phi)}{e^{2\varphi h} - e^{-2\varphi h}} e^{\varphi x} + \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \frac{e^{\varphi h}(-\Phi + h) + e^{-\varphi h}(h + \Phi)}{e^{2\varphi h} - e^{-2\varphi h}} e^{-\varphi x} + \frac{x}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$$

Taking the derivative, evaluating in $x = -h$ and imposing $W'(-h) = 0$, we obtain

$$-\Phi(e^{-2\varphi h} + e^{2\varphi h} - 2) = \frac{1}{\varphi}(e^{2\varphi h} - e^{-2\varphi h}) - \frac{1}{2\varphi}2\varphi h(e^{2\varphi h} + e^{-2\varphi h} + 2). \quad (\text{I.50})$$

It would be useful to express equation (I.50) using $\sinh(x) = \frac{e^x - e^{-x}}{2}$ and $\cosh(x) = \frac{e^x + e^{-x}}{2}$.

Using the hyperbolic functions,

$$-\Phi 2\varphi (\cosh(2\varphi h) - 1) = 2 \sinh(2\varphi h) - \varphi 2h (\cosh(2\varphi h) + 1).$$

Next, we change variables with $q \equiv 2\varphi h$ and define q as the implicit solution of

$$-2\Phi\varphi (\cosh(q) - 1) + q (\cosh(q) + 1) = 2 \sinh(q).$$

Thus, $h = \frac{q(2\Phi\varphi)}{2\varphi}$. Let $b = 2\Phi\varphi > 0$, then we can express the function $x(\cdot)$ as the solution of $b = -\frac{2 \sinh(q(b)) - q(b)(\cosh(q(b)) + 1)}{(\cosh(q(b)) - 1)}$. Notice that if we define $f(q) = -\frac{2 \sinh(q) - q(\cosh(q) + 1)}{(\cosh(q) - 1)}$, the following properties about $f(q)$ hold:

1. $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} f(q) = 0$ and $\lim_{q \rightarrow \infty} f(q) = \infty$.
2. $f(q)$ is increasing and convex, with $\lim_{q \rightarrow 0} f'(q) = 1/3$ and $\lim_{q \rightarrow \infty} f'(q) = 1$.
3. $\frac{d \log(f(q))}{d \log(q)} > 1$.

Given these properties, we can write $h(\varphi, \Phi) = \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi}$ and show the following properties of $h(\varphi, \Phi)$

1. $h(\varphi, \Phi)$ is increasing in Φ : Since $f^{-1}(\cdot)$ is increasing, we have the result.
2. $h(\varphi, \Phi)$ is decreasing in φ : Taking the derivative of $h(\varphi, \Phi) = \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi}$ with respect to φ and operating

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial h(\varphi, \Phi)}{\partial \varphi} &= \frac{df^{-1}(q)}{dq} \Big|_{q=2\varphi\Phi} \frac{2\Phi}{2\varphi} - \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi^2} = \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi^2} \left[\frac{df^{-1}(q)}{dq} \Big|_{q=2\varphi\Phi} \frac{2\varphi\Phi}{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)} - 1 \right] \\ &= \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi^2} \left[\frac{d \log(q)}{d \log(f(q))} \Big|_{f(q)=2\varphi\Phi} \frac{2\varphi\Phi}{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)} - 1 \right] < 0. \end{aligned}$$

3. $\lim_{\varphi \downarrow 0} h(\varphi, \Phi) = 3\Phi$ and $\lim_{\varphi \rightarrow \infty} h(\varphi, \Phi) = \Phi$: Applying L'Hôpital's rule and using properties of the derivative of the inverse,

$$\begin{aligned}\lim_{\varphi \rightarrow \infty} h(\varphi, \Phi) &= \lim_{\varphi \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi} = \lim_{\varphi \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{f'(2\varphi\Phi)}\Phi = \Phi \\ \lim_{\varphi \downarrow 0} h(\varphi, \Phi) &= \lim_{\varphi \downarrow 0} \frac{f^{-1}(2\varphi\Phi)}{2\varphi} = \lim_{\varphi \downarrow 0} \frac{1}{f'(2\varphi\Phi)}\Phi = 3\Phi\end{aligned}$$

Observe that as $\sigma \rightarrow \infty$, we have that $\varphi \rightarrow 1$. Since $h(\cdot, \Phi)$ is decreasing in φ , we have that $\lim_{\varphi \rightarrow 1} h(\varphi, \Phi) \leq \lim_{\varphi \rightarrow 0} h(\varphi, \Phi) = 3\Phi$.

4. $h(\varphi, \Phi) = \omega(2\varphi\Phi)\Phi$: Define $\omega(z) = \frac{f^{-1}(z)}{z}$, then it is easy to see that $h(\varphi, \Phi) = \omega(2\varphi\Phi)\Phi$. Moreover, from property 2 and 3, $\omega(z)$ is decreasing with $\lim_{z \downarrow 0} \omega(z) = 3$ and $\lim_{z \rightarrow \infty} \omega(z) = 1$. Moreover, it is easy to show with similar arguments that $\omega(2\varphi\Phi)\Phi$ is increasing in Φ and $\omega(2\varphi\Phi)\varphi$ is increasing in φ .

Now, we can compute $\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})$. Note that we can define $T(x) = \mathcal{T}(x + \hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})$, which solves $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)T(x) = 1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}T''(x)$, with $T(\pm h(\varphi, \Phi)) = 0$. The solution to this differential equation is given by $T(x) = \frac{1 - \frac{e^{\varphi x} + e^{-\varphi x}}{e^{\varphi h} + e^{-\varphi h}}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$. Thus, $T'(0) = 0$ and $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$. Finally, using the property that $\text{sech}(x) = \frac{2}{e^x + e^{-x}}$, we have $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = \frac{1 - \text{sech}(\varphi\omega(2\varphi\Phi)\Phi)}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$. \square

Proof of Proposition 5. Now, we take the limit $\sigma \downarrow 0$. The equilibrium conditions in this case are

$$\begin{aligned}(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j \cap \mathcal{Z}^h \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= 1 - e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in \hat{\mathcal{Z}}^j \cap \mathcal{Z}^h \\ (1 - \alpha)\frac{d\log \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}} &= -\alpha\frac{d\log \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}}\end{aligned}$$

with the value matching and smooth pasting conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^+) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^+) = 0$ and $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^+) = 0$. Without idiosyncratic shocks and $\gamma > 0$ the upper Ss band is not active. Thus, we discard the optimality condition for \hat{w}^+ . In this case, the stopping time is a deterministic function; hence, it is easier to work with the sequential formulation.

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \max_T \int_0^T e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \right) ds \quad (\text{I.51})$$

$$\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \int_0^{T(\hat{w})} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(1 - e^{\hat{w}-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds. \quad (\text{I.52})$$

In equation (I.52), $T(\hat{w})$ is the optimal policy of the worker. Taking the first order conditions with respect to $T(\hat{w})$, $e^{\hat{w}-\hat{\gamma}T(\hat{w})} = \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$. Solving this equation, $T(\hat{w}) = \frac{\hat{w}-\log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}}$. Thus, if $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$, we have that $\hat{w}^- = \hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}T(\hat{w}^*)$ satisfies $\hat{w}^- = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. Taking the derivatives of $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ and $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$, and using the envelope condition for $\hat{W}'(\hat{w})$, we have

$$\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) = \int_0^{T(\hat{w})} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds, \quad (\text{I.53})$$

$$\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) = - \int_0^{T(\hat{w})} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds + e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)T(\hat{w})} \left(1 - e^{\hat{w}-\hat{\gamma}T(\hat{w})}\right) \underbrace{T'(\hat{w})}_{= 1/\hat{\gamma}}. \quad (\text{I.54})$$

From equations (I.53) and (I.54), we get the Nash bargaining solution

$$-\alpha \frac{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds}{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\right) ds} = (1-\alpha) \frac{\left[- \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds + e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)T^*} \frac{(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}}\right]}{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(1 - e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds} \quad (\text{I.55})$$

Define $\Omega(a, T^*) := \frac{1-e^{-aT^*}}{a}$. Operating,

$$\alpha \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(1 - e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds = (1-\alpha) \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\right) ds \left[1 - \frac{e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)T^*} (1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma} \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s}\right) ds}\right] \iff$$

$$(\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \Omega(\hat{\rho} + \delta, T^*) = e^{\hat{w}^*} \Omega(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \hat{\gamma}, T^*) - \frac{(1-\alpha)e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)T^*} (1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}} \left[1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \frac{\Omega(\hat{\rho} + \delta, T^*)}{e^{\hat{w}^*} \Omega(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \hat{\gamma}, T^*)}\right]$$

Define $\tilde{T} = \hat{\gamma}T^*$ and $\Omega(a, T^*) := \frac{1-e^{-aT^*}}{a} = \hat{\gamma}^{-1}\Omega\left(\frac{a}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)$. Then, the policy (T^*, \hat{w}^*) solves $e^{\hat{w}^*-\tilde{T}} = \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ and

$$(\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \hat{\gamma}^{-1}\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right) = e^{\hat{w}^*} \hat{\gamma}^{-1}\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} + 1, \tilde{T}\right) - \frac{(1-\alpha)e^{-\frac{\hat{\rho}+\delta}{\hat{\gamma}}\tilde{T}} (1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}} \left[1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \frac{\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)}{e^{\hat{w}^*} \Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} + 1, \tilde{T}\right)}\right].$$

Therefore, the optimal stopping is given by

$$\frac{\alpha + (1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} = e^{\tilde{T}} \frac{\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} + 1, \tilde{T}\right)}{\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)} - \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \left[1 - \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} \Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)\right]}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U} \Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)} \left[1 - \frac{\Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \tilde{T}\right)}{e^{\tilde{T}} \Omega\left(\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} + 1, \tilde{T}\right)}\right] \quad (\text{I.56})$$

Now, we show the properties satisfied by $\tilde{T} \left(\frac{\alpha+(1-\alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}, \frac{\hat{\rho}+\delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \right)$. Let us define the function

$$f(a, b, c) := e^a \frac{1 - e^{-(1+b)a}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \frac{b}{b+1} - cb \frac{e^{-ba}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \left[1 - \frac{b+1}{b} \frac{1 - e^{-ba}}{e^a - e^{-ba}} \right].$$

Observe that with this function:

$$\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} = f \left(\tilde{T} \left(\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}, \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \right), \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}}, \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \right).$$

The following properties are easy to show:

1. $f(a, b, c)$ is increasing in a .
2. If $a, c > 0, b \rightarrow \infty$, then $f(a, b, c) \rightarrow e^a$: To see this property, taking the limit

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow \infty, c \propto b} \left[e^a \frac{1 - e^{-(1+b)a}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \frac{b}{b+1} - cb \frac{e^{-ba}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \left[1 - \frac{b+1}{b} \frac{1 - e^{-ba}}{e^a - e^{-ba}} \right] \right] \\ &= e^a \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - e^{-(1+b)a}}{1 - e^{-ba}}}_{=1} \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow \infty} \frac{b}{b+1}}_{=1} - \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow \infty} cb \frac{e^{-ba}}{1 - e^{-ba}}}_{=0} \left[1 - \underbrace{\lim_{b \rightarrow \infty} \frac{b+1}{b}}_{=1} \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1 - e^{-ba}}{e^a - e^{-ba}}}_{=e^{-a}} \right] = e^a. \end{aligned}$$

3. If $a, c > 0$ and $b \rightarrow 0$ then $f(a, b, c) \rightarrow \frac{e^a - 1 - c(1 - \frac{a}{e^a - 1})}{a}$: To see this property, taking the limit

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow 0} \left[e^a \frac{1 - e^{-(1+b)a}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \frac{b}{b+1} - cb \frac{e^{-ba}}{1 - e^{-ba}} \left[1 - \frac{b+1}{b} \frac{1 - e^{-ba}}{e^a - e^{-ba}} \right] \right] \\ &= e^a (1 - e^{-a}) \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow 0} \frac{b}{1 - e^{-ba}}}_{=1/a} - c \underbrace{\lim_{a>0, b \rightarrow 0} \frac{b}{1 - e^{-ba}}}_{=1/a} \left[1 - \frac{1}{e^a - 1} \underbrace{\lim_{b \rightarrow 0} \frac{1 - e^{-ba}}{b}}_{=a} \right] = \frac{e^a - 1 - c(1 - \frac{a}{e^a - 1})}{a}. \end{aligned}$$

4. $e^a \geq f(a, b, c) \geq \frac{e^a - 1 - c(1 - \frac{a}{e^a - 1})}{a}$ where the upper bound is reached when $b \rightarrow \infty$ and the lower bound when $b \downarrow 0$.

5. Duration of the match: It is easy to show that $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = \frac{1 - e^{-\frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\gamma}} \tilde{T}(\cdot)}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$.

6. The worker's share is given by

$$\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{e^{\hat{\gamma}T^*(\cdot) + \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})} \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta} + \hat{\gamma})t} dt - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})t} dt}{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})t} dt} = \frac{e^{\tilde{T}(\cdot)} \frac{1 - e^{-\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}}\right)\tilde{T}(\cdot)}}{\frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}}\tilde{T}(\cdot)} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \quad (\text{I.57})$$

With these properties, we can characterize the equilibrium policies:

1. $\tilde{T}\left(\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}, \frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}}, \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}\right)$ is increasing in the first argument.
2. If $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow 0$, then $\frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}} \rightarrow \infty$ and $\lim_{(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})/\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{T}(\cdot) = \log\left(\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}\right)$. The expected discounted duration in the limit is equal to $\lim_{\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow 0} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}$. The worker's share in the limit is equal to

$$\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{e^{\tilde{T}(\cdot)} \frac{1 - e^{-\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}}\right)\tilde{T}(\cdot)}}{\frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}}\tilde{T}(\cdot)} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \hat{\rho}\hat{U} = \frac{e^{\tilde{T}(\cdot)} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \hat{\rho}\hat{U} = \frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \hat{\rho}\hat{U} = \alpha$$

3. If $\hat{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty$, then $\frac{\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta}}{\hat{\gamma}} \rightarrow 0$, which provides the same $\tilde{T}(\cdot)$ as $\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta} \rightarrow 0$. As we have shown before, under this limit, $\tilde{T}(\cdot)$ converges to the implicit solution given by

$$\frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} = \frac{e^{\tilde{T}(\cdot)} - 1 - \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}} \left(1 - \frac{\tilde{T}(\cdot)}{e^{\tilde{T}(\cdot)} - 1}\right)}{\tilde{T}(\cdot)}.$$

Given the convergence, we now show the limit for $\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ since clearly $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \rho) \rightarrow 0$. Let us depart from equation (I.55)

$$-\alpha \frac{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})s} (e^{\hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}s}) ds}{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})s} (e^{\hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) ds} = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\left[-\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})s} (e^{\hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}s}) ds + e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})T^*} \frac{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}}\right]}{\int_0^{T^*} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta})s} (1 - e^{\hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}s}) ds}$$

Taking the limit as $\hat{\rho} + \hat{\delta} \rightarrow 0$

$$\alpha \int_0^{T^*} (1 - e^{w_t}) dt = (1 - \alpha) \int_0^{T^*} (e^{w_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt - \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}} \frac{\int_0^{T^*} (e^{w_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt}{\int_0^{T^*} e^{w_t} dt}.$$

Operating and using the occupancy measure

$$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\gamma}T^*} \frac{\int_0^{T^*} e^{w_t} dt}{\frac{\int_0^{T^*} e^{w_t} dt}{T^*}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} = \frac{\int_0^{T^*} e^{w_t} dt}{T^*}$$

It is easy to check that


$$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{1 - \alpha}{\hat{\gamma}T^*} \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{\hat{w}}] - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\mathbb{E}[e^{\hat{w}}]} (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) = \mathbb{E}[e^{\hat{w}}].$$

From (I.57), since $\hat{\rho} + \delta \rightarrow 0$, we have that $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[e^{\hat{w}}] - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}$. Combining these steps yields the desired result. □

I.7 Equilibrium Value Functions and Continuation Sets

Figure I3 shows the equilibrium values and continuation sets of the worker (blue solid line) and the firm (red solid line) in our baseline model.

FIGURE I3. EQUILIBRIUM VALUE FUNCTIONS AND CONTINUATION SETS



Notes: The figure plots the equilibrium value functions of the firm (i.e., $\hat{f}(\hat{w})$) and the employed worker (i.e., $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$) as a function of $\hat{w} = w - z$. The blue and red solid lines show the value function of the employed worker and the value function of the firm, respectively. The dotted vertical lines mark the boundaries of the firms' continuation set $(-\infty, \hat{w}^l)$ and the worker's continuation set (\hat{w}^q, ∞) . *Source:* Model simulations.

II Proofs for Section 3: Aggregate Shocks with Wage-Rigidity-Induced Job Separations

II.1 A Monetary Economy with Exogenous Money Supply

We modify four aspects of the baseline model. First, we introduce preferences over real money holdings:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left(C_{it} + \mu \log \left(\frac{\hat{M}_{it}}{P_t} \right) \right) dt \right], \quad (\text{II.1})$$

where \hat{M}_{it} denotes the money holdings of worker i , P_t is the relative price of the consumption good in terms of money, and μ is a preference weight on real money holdings.

Second, workers face a budget constraint that reflects ownership of firms and access to complete financial markets. Given a history of labor market decisions regarding job search, job acceptance, and job dissolution, $lm_i^t := \{lm_{it'}\}_{t'=0}^t$, a worker's private income is $Y_t(lm_i^t)$, which equals the nominal value of the wage while employed and the nominal value of home production while unemployed. In addition, each worker receives transfers of T_{it} from the government and fully diversified claims on firms' profits. On the spending side, a worker pays for consumption expenditures $P_t C_{it}$ and the opportunity cost of holding money $i_t \hat{M}_{it}$ at a given interest rate $i_t \geq 0$. Letting Q_t denote the time-0 Arrow-Debreu price under complete markets, the worker's budget constraint is

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t (P_t C_{it} + i_t \hat{M}_{it} - Y_t(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) dt \right] \leq M_{i0}. \quad (\text{II.2})$$

The worker's problem is to choose a consumption stream $\{C_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, labor market decisions $\{lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and money holdings $\{\hat{M}_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ to maximize utility (II.1) subject to the budget constraint (II.2) at time 0.

Third, the economy is subject to shocks to the aggregate money supply M_t . We assume that the log of the aggregate money supply m_t follows a Brownian motion with drift π and volatility ζ :

$$dm_t = \pi dt + \zeta d\mathcal{W}_t^m,$$

where \mathcal{W}_t^m is a Wiener process. Fourth and finally, we assume that the vacancy posting cost KZ_t and the value of home production BZ_t are both denominated in real terms.

Given these modifications, the market-clearing conditions for goods and money, re-

spectively, are

$$\int_0^1 (C_{it} + \theta_{it} \mathbb{1}[E_{it} = u] K Z_{it}) \, di = \int_0^1 (Z_{it} \mathbb{1}[E_{it} = h] + B Z_{it} \mathbb{1}[E_{it} = u]) \, di, \quad (\text{II.3})$$

$$\int_0^1 \hat{M}_{it} \, di = M_t, \quad (\text{II.4})$$

where $\mathbb{1}[\cdot]$ is an indicator function that takes a logical expression as its argument. Equation (II.3) states that the sum of real consumption and recruiting expenses must equal the total market and home production of the good. Equation (II.4) states that the total demand of nominal money holdings across workers equals the aggregate money supply.

The following proposition characterizes the worker's problem in this monetary economy.

Proposition II.1. *Let $Q_0 = 1$ be the numéraire and assume $\mu = \rho + \pi - \zeta^2/2$. Then, $P_t = M_t$ and the value of a worker at time 0 is*

$$V_0 = \max_{\{lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y(lm_i^t)}{P_t} \, dt \right] + k,$$

where k is a constant independent of the worker's choices, capturing the present discounted value of financial wealth.

Proposition II.1 shows that the price level equals the aggregate money supply and that maximizing (II.1) subject to (II.2) is equivalent to maximizing expected discounted real income. The result relies on three assumptions: (i) complete markets, (ii) worker preferences that are quasi-linear in consumption, and (iii) the log of aggregate money supply following a random walk with drift. The first two assumptions imply a constant marginal value of nominal wealth, which, combined with the last assumption, leads to a constant real interest rate and a one-for-one pass-through of money shocks to inflation.

Proof. Let V_0 be the present discounted value of the optimal plan. The worker's value is given by

$$V_0 = \max_{\{C_{it}, \hat{M}_{it}, lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left(C_{it} + \mu \log \left(\frac{\hat{M}_{it}}{P_t} \right) \right) \, dt \right],$$

subject to

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t (P_t C_{it} + i_t \hat{M}_{it} - Y(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) \, dt \right] \leq M_{i0}. \quad (\text{II.5})$$

The first-order conditions for consumption and money holdings, combined with the

definition of the nominal interest rate, are given by

$$e^{-\rho t} = \Lambda_i Q_t P_t, \quad (\text{II.6})$$

$$\mu \frac{e^{-\rho t}}{\hat{M}_{it}} = \Lambda_i Q_t i_t, \quad (\text{II.7})$$

$$\mathbb{E}[dQ_t] = -i_t Q_t dt. \quad (\text{II.8})$$

Here, Λ_i is the Lagrange multiplier of (II.5) for each worker. Equation (II.6) shows that $\Lambda_i = \Lambda$ for all i . Taking integrals over (II.7), we can replace $\hat{M}_{it} = M_t$. With these results, we guess and verify the following equilibrium outcomes

$$\begin{aligned} P_t &= A^p M_t, \\ i_t &= A^i, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.9})$$

$$Q_t = \frac{A^Q e^{-\rho t}}{M_t}.$$

given a set of constants A^p , A^i , and A^Q . Using the guess in (II.6) and (II.7)

$$1 = \Lambda A^Q A^p, \quad (\text{II.10})$$

$$\mu = \Lambda A^Q A^i. \quad (\text{II.11})$$

Equations (II.10) and (II.11) provide the equilibrium values for A^Q and A^p given A^i . Applying Ito's lemma and using the guess over (II.8)

$$\begin{aligned} dQ_t &= A^Q d \left(\frac{e^{-\rho t}}{e^{\log(M_t)}} \right), \\ &= -\rho A^Q \left(\frac{e^{-\rho t}}{e^{\log(M_t)}} \right) dt - A^Q \frac{e^{-\rho t}}{e^{\log(M_t)}} d\log(M_t) + A^Q \frac{e^{-\rho t}}{2e^{\log(M_t)}} (d\log(M_t))^2, \\ &= -\rho Q_t dt - \pi Q_t dt - \zeta Q_t d\mathcal{W}_t^m + \frac{\zeta^2}{2} Q_t dt. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, using the guess (II.9) and $\mathbb{E}[d\mathcal{W}_t^m] = 0$

$$\mathbb{E}[dQ_t] = - \underbrace{\left(\rho + \pi - \frac{\zeta^2}{2} \right)}_{=A^i} Q_t dt.$$

If we take as numéraire $Q_0 = 1$, then we verify the guess with $\mu = \rho + \pi - \frac{\zeta^2}{2}$:

$$\begin{aligned} A^Q &= M_0, \\ A^i &= \rho + \pi - \frac{\zeta^2}{2} = \mu, \\ \Lambda &= \frac{\mu}{M_0(\rho + \pi - \zeta^2/2)} = \frac{1}{M_0}, \\ A^p &= \frac{\rho + \pi - \zeta^2/2}{\mu} = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Using the budget constraint (II.5)

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty Q_t (P_t C_{it} + i_t \hat{M}_{it} - Y(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) dt \right] &= M_{i0} \iff \\ \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{M_0 e^{-\rho t}}{M_t} (M_t C_{it} + \mu M_t - Y(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) dt \right] &= M_{i0} \iff \\ M_0 \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} C_{it} dt \right] &= M_{i0} + M_0 \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y(lm_i^t)}{M_t} dt \right] + M_0 \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{T_{it}}{M_t} dt \right] - \frac{M_0}{\rho} \mu \iff \\ \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} C_{it} dt \right] &= \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y(lm_i^t)}{M_t} dt \right] + k_i, \end{aligned}$$

where k_i is a constant independent of the worker's policies. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} V_0 &= \max_{\{C_{it}, \hat{M}_{it}, lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left(C_{it} + \mu \log \left(\frac{\hat{M}_{it}}{P_t} \right) \right) dt \right], \\ &= \max_{\{C_{it}, lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left(C_{it} + \mu \log \left(\frac{\mu}{\rho + \pi - \zeta^2/2} \right) \right) dt \right], \\ &= \max_{\{C_{it}, lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} C_{it} dt \right], \\ &= \max_{\{lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y(lm_i^t)}{M_t} dt \right] + k_i. \end{aligned}$$

□

II.2 A Monetary Economy with a Taylor Rule and Interest Rate Shocks

We now show that our previous environment is isomorphic to an economy in which the monetary authority sets the interest rate by following a Taylor rule. As in Galí (2015), we study a cashless economy in discrete time where $t \in \mathbb{T} = \{0, \Delta, 2\Delta, 3\Delta, \dots\}$.

Preferences are the same as in Section 2:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} e^{-\rho t} C_{it} \Delta \right], \quad (\text{II.12})$$

where $e^{-\rho t}$ denotes the discount factor. Workers face a budget constraint that reflects ownership of firms and access to complete financial markets. Given a history of labor market decisions regarding job search, job acceptance, and job dissolution, $lm_i^t := \{lm_{it'}\}_{t'=0}^t$, a worker's private income is $Y_t(lm_i^t)$, which equals the nominal value of the wage while employed and the nominal value of home production while unemployed. In addition, each worker receives transfers of T_{it} from the government and fully diversified claims on firms' profits. On the spending side, a worker pays for consumption expenditures $P_t C_{it}$. Letting Q_t denote the time-0 Arrow-Debreu price under complete markets, the worker's budget constraint is

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t (P_t C_{it} - Y_t(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) \Delta \right] \leq 0. \quad (\text{II.13})$$

The worker's problem is to choose a consumption stream $\{C_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and labor market decisions $\{lm_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ to maximize utility (II.12) subject to the budget constraint (II.13) at time 0.

In this microfoundation, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule given by

$$i_t = \rho + \bar{\pi} + \phi_{\pi}(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) + \iota_t$$

Here, i_t is the nominal interest rate, $\bar{\pi}$ is the inflation target, and ι_t is a compound Poisson process such that with probability $e^{-\lambda \Delta}$ it is equal to zero and with probability $1 - e^{-\lambda \Delta}$ it is equal to $\epsilon_t \sigma_i / \Delta$, where ϵ_t is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and standard deviation of 1.

Finally, we assume that the vacancy posting cost KZ_t and the value of home production BZ_t are both denominated in real terms. The market-clearing condition for the goods market is still given by (II.3).

The following proposition characterizes the worker's problem in this monetary econ-

omy.

Proposition II.2. *Take the limit $\Delta \downarrow 0$. Then,*

$$d\log(P_t) = \bar{\pi} dt - \frac{\sigma_i}{\phi_\pi} \epsilon_t d\mathcal{N}_t,$$

where \mathcal{N}_t is a Poisson process with intensity λ . The value of a worker at time 0 is

$$V_0 = \max_{\{lm_{it}\}_{i=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y(lm_i^t)}{P_t} dt \right] + k_i,$$

where k_i is a constant independent of the worker's choices, which captures the present discounted value of financial wealth.

Proof. Let V_0 be the present discounted value of the optimal plan. The worker's value is given by

$$V_0 = \max_{\{C_{it}, lm_{it}\}_{i=0}^\infty} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} e^{-\rho t} C_{it} \Delta \right],$$

subject to

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t (P_t C_{it} - Y_t(lm_i^t) - T_{it}) \Delta \right] \leq 0. \quad (\text{II.14})$$

The first-order condition for consumption is given by

$$e^{-\rho t} = \Lambda_i Q_t P_t, \quad (\text{II.15})$$

Here, Λ_i is the Lagrange multiplier of (II.14) for worker i . Equation (II.15) shows that $\Lambda_i = \Lambda$ for all i . Evaluating (II.15) at periods t and $t + \Delta$ and taking their ratio, we have

$$e^{-\rho \Delta} = \frac{Q_{t+\Delta} P_{t+\Delta}}{Q_t P_t} \iff \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{P_t}{P_{t+\Delta}} e^{-\rho \Delta} \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{Q_{t+\Delta}}{Q_t} \right]$$

By definition of the interest rate, the lack of arbitrage opportunities with the nominal bond offered by the monetary authority $\mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{Q_{t+\Delta}}{Q_t} \right] = e^{-i_t \Delta}$, and the Taylor rule, we have the following system of equations:

$$1 = e^{i_t \Delta} e^{-\rho \Delta} \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{P_t}{P_{t+\Delta}} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad i_t = \rho + \bar{\pi} + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) + \iota_t.$$

Since $P_{t+\Delta} = P_t e^{\pi_{t+\Delta} \Delta}$, from the first equation we have that $e^{\rho \Delta} = e^{i_t \Delta} \mathbb{E}_t [e^{-\pi_{t+\Delta} \Delta}]$. Making a first order Taylor approximation when $\Delta \downarrow 0$, we obtain $\rho = i_t - \mathbb{E}_t [\pi_{t+\Delta}]$. Replacing in

the expression for i_t from the Taylor rule,

$$\pi_t = \bar{\pi} - \frac{l_t}{\phi_\pi} + \frac{1}{\phi_\pi} \mathbb{E}_t [\pi_{t+\Delta} - \bar{\pi}].$$

Iterating this equation forward, inflation can be expressed as a function of the current and future shocks:

$$\pi_t - \bar{\pi} = -\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{\phi_\pi} \right)^{j\Delta} \frac{l_{t+j}}{\phi_\pi} \right].$$

Since $\mathbb{E}_t [l_{t+j}] = 0$, we have that $\pi_t - \bar{\pi} = -\frac{l_t}{\phi_\pi}$, and therefore

$$\log(P_{t+\Delta}) = \log(P_t) + \pi_{t+\Delta}\Delta = \log(P_t) + \bar{\pi}\Delta - \frac{l_t\Delta}{\phi_\pi} = \log(P_t) + \bar{\pi}\Delta - \mathbb{B}_t \frac{\sigma_i}{\phi_\pi} \epsilon_t,$$

where \mathbb{B}_t is a random variable equal to one with probability $1 - e^{-\lambda\Delta}$ and zero otherwise. Taking the limit $\Delta \downarrow 0$, we have a continuous-time compound Poisson process for the aggregate consumer price index

$$d\log(P_t) = \bar{\pi} dt - \frac{\sigma_i}{\phi_\pi} \epsilon_t d\mathcal{N}_t,$$

where \mathcal{N}_t is a Poisson process with intensity λ . Combining the fact that $e^{-\rho t} = \Lambda Q_t P_t$ with the worker's budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} e^{-\rho t} C_{it} \Delta \right] &= \Lambda \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t P_t C_{it} \Delta \right] \\ &= \Lambda \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t (Y_t(lm_i^t) + T_{it}) \Delta \right] \\ &= \Lambda \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t Y_t(lm_i^t) \Delta \right] + \underbrace{\Lambda \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} Q_t T_{it} \Delta \right]}_{=k_i} \\ &= \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} e^{-\rho t} \frac{Y_t(lm_i^t)}{P_t} \Delta \right] + k_i. \end{aligned}$$

Taking the limit when $\Delta \downarrow 0$, we have the desired result. □

II.3 Proofs of Proposition 6 and 7: CIR of Employment with Flexible Entry Wage

We divide the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7 into three propositions. Proposition II.3 relates the CIR to a perturbation of two Bellman equations describing future employment fluctuations for initially employed and unemployed workers. This proposition covers both the case with flexible and sticky entry wages. Proposition II.4 relates steady-state moments of the perturbed Bellman equations to steady-state moments of the distribution of Δz . Finally, Proposition II.5 relates the steady-state moments of Δz to observable moments in the steady-state. Let $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$ be the distributions of Δz for employed and unemployed workers, respectively. The support of $g^h(\Delta z)$ is $[-\Delta^q, \Delta^l]$, where $\Delta^q := \hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^q$ and $\Delta^l := \hat{w}^l - \hat{w}^*$. Denote by $\mathbb{E}_h[\cdot]$ and $\mathbb{E}_u[\cdot]$ the expectation operators under $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$, respectively.

Proposition II.3. *Given steady-state policies $(\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^l)$ and distributions $(g^h(\Delta z), g^u(\Delta z))$, the CIR is given by*

$$CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z,$$

where the value functions $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)$ are defined as:

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, 0) \mid \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right], \quad (\text{II.16})$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^u(\zeta)} (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) \mid \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right], \quad (\text{II.17})$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z,$$

with $\tau^u(\zeta)$ being distributed according to a Poisson process with arrival rate $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))$.

Proof. We define the cumulative impulse response of aggregate employment to an aggregate TFPR shock as

$$CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_0^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left(g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t) - g^h(\Delta z) \right) d\Delta z dt.$$

Note that $\mathcal{E}_t = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t) d\Delta z$ is a function of ζ since aggregate shocks affect net flows into employment. The proof proceeds in three steps. Step 1 rewrites the CIR as the integral over time of two value functions, one for employed and unemployed workers, up

to a finite time \mathcal{T} . Step 2 expresses the CIR as $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty$. Step 3 uses the equivalence of the combined Dirichlet-Poisson problem (i.e., the mapping between the sequential problem and the corresponding HJB equations and boundary conditions).

Step 1. Here, we follow a recursive representation for the CIR. The CIR satisfies

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} \left[m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) \right] d\Delta z,$$

where we defined

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0, \mathcal{T}) := \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) \right] d\Delta z dt \right],$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) := \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) \right] d\Delta z dt \right].$$

Proof of Step 1. Following [Baley and Blanco \(2024\)](#), it can be shown that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) &= \int_0^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left(g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t) - g^h(\Delta z) \right) d\Delta z dt \\ &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z \quad (\text{II.18}) \end{aligned}$$

where we define

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0, \mathcal{T}) \equiv \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) \right] d\Delta z dt \right]$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) \equiv \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) \right] d\Delta z dt \right].$$

Step 2. The CIR satisfies

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z$$

and the value functions $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0)$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta)$ satisfy the following HJB and border conditions:

$$0 = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta(m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)), \quad (\text{II.19})$$

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z^2} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)) \quad (\text{II.20})$$

$$0 = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z), \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{II.21})$$

$$0 = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} \quad (\text{II.22})$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z. \quad (\text{II.23})$$

Proof of Step 2. We divide this proof into steps *a–c*.

(a) We show that $\lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ and $\lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)$: This property holds due to the convergence of the distribution of Δz over time to its ergodic distribution for any initial condition (Stokey *et al.*, 1989).

(b) To show that $0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0, \mathcal{T}) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z$ and that $0 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z$, see Baley and Blanco (2024).

(c) We show that the CIR satisfies (II.18) with $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0)$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta)$ satisfying (II.19)–(II.23): Writing the HJB for $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0, \mathcal{T})$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta, \mathcal{T})$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T})}{d\mathcal{T}} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z^2} \\ &\quad + \delta(m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, 0, \mathcal{T}) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T})), \\ 0 &= -\mathcal{E}_{ss} - \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})}{d\mathcal{T}} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z^2} \\ &\quad + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta, \mathcal{T}) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})) \\ 0 &= m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, 0, \mathcal{T}) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}), \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \\ 0 &= \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z} = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})}{d\Delta z} \\ 0 &= \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0, \mathcal{T}) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z. \end{aligned}$$

The border condition for $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})$ is implied from the fact that the job-finding rate $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$ is independent of Δz , so the function $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T})$ is constant in the entire domain. Taking the limit $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty$ and using point-wise convergence of $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0, \mathcal{T})$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta, \mathcal{T})$, we have the result.

Step 3. The solutions of the differential equations (II.19)–(II.22) satisfy (II.16) and (II.17).

Proof of Step 3. This is just an application of Øksendal (2007), Chapter 9. □

Before starting the next step of the proof, we summarize the conditions that characterize the distributions of Δz .

Steady-State Cross-Sectional Distribution Δz . Below we describe the Kolmogorov Forward Equations (KFE) for $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$.

$$\delta g^h(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) / \{0\} \quad (\text{II.24})$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))g^u(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^u)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^u)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\infty, \infty) / \{0\} \quad (\text{II.25})$$

$$g^h(\Delta z) = 0, \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{II.26})$$

$$\lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} g^u(\Delta z) = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} g^u(\Delta z) = 0. \quad (\text{II.27})$$

$$1 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \quad (\text{II.28})$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))(1 - \mathcal{E}) = \delta \mathcal{E} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^q} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{\Delta z \uparrow \Delta^l} (g^h)'(\Delta z) \right], \quad (\text{II.29})$$

$$g^h(\Delta z), g^u(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}, \quad g^u(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}^2((-\infty, \infty) / \{0\}), \quad g^h(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}^2((-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) / \{0\})$$

Proposition II.4. *Assume flexible entry wages. Up to first order, the CIR of employment is given by:*

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} + o(\zeta).$$

Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. Step 1 computes the value function for an unemployed worker $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z)$ (when entry wages are flexible, the job-finding rate and this value function are independent of the shock ζ , so we omit this argument). Step 2 computes the value for the employed worker at $\Delta z = 0$ —i.e., $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0)$. Step 3 characterizes the CIR as a function of steady-state aggregate variables and moments.

Step 1. The CIR is given by

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}),$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \right), \\ 0 &= -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z), \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \\ 0 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.30})$$

Proof of Step 1. To show this result, note that the solution to (II.20) and (II.22) is $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z) = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)$, for all Δz . Thus,

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) (m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)) \iff m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0). \quad (\text{II.31})$$

Replacing (II.31) into the CIR, we have the result.

Step 2. We show that $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[a]$, where $\mathbb{E}_h[a]$ is the cross-sectional expected age of the match or the worker's tenure at the current match.

Proof of Step 2. Observe that $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ satisfies the following recursive representation

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]. \quad (\text{II.32})$$

Define the following auxiliary function

$$\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{\varphi t} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + e^{\varphi \tau^m} \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]. \quad (\text{II.33})$$

and note that $\Psi(\Delta z|0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$. The auxiliary function $\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)$ satisfies the following HJB and border conditions:

$$-\varphi \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) + \delta \left(\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) - \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \right) = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial \Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial \Delta z^2}, \quad (\text{II.34})$$

$$\Psi(\Delta z, \varphi) = \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l).$$

Taking the derivative with respect to φ in (II.34), we have that

$$\begin{aligned} (\delta - \varphi) \frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} - \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) &= -(\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial^2 \Psi(\Delta z, \varphi)}{\partial \Delta z \partial \varphi} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^3 \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial \Delta z^2 \partial \varphi}, \\ \frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} &= 0 \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l). \end{aligned}$$

Using the Schwarz theorem to exchange partial derivatives, evaluating at $\varphi = 0$, and using $\Psi(\Delta z|0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$, we obtain

$$\delta \frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial \varphi} - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = -(\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial}{\partial \Delta z} \left(\frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial \varphi} \right) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \Delta z^2} \left(\frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial \varphi} \right), \quad (\text{II.35})$$

$$\frac{\partial \Psi(-\Delta^q|0)}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta^l|0)}{\partial \varphi} = 0. \quad (\text{II.36})$$

Equations (II.35) and (II.36) correspond to the HJB and border conditions of the function $\frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial \varphi} = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_t) dt \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]$. Evaluating $\frac{\partial \Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial \varphi}$ at $\Delta z = 0$, using the occupancy measure and result (II.30), we write the previous equation as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Psi(0|0)}{\partial \varphi} &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_t) dt \middle| \Delta z_0 = 0 \right] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}} \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \left(\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \frac{(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.37})$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m]$ is the mean duration of completed employment spells (the subscript highlights that the moment can be easily computed from the data). From (II.33), we also have that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Psi(0|0)}{\partial \varphi} &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} s(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) ds + \tau^m \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \middle| \Delta z_0 = 0 \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[a]}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}} + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.38})$$

Combining (II.37) and (II.38), and solving for $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0)$ we obtain $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[a]$.

Step 3. Up to a first-order approximation, the CIR is given by:

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} \zeta + o(\zeta^2).$$

Proof of Step 3. To help the reader, we summarize below the conditions used in this step of the proof.

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \quad (\text{II.39})$$

with

$$\delta m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0), \quad (\text{II.40})$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l)$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}). \quad (\text{II.41})$$

1. **Zero Order:** If $\zeta = 0$, condition (II.41) implies

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) = 0.$$

2. **First Order:** Taking the derivative of (II.39) we obtain $\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z$, which evaluated at $\zeta = 0$ becomes $\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z$.

Using condition (II.24) to replace $\delta = \frac{(\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z)}{g^h(\Delta z)}$ into equation (II.40), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z)}{g^h(\Delta z)} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) &= 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi)m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}m''_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \\ &+ \frac{(\gamma + \pi)g'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}g''(\Delta z)}{g(\Delta z)} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0). \end{aligned}$$

Multiplying both sides by $g^h(\Delta z)\Delta z$ and integrating between $-\Delta^q$ and Δ^l ,

$$0 = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi)T_1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}T_2 + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)T_3 \quad (\text{II.42})$$

$$T_1 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)g^h(\Delta z) + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)'(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z$$

$$T_2 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m''_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)g^h(\Delta z) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)''(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z$$

$$T_3 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left((\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \right) d\Delta z.$$

Next, we operate on the terms T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 . The term T_1 is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} T_1 &= \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)g^h(\Delta z) + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)'(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z \\ &= m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.43})$$

The term T_2 satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} T_2 &= \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m''_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)g^h(\Delta z) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)''(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z \\ &= -m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) \Delta z (g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} + 2 \int_{\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g'(\Delta z) d\Delta z. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.44})$$

Finally, the term T_3 is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} T_3 &= \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left((\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \right) d\Delta z \quad (\text{II.45}) \\ &= -(\gamma + \pi)\mathcal{E}_{ss} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\Delta z(g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Combining results (II.42), (II.43), (II.44), (II.45) and those in Step 2, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi)T_1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}T_2 + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)T_3 \\ &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi)m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) + \sigma^2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \end{aligned}$$

which implies $\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)(g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2}$.

□

Proposition II.5. *If $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$, up to first order, the $\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)$ can be expressed in terms of data moments as follows:*

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Std}[\Delta w]} \frac{\text{Skew}[\Delta w]}{3} + o(\zeta).$$

Proof. The goal is to express the sufficient statistics of the CIR, $\mathbb{E}_h[a]$ and $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$, in terms of moments of the distribution of Δw and (τ^u, τ^m) . We focus on the case of $(\gamma + \pi) \neq 0$ and then we use the assumption $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$. Let $\tilde{x} \equiv x/\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[x]$ denote random variable x relative to its mean in the data.

Proposition II.12 expresses moments of the wage distribution as a linear combination of moments of the distribution of productivity changes among completed employment and unemployment spells:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w] &= -[\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z] + \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z]] \\ \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^2] &= [\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^2] + 2\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z]\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z] + \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2]] \\ \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^3] &= -[\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^3] + 3\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z]\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^2] + 3\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2]\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z] + \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^3]], \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\cdot]$ and $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\cdot]$ denote the expectation operators under the distributions $\bar{g}^h(\Delta z)$ and $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$, respectively. Using results from the same Proposition, we can express the

moments of productivity changes for completed unemployment spells in terms of model parameters:

$$\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u [\Delta z] = \frac{(\mathcal{L}_2^{-1} - \mathcal{L}_2)}{\mathcal{L}_1}, \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u [\Delta z^2] = \frac{2(\mathcal{L}_2^{-2} + \mathcal{L}_2^2 - 1)}{\mathcal{L}_1^2}, \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u [\Delta z^3] = \frac{6(-\mathcal{L}_2^3 + \mathcal{L}_2 - \mathcal{L}_2^{-1} + \mathcal{L}_2^{-3})}{\mathcal{L}_1^3},$$

where

$$\mathcal{L}_1 = \sqrt{\frac{2f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{\sigma^2}}, \mathcal{L}_2 = \sqrt{\frac{(\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}{-\gamma - \pi + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}}$$

From these two sets of equations, we solve for the moments of productivity changes for completed employment spells and obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h [\Delta z] &= - \left(\frac{(\mathcal{L}_2^{-1} - \mathcal{L}_2)}{\mathcal{L}_1} \right) - \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w] \\ \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h [\Delta z^2] &= \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^2] + 2\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w] \left(\frac{(\mathcal{L}_2^{-1} - \mathcal{L}_2)}{\mathcal{L}_1} \right) - \frac{2}{\mathcal{L}_1^2} \\ \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h [\Delta z^3] &= -\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^3] - 3\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^2] \left(\frac{(\mathcal{L}_2^{-1} - \mathcal{L}_2)}{\mathcal{L}_1} \right) + \frac{6}{\mathcal{L}_1^2} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w]. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$, to obtain $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$, we evaluate (II.70) at $m = 1$, use the fact that $\mathcal{L}_2 = 1$, $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w] = 0$ and $\frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^u]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau]} = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}$, and substitute σ^2 from Lemma II.9:

$\mathbb{E}_h [\Delta z] = -\frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^3]}{3\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^2]}$. Finally, replace this expression into (23):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} &= -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_h [\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{\frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^3]}{3\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^2]}}{\frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^2]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau]}} \\ &= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^3]}{3\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^2]^2} \\ &= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Var}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w]} \frac{1}{3} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} \left[\Delta w \frac{\Delta w^2}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^2]} \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Var}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w]^{1/2}} \frac{1}{3} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^3]}{\text{Var}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w^2]^{3/2}} \\ &= \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Std}[\Delta w]} \text{Skew}[\Delta w]. \end{aligned}$$

□

II.4 CIR of Employment with Sticky Entry Wages

This section characterizes the CIR with sticky entry wages. Proposition II.6 describes the case of sticky entry wages.

Proposition II.6. *Up to first order, the CIR of employment under sticky entry wages is*

$$\frac{CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left[\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \left[\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*))} - \frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} \right]}_{\text{job-finding effect}} - \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)}}_{\text{new-hires' separation effect}} \right] \right] + o(\zeta) \quad (\text{II.46})$$

$$= -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \left[\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left[\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} - \frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)} \right] \right] + o(\zeta). \quad (\text{II.47})$$

Proof. We divide the proof in two steps. Step 1 characterizes $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)$. Step 2 uses the equilibrium conditions to show (II.47). The starting point is the CIR for employment, which is given by

$$CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z, \quad (\text{II.48})$$

with

$$0 = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta(m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)), \text{ for all } \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{II.49})$$

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z^2} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)) \quad (\text{II.50})$$

$$0 = m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z), \text{ for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{II.51})$$

$$0 = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} \quad (\text{II.52})$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z \quad (\text{II.53})$$

The key differences between the CIR with flexible wages and the CIR with sticky wages are found in the HJB equation at the moment of the shock. With sticky entry wages, the

job-finding probability is given by $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))$, since now the TFPR-adjusted entry wage is lower. As a consequence, we need to evaluate $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ at $\Delta z = -\zeta$ because conditional on finding a job, the TFPR-adjusted entry wage is lower. Observe that following the first job separation, the aggregate TFPR shock is fully absorbed (see the term $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0,0)$ in equation (II.49)).

Step 1. The value function $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta)$ is independent of Δz and satisfies $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta)$.

Proof of Step 1. We guess and verify that $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta) = m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0, \zeta)$ for all Δz . From the equilibrium conditions (II.50) and (II.52),

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0, \zeta)).$$

Thus, $m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(0, \zeta) = m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, \zeta) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta)$.

Step 2. Up to a first-order approximation, the CIR is given by:

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} \zeta + \frac{(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left(\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} - \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, 0)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)} \right) \zeta + o(\zeta^2).$$

Proof of Step 2. From Step 1, we have that

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss} f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))^2} - m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}).$$

Since $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z$ satisfies the same system of functional equations as the CIR with flexible entry wages characterized in the Supplementary Material II.3,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2}. \quad (\text{II.54})$$

Observe that we can write

$$\begin{aligned} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + m_{\mathcal{E},\mu}(\Delta z, 0) \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right], \\ &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^* + \Delta z, 0) - \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0). \end{aligned}$$

Taking the derivative with respect to Δz , evaluating it at $\Delta z = 0$, and using $s = 1/\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)$

from the Renewal Principle, we have that

$$m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0) = \frac{s}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s}\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0) = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s}\frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, 0)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)}. \quad (\text{II.55})$$

From the free entry condition $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) = \left(\frac{\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{\bar{K}}\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}$, and the definition $(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*)) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)/\hat{S}(\hat{w}^*)$, we can compute the elasticity of the job finding rate with respect to the entry wage:

$$\frac{f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} = \frac{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \left(\frac{\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{\bar{K}}\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}-1} \frac{\hat{J}'(\hat{w}^*)}{\bar{K}}}{\left(\frac{\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{\bar{K}}\right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}}} = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\hat{J}'(\hat{w}^*)}{\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \left[-\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{(1-\eta(\hat{w}^*))} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} \right].$$

Finally, combining this result with the fact that $\mathcal{E}_{ss} = \frac{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s}$, $s = \frac{1}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)}$, $\eta'(\hat{w}^*) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} - \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\eta(\hat{w}^*)}\right) = -\frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}$, and operating, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))^2} &= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left[-\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \left[-\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{(1-\eta(\hat{w}^*))} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} \right] \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left[\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{II.56})$$

Combining results in equations (II.54), (II.55), and (II.56), we obtain the desired result:

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2} + \frac{1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \left[\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} + \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} - \frac{\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}^*, 0)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)} \right].$$

□

Focusing first on equation (II.46) of Proposition II.6, the first term in brackets reflects the same forces at play in the CIR under flexible entry wages. The remaining terms in brackets capture two new mechanisms at play when entry wages are sticky. First, the *job-finding effect* captures the fact that lower inflation-adjusted entry wages increase the firm's surplus share (i.e., $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*))$) but also changes the expected match duration (i.e., $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})/\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})$) and the match surplus, both of which shape firms' incentives to post vacancies. Second, the *new hires' separation effect* captures the fact that lower inflation-adjusted entry wages directly affect the separation rate of initially unemployed workers (i.e., $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0)/\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0)$).

Next, we move to equation (II.47), which comes from combining (II.46) with the optimality condition for \hat{w}^* in (17). This step's goal is to take advantage of the fact that

workers internalize the effect of entry wages on net job creation. To shed light on the two key elasticities appearing in equation (II.47), we first show that $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) / \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) - \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, 0) / \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, 0) \approx 0$. While this property trivially holds when $\hat{\rho} \downarrow 0$, the following lemma shows that the elasticity of the expected match duration to the entry wage is independent of the discount factor $\hat{\rho}$ up to second order.

Lemma II.1. *Up to a second-order approximation of the match duration $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$ around $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$ and for all $\hat{\rho}$, we have $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) / \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = (\Delta^l - \Delta^q) / (\Delta^l \Delta^q)$.*

Proof. To show this property, it is useful to change the state variable in $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$ from \hat{w} to Δz . Define $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) := \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^* + \Delta z, \hat{\rho})$. Then, applying Itô's Lemma, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) &= 1 - \hat{\rho} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) - (\gamma + \pi) \tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{II.57}) \\ \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) &= 0 \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l). \quad (\text{II.58}) \end{aligned}$$

Let $(\gamma + \pi) \neq 0$ and $\Delta^l \neq \Delta^q$. In this case, we proceed with a second-order Taylor approximation of $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho})$ around $\Delta z = 0$,

$$\tilde{\mathcal{T}}(\Delta z, \hat{\rho}) = \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho}) + \tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho}) \Delta z + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) \Delta z^2 + O(\Delta z^3).$$

From the border conditions in (II.58), we obtain (we omit the term $O(\Delta z^3)$ to save on notation)

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho}) + \tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho}) \Delta^l + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) (\Delta^l)^2 &= 0, \quad (\text{II.59}) \\ \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho}) + \tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho}) (-\Delta^q) + \frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) (\Delta^q)^2 &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Taking the difference

$$\tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho}) (\Delta^l + \Delta^q) = -\frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) \left((\Delta^l)^2 - (\Delta^q)^2 \right) \iff \tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho}) = -\frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) (\Delta^l - \Delta^q).$$

Replacing this last equation into the HJB equation in (II.57) evaluated at $\Delta z = 0$ and into (II.59), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho}) &= \frac{1 + \left(\frac{\sigma^2 + (\gamma + \pi)(\Delta^l - \Delta^q)}{2} \right) \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho})}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \\ \tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho}) &= -\frac{1}{2} \tilde{\mathcal{T}}''_{\Delta z^2}(0, \hat{\rho}) \left((\Delta^l)^2 - \Delta^l (\Delta^l - \Delta^q) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Combining these equations and solving for $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, \hat{\rho})$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}'_{\Delta z}(0, \hat{\rho})$, we have □

Lemma II.1 shows that the elasticity of match duration is a function of the quit and layoff thresholds expressed in terms of cumulative shocks to worker productivity, Δ^q and Δ^l . Thus, the key sufficient statistic for the effect of lower entry wages on job creation in equation (II.47) is $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$. From this, one may be inclined to conclude that the prevalence of inefficient separations cannot be an important determinant of aggregate job creation. However, we find that this is not generally the case. The following result shows this by characterizing the elasticity of the worker's share to changes in the entry wage.

Proposition II.7. *The rent-sharing elasticity $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ satisfies the following properties:*

1. If $\Delta^q, \Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$, then

$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}. \quad (\text{II.60})$$

2. If $\Delta^q = \Delta^l$ and Δ^l is small enough, then


$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\sqrt{s^{end}}}{2\alpha\sigma}. \quad (\text{II.61})$$

Proof. See Supplementary Material II.4.1. □

Proposition II.7 characterizes the rent-sharing elasticity $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ under two polar cases, namely as the inaction region grows infinitely wide (Part 1) and for a symmetric and narrow enough inaction region (Part 2). The two results are best explained with the aid of Figure III1, which we construct in two steps. First, we set $\delta = 0$ and calibrate the model to match the U.S. economy's job-finding rate \bar{f} and separation rate \bar{s} with a replacement ratio B of 0.29. We purposely choose α so that $\Delta^l = \Delta^q$ and thus $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$. Second, for different levels of the exogenous separation rate δ , we find the productivity volatility σ as a function of δ that keeps the total separation rate constant. The objective of this exercise is to vary the fraction of endogenous job separations s^{end}/s from 0 to 100 percent while keeping the opportunity cost $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ and the total separation rate fixed by construction. Panel A of the figure shows combinations of δ and σ that constitute the "iso-separation rate curve" defined by $s(\delta, \sigma) = \bar{s}$, while Panel B plots the rent-sharing elasticity $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)/\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ as a function of the share of endogenous job separations s^{end}/s .

Consider the limiting case as $\delta \rightarrow \bar{s}$ (i.e., $s^{end}/s \rightarrow 0$), so that all separations are exogenous, as in Part 1 of Proposition II.7. Then, a marginal increase in the entry wage increases workers' surplus share according to equation (II.60), reflecting the well-known result that, absent inefficient turnover, the rent-sharing elasticity is inversely proportional

FIGURE III. ISO-SEPARATION RATE CURVE AND THE ELASTICITY OF RENT SHARING



Notes: Panel A shows the iso-separation rate curve defined by $s(\delta, \sigma) = \bar{s}$. Panel B shows the rent-sharing elasticity as a function of the share of endogenous separations (black solid line) and compares it to an approximation of the rent-sharing elasticity given by $\sqrt{s^{end}} / (2\alpha\sigma)$ based on equation (II.61). Note that the productivity volatility σ is a function of δ derived from the iso-separation rate curve. The parameter values for $\delta = 0$ are $(\gamma + \chi, \sigma, \rho, \alpha, \bar{K}, \delta, \bar{B}) = (0, 0.0235, 0.0048, 0.452, 1.87, 0, 0.29)$ which implies $(f(\theta(\hat{w}^*)), s) = (0.55, 0.034)$ with $\Delta^+ = \Delta^-$. Source: Model simulations.

to the flow surplus $1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ (Shimer, 2005). As the share of inefficient separations (i.e., s^{end}/s) increases in Panel B of Figure III, the rent-sharing elasticity (black solid line) decreases due to a novel mechanism in our framework with rigid entry wages. A higher entry wage increases the layoff probability and decreases the quit probability. By construction, the expected duration of the match does not change, so match surplus is constant. As workers make optimal quit decisions, a marginally lower quit probability leaves their value unchanged due to an envelope condition (i.e., $\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^q) = 0$). But a marginal increase in the layoff probability reduces the worker's value, since the firm makes layoff decisions. Therefore, the rent-sharing elasticity decreases in the share of endogenous job separations, which the following section shows how to measure using conventional labor market microdata.

II.4.1 Proof of Proposition II.7

We divide Proposition II.7 into two propositions. Proposition II.8 “rescales the speed of time” to provide a recursive representation of $\eta(\hat{w})$.

Proposition II.8. Define

$$\tau^{end} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \Gamma_t \notin (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)\}$$

where (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, the worker's share $\eta(\hat{w})$ satisfies the following Bellman

equation

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{end}} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{e^{\Gamma_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} dt + e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)\tau^{end}} \mathbb{1}[\Delta z_{\tau^{end}} = \Delta^l] | \Gamma_0 = \hat{w} \right]$$

with

$$d\Gamma_t = (\hat{\rho} + \delta)(-\hat{\gamma}\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho}) + \sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho})) dt + \sigma \sqrt{\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho})} (\hat{\rho} + \delta) dW_t^z.$$

Proof. The HJB equations for the worker's value and the surplus of the match are

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l) \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{S}(\hat{w}) &= 1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}\hat{S}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{S}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l), \end{aligned}$$

respectively. Replacing the definition of the worker's share $\eta(\hat{w}) = \hat{W}(\hat{w})/\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ into the worker's value function, we obtain

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)(\eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\gamma}(\eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}'(\hat{w}) + \eta'(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(\eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}''(\hat{w}) + 2\eta'(\hat{w})\hat{S}'(\hat{w}) + \eta''(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l).$$

Using the HJB equation of the surplus to replace $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ on the left-hand side,

$$(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\eta(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \eta'(\hat{w})(-\hat{\gamma}\hat{S}(\hat{w}) + \sigma^2\hat{S}'(\hat{w})) + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{S}(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l).$$

Since $\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$, multiplying by $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)$, we arrive at

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\eta(\hat{w}) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} + \eta'(\hat{w})(\hat{\rho} + \delta)(-\hat{\gamma}\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) + \sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})) + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2}(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l).$$

Finally, recall the value-matching conditions $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^q) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^l) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^l) = 0$, and the smooth pasting conditions $\hat{W}'(-\Delta^q) = \hat{J}'(\Delta^l) = 0$. The L'Hôpital's rule implies

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \eta(\hat{w}) &= \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \frac{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\hat{S}(\hat{w})} = \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^q} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{J}'(\hat{w})} = 0 \\ \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^l} \eta(\hat{w}) &= \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^l} \frac{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\hat{S}(\hat{w})} = \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^l} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})} = 1, \end{aligned}$$

which are the boundary values for the worker's share at the separation triggers.

Finally, the equivalence of the combined Dirichlet-Poisson problem (i.e., the mapping from the corresponding HJB equations and boundary conditions of $\eta(\hat{w})$ to the sequential

formulation) gives us the following Bellman equation

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{end}} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{e^{\Gamma_t} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} dt + e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)\tau^{end}} \mathbb{1}[\Delta z_{\tau^{end}} = \Delta^l] | \Gamma_0 = \hat{w} \right],$$

where $\tau^{end} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \Gamma_t \notin (\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^l)\}$ and

$$d\Gamma_t = (\hat{\rho} + \delta)(-\hat{\gamma}\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho}) + \sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho})) dt + \sigma \sqrt{\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho})(\hat{\rho} + \delta)} dW_t^z.$$

□

Proof of Proposition II.7. Below, we prove each property.

1. If $\Delta^l, \Delta^q \rightarrow \infty$, then $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) = \int_0^\infty e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta)t} dt = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho}+\delta}$. The optimality condition for \hat{w}^* implies

$$0 = -\frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho})} = \eta'(\hat{w}^*) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} - \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*)} \right) \iff \alpha = \eta(\hat{w}^*).$$

Therefore, by the definition of $\eta(\hat{w})$,

$$\alpha = \eta(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\hat{\rho}t + \hat{w}t} dt | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right] - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})}{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})}$$

$$\iff [\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}] \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\hat{\rho}t + \hat{w}t} dt | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right].$$

Here, $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}$ is the expectation under the drift $\hat{\gamma}$. Since $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$ is constant, the HJB equation of the worker's share $\eta(\hat{w})$ is given by

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\eta(\hat{w}) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} - \hat{\gamma}\eta'(\hat{w}) + \eta''(\hat{w}) \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (-\infty, \infty). \quad (\text{II.62})$$

Taking the derivative of (II.62) with respect to \hat{w} yields

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\eta'(\hat{w}) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{e^{\hat{w}}}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} - \hat{\gamma}\eta''(\hat{w}) + \eta'''(\hat{w}) \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (-\infty, \infty).$$

This expression corresponds to the HJB of the function $\eta'(\hat{w})$, which can be expressed

as

$$\eta'(\hat{w}^*) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\hat{\rho}t + \hat{w}_t} dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right]}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}$$

Combining all these results, we finally obtain

$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\alpha} = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\hat{\rho}t + \hat{w}_t} dt \mid \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right]}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})} = (\hat{\rho} + \delta) \frac{[\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}] \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})} = \frac{[\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}]}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}.$$

2. If $\gamma + \pi = 0$ and $\Delta^l = \Delta^q$, then $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$ and $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$. If $(\Delta^l + \Delta^q)$ is small enough, then we can use a second-order approximation of $\eta(\hat{w})$ around $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$ to characterize $\eta'(\hat{w}^*)$ *only* using the border conditions. The approximation is given by

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = \eta(\hat{w}^*) + \eta'(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*) + \frac{1}{2}\eta''(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*)^2 + O((\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*)^3).$$

Evaluating this expression at \hat{w}^q and \hat{w}^l , and omitting any terms of the order $O((\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*)^3)$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \eta(\hat{w}^*) + \eta'(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w}^q - \hat{w}^*) + \frac{1}{2}\eta''(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w}^q - \hat{w}^*)^2 &= 0, \\ \eta(\hat{w}^*) + \eta'(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w}^l - \hat{w}^*) + \frac{1}{2}\eta''(\hat{w}^*)(\hat{w}^l - \hat{w}^*)^2 &= 1, \end{aligned}$$

respectively. The difference between the two equations is given by $\eta'(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{1}{\Delta^l + \Delta^q}$. Also, we know that $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}(0, 0) = 1/s = 1/(\delta + (\sigma/\Delta^l)^2) \Rightarrow s^{end} = (\sigma/\Delta^l)^2$. Replacing this result in the previous equation, we obtain, $\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{1}{\Delta^l + \Delta^q} = \frac{\sqrt{s^{end}}}{2\alpha\sigma}$.

□

II.5 Auxiliary Results for Proposition 7

Here we show how to recover the parameters of the stochastic process of the wage-to-productivity ratio Δz in 7 and also how to recover the distribution of Δz . Proposition II.9 recovers the parameters of the stochastic process of the wage-to-productivity ratio Δz . Proposition II.10 recovers the distribution of cumulative productivity shocks conditional on job transitions $\bar{G}^h(\Delta z)$. Proposition II.11 recovers the distribution of Δz among employed workers $G^h(\Delta z)$. Finally, Proposition II.12 recovers moments of Δz from wage across jobs.

Proposition II.9. *Let $\tau := \tau^m + \tau^u$. The drift $(\gamma + \pi)$ and volatility σ of the stochastic process guiding cumulative productivity shocks can be recovered from the data with*

$$\gamma + \pi = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau]}, \quad \sigma^2 = \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[(\Delta w - (\gamma + \pi)\tau)^2]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau]}$$

Proof. From the law of motion $dz_t = (\gamma + \pi) dt + \sigma d\mathcal{W}_t^z$ and the fact that $w_{t_0} - z_{t_0} - p_{t_0} = \hat{w}^*$, we have

$$\Delta w = -\Delta z_{\tau} = (\gamma + \pi)\tau + \sigma\mathcal{W}_{\tau}^z. \quad (\text{II.63})$$

Drift: Taking expectation on both sides conditional on a h -to- u -to- h transition, we have that $\sigma\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{W}_{\tau}^z] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w] - (\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau]$. Since \mathcal{W}_t^z is a martingale, by Doob's Optional Stopping Theorem (OST) \mathcal{W}_{τ}^z is also a martingale, and $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{W}_{\tau}^z] = \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{W}_0^z] = 0$, thus yielding the desired result.

Idiosyncratic volatility: Let us define $Y_t = (\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t)^2$. We apply Itô's Lemma to Y_t and obtain

$$dY_t = 2(\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t)(d\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)dt) + \frac{1}{2}2(d\Delta z_t)^2 = 2\sigma(\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t)d\mathcal{W}_t^z + \sigma^2 dt$$

Integrating the previous equation between 0 and τ and using condition (II.63), we obtain

$$(\Delta w - (\gamma + \pi)\tau)^2 = 2\sigma \int_0^{\tau} (\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t) d\mathcal{W}_t^z + \sigma^2\tau.$$

Since $\int_0^t (\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t) d\mathcal{W}_t^z$ is a martingale, by the OST, $\int_0^{\tau} (\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t) d\mathcal{W}_t^z$ is a martingale and $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^{\tau} (\Delta z_t + (\gamma + \pi)t) d\mathcal{W}_t^z] = 0$, thus yielding the desired result. \square

Proposition II.10. *The cumulative distribution of Δz conditional on a job separation is given by*

$$\bar{G}^h(\Delta z) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{dI^w(-\Delta z)}{dz} - \frac{(\gamma + \pi)}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} I^w(-\Delta z) - [1 - L^w(-\Delta z)]. \quad (\text{II.64})$$

where $L^w(\Delta w)$ denotes the CDF corresponding to the marginal distribution $l^w(\Delta w)$.

Proof. The objective in this proof is to use the non-differentiability of the distribution of $\bar{g}_s(\Delta z)$ for $s = \{h, u\}$ at $\Delta z = 0$ to express the distribution of Δz conditional on a separation. Observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
L^w(a) &= Pr^{l^w}(\Delta w \leq a) \\
&\stackrel{(1)}{=} Pr^{\bar{G}^h, \bar{G}^u}(-(\Delta z^h + \Delta z^u) \leq a) \\
&\stackrel{(2)}{=} Pr^{\bar{G}^h, \bar{G}^u}(\Delta z^h + \Delta z^u \geq -a) \\
&\stackrel{(3)}{=} 1 - Pr(\Delta z^h + \Delta z^u \leq -a) \\
&\stackrel{(4)}{=} 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(-a - y) \bar{g}^u(y) dy.
\end{aligned}$$

Step (1) uses the definition of Δw . Steps (2)–(4) use independence of $\bar{G}^h(\cdot)$ and $\bar{g}^u(\cdot)$. It can be shown that

$$\bar{g}^u(\Delta z) = \mathcal{G}_u \begin{cases} e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, 0] \\ e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \infty) \end{cases}, L^w(\Delta w) = 1 - C_1(\Delta w) - C_2(\Delta w), \tag{II.65}$$

where

$$C_1(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \int_0^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w - u) e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))u} du, \quad C_2(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \int_{-\infty}^0 \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w - u) e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))u} du.$$

Departing from $L^w(\Delta w) = 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w - y) \bar{g}^u(y) dy$ and doing the change of variable $x = -\Delta w - y$,

$$L^w(\Delta w) = 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(x) \bar{g}^u(-\Delta w - x) dx.$$

Taking the derivative on both sides with respect to Δw , we obtain

$$l^w(\Delta w) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(x) (\bar{g}^u)'(-\Delta w - x) dx.$$

Reverting the change of variables and using the fact that $\bar{g}^u(-\Delta w - x)$ is non-differentiable at 0, we obtain

$$l^w(\Delta w) = \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_1(\Delta w) + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_2(\Delta w).$$

Thus,

$$I^w(\Delta w) = \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_1(\Delta w) + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_2(\Delta w). \quad (\text{II.66})$$

To obtain the last condition, observe that

$$C_1(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \int_{-\infty}^{-\Delta w} \bar{G}^h(y) e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))(-\Delta w - y)} dy, \quad C_2(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \int_{-\Delta w}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(y) e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))(-\Delta w - y)} dy.$$

Taking the derivative with respect to Δw and using the Leibniz rule, we obtain

$$C_1'(\Delta w) = -\mathcal{G}_u \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_1(\Delta w), \quad (\text{II.67})$$

$$C_2'(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w) - \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_2(\Delta w). \quad (\text{II.68})$$

Taking derivative of (II.66),

$$(I^w)'(\Delta w) = \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_1'(\Delta w) + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_2'(\Delta w)$$

and using conditions (II.67) and (II.68),

$$(I^w)'(\Delta w) = \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w) \mathcal{G}_u [\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))] \\ - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^2 C_1(\Delta w) - \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^2 C_2(\Delta w). \quad (\text{II.69})$$

Equations (II.65), (II.66), and (II.69) give a system of three functional equations with three unknowns:

$$1 - L^w(\Delta w) = C_1(\Delta w) + C_2(\Delta w), \\ I^w(\Delta w) = \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_1(\Delta w) + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))C_2(\Delta w), \\ (I^w)'(\Delta w) = \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w) \mathcal{G}_u [\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))] \\ - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^2 C_1(\Delta w) - \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^2 C_2(\Delta w).$$

Operating on the system of functional equations,

$$(I^w)'(\Delta w) + [\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) + \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))] I^w(\Delta w) + \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) [1 - L^w(\Delta w)] \\ = \bar{G}^h(-\Delta w) \mathcal{G}_u [\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))] ,$$

with

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{G}_u &= \left(\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} \right)^{-1} \\ \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) &= \frac{-(\gamma + \pi) - \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}{\sigma^2}, \\ \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) &= \frac{-(\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}{\sigma^2}.\end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{G}_u[\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))] &= \frac{2f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{\sigma^2} \\ \frac{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) + \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))}{\mathcal{G}_u[\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))]} &= -\frac{(\gamma + \pi)}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}. \\ \frac{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))}{\mathcal{G}_u[\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) - \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))]} &= -1.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the differential equation is given by (II.64). □

Proposition II.11. *If $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$, the distribution of cumulative productivity shocks $g^h(\Delta z)$ is given by*

$$g^h(\Delta z) = s\mathcal{E} \left[\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} \frac{2(\Delta z - y)}{\sigma^2} \bar{g}^h(y) dy + \bar{G}^h(-\Delta^q) \frac{2(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}{\sigma^2} \right].$$

If $(\gamma + \pi) \neq 0$, the distribution of cumulative productivity shocks $g^h(\Delta z)$ is given by

$$g^h(\Delta z) = \frac{s\mathcal{E}}{(\gamma + \pi)} \left[\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} \left(1 - e^{\frac{2(\gamma + \pi)}{\sigma^2}(y - \Delta z)} \right) \bar{g}^h(y) dy + \bar{G}^h(-\Delta^q) \left[1 - e^{-\frac{2(\gamma + \pi)}{\sigma^2}(\Delta z + \Delta^q)} \right] \right].$$

Proof. During employment, the distribution of cumulative productivity shocks satisfies the following KFE and the boundary conditions

$$\begin{aligned}\delta g^h(\Delta z) &= (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \setminus \{0\}, \\ g^h(-\Delta^q) &= g^h(\Delta^l) = 0, G^h(\Delta^l) = \mathcal{E}, \\ g^h(\Delta z) &\in \mathbb{C}.\end{aligned}$$

The distribution of cumulative productivity shocks conditional on a job separation satisfies

$$\bar{G}^h(\Delta z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \Delta z \in [\Delta^l, \infty) \\ \frac{1}{s\mathcal{E}} \left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^q} (g^h)'(\Delta z) + \delta \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} g^h(x) dx \right] & \text{if } \Delta z \in [-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \\ 0 & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, -\Delta^q). \end{cases}$$

Combining these two conditions, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} s\mathcal{E} \bar{g}^h(\Delta z) &= (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \setminus \{0\} \\ g^h(-\Delta^q) &= g^h(\Delta^l) = 0, G^h(\Delta^+) = \mathcal{E}. \end{aligned}$$

Multiplying both sides of the first equation by $e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta z}$ we get

$$s\mathcal{E} e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta z} \bar{g}^h(\Delta z) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d(e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta z} (g^h)'(\Delta z))}{d\Delta z}.$$

Integrating both sides from $-\Delta^q$ to Δz , we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} s\mathcal{E} \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}x} \bar{g}^h(x) dx &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta z} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{x \downarrow -\Delta^q} e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}x} (g^h)'(x) \right], \\ &= \frac{\sigma^2}{2} e^{\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta z} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - s\mathcal{E} e^{-\frac{2(\gamma+\pi)}{\sigma^2}\Delta^q} \bar{G}^h(-\Delta^q), \end{aligned}$$

where the last equation uses the value of $\bar{G}^h(\Delta z)$ evaluated at $\Delta z = -\Delta^q$. Solving for $(g^h)'(\Delta z)$, integrating from $-\Delta^q$ to Δz and taking the limit as $(\gamma + \pi) \downarrow 0$, we get

$$g^h(\Delta z) = s\mathcal{E} \left[\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} \frac{2(\Delta z - y)}{\sigma^2} \bar{g}^h(y) dy + \bar{G}^h(-\Delta^q) \frac{2(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}{\sigma^2} \right].$$

□

Let $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\cdot]$ and $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\cdot]$ be the expectation operators under the distributions $\bar{g}^h(\Delta z)$ and $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$, respectively.

Proposition II.12. Define the weights $\omega^{hn}(\Delta z) = \frac{\Delta z^n}{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^n]}$ with the property that

$$\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h \left[\omega^{hn}(\Delta z) \right] = 1.$$

If $\gamma + \pi = 0$, then $\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n]$ can be recovered from

$$\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = \frac{2\mathcal{E}}{(n+1)(n+2)} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h \left[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{h2}(\Delta z) \right]. \quad (\text{II.70})$$

If $\gamma + \pi \neq 0$, then $\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n]$ can be recovered recursively from

$$\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = \frac{\mathcal{E}}{n+1} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{h1}(\Delta z)] + \frac{\sigma^2 n}{2(\gamma + \pi)} \mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-1}].$$

The moments $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{hk}(\Delta z)] = \frac{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^{n+k}]}{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^k]}$ can be recovered from the following linear system of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^n] &= (-1)^n \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{n}{i} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^i] \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^{n-i}], \\ \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[(\Delta z)^{n-i}] &= \frac{(n-i)!}{\mathcal{L}_1^{n-i} (\mathcal{L}_2 + \mathcal{L}_2^{-1})} \left(\mathcal{L}_2^{-(n-i+1)} - (-\mathcal{L}_2)^{(n-i+1)} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\mathcal{L}_1 = \sqrt{\frac{2f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{\sigma^2}} \text{ and } \mathcal{L}_2 = \sqrt{\frac{(\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}{- (\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}.$$

Proof. We divide the proof into 3 steps.

Step 1. We first show that

$$\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = \frac{\mathcal{E}}{n+1} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{h1}(\Delta z)] - \frac{\sigma^2 n}{2(\gamma + \pi)} \mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-1}].$$

when $(\gamma + \pi) \neq 0$. For the case with $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$, see [Baley and Blanco \(2021\)](#).

Let us define $Y_t = (\Delta z_t)^n$. The law of motion for Δz_t is given by $d\Delta z_t = -(\gamma + \pi) dt + \sigma d\mathcal{W}_t^z$. Applying Itô's Lemma, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} dY_t &= n(\Delta z_t)^{n-1} d\Delta z_t + \frac{1}{2} n(n-1) (\Delta z_t)^{n-2} (d\Delta z_t)^2 \\ &= \left[-(\gamma + \pi) n (\Delta z_t)^{n-1} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} n(n-1) (\Delta z_t)^{n-2} \right] dt + n\sigma (\Delta z_t)^{n-1} d\mathcal{W}_t^z \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$(\Delta z_{\tau^m})^n = -(\gamma + \pi)n \int_0^{\tau^m} (\Delta z_t)^{n-1} dt + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}n(n-1) \int_0^{\tau^m} (\Delta z_t)^{n-2} dt + n \int_0^{\tau^m} (\Delta z_t)^{n-1} \sigma dW_t^z.$$

Following the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition II.9 and using the Renewal Principle to have $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] = 1/s$, we obtain

$$\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = -(\gamma + \pi)n\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-1}]}{\mathcal{E}} + \frac{\sigma^2 n(n-1)}{2s} \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-2}]}{\mathcal{E}}$$

or equivalently

$$\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = -\frac{\mathcal{E}}{(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m]} \frac{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^{n+1}]}{n+1} + \frac{\sigma^2 n}{2(\gamma + \pi)} \mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-1}].$$

From Proposition II.9, we have $(\gamma + \pi)\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] = -\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)]$ and $\frac{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^{n+1}]}{\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)]} = \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{h1}(\Delta z)]$. Thus,

$$\mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^n] = \frac{\mathcal{E}}{n+1} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(\Delta z)^n \omega^{h1}(\Delta z)] + \frac{\sigma^2 n}{2(\gamma + \pi)} \mathbb{E}_h[(\Delta z)^{n-1}].$$

Step 2. Here we show that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^n] = (-1)^n \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{n}{i} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^i] \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^{n-i}].$$

Using the independence of cumulative productivity shocks during employment and unemployment,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w^n] &= \bar{\mathbb{E}}[(-\Delta z^h - \Delta z^u)^n], \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{n}{i} \bar{\mathbb{E}}[(-\Delta z^h)^i (-\Delta z^u)^{n-i}], \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{n}{i} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[(-\Delta z)^i] \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[(-\Delta z)^{n-i}], \\ &= (-1)^n \sum_{i=0}^n \binom{n}{i} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^i] \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^{n-i}], \end{aligned}$$

Step 3. Here we show that

$$\mathbb{E}_u[(\Delta z)^{n-i}] = \frac{(n-i)!}{\mathcal{L}_1^{n-i} (\mathcal{L}_2 + \mathcal{L}_2^{-1})} \left(\mathcal{L}_2^{-(n-i+1)} - (-\mathcal{L}_2)^{(n-i+1)} \right).$$

Let us depart from the definition of $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$, which is given by

$$\bar{g}^u(\Delta z) = \left[-\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} \right]^{-1} \begin{cases} e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, 0) \\ e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \infty) \end{cases}$$

where $\beta_1(x) = \frac{-(\gamma+\pi) - \sqrt{(\gamma+\pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 x}}{\sigma^2}$ and $\beta_2(x) = \frac{-(\gamma+\pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma+\pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 x}}{\sigma^2}$. This step consists of showing that $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$ is an asymmetric Laplace distribution with parameters

$$\mathcal{L}_1 = \sqrt{\frac{2f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{\sigma^2}} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{L}_2 = \sqrt{\frac{(\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}{-\gamma - \pi + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}}$$

The ratio between \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 is

$$\frac{\mathcal{L}_1}{\mathcal{L}_2} = \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))).$$

The negative of the product between \mathcal{L}_1 and \mathcal{L}_2 is

$$-\mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_2 = \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))).$$

Therefore, we can write $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$

$$\bar{g}^u(\Delta z) = \frac{\mathcal{L}_1}{\mathcal{L}_2 + \mathcal{L}_2^{-1}} \begin{cases} e^{\frac{\mathcal{L}_1}{\mathcal{L}_2} \Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, 0] \\ e^{-\mathcal{L}_1 \mathcal{L}_2 \Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \infty), \end{cases}$$

which is the probability distribution function of an asymmetric Laplace distribution. It is a standard result that the n -th moment for an asymmetric Laplace distribution is given by

$$\mathbb{E}_u[(\Delta z)^n] = \frac{n!}{\mathcal{L}_1^n (\mathcal{L}_2 + \mathcal{L}_2^{-1})} \left(\mathcal{L}_2^{-(n+1)} - (-\mathcal{L}_2)^{(n+1)} \right).$$

□

II.6 Characterizing $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$ and the distribution of log nominal wage changes

The equilibrium policies $(\hat{w}^q, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^l)$ together with the stochastic process guiding Δz and the exogenous job separation rate determine the equilibrium distributions of cumulative productivity shocks $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$. Due to the law of motion for Δz being independent of the worker's employment state, the KFEs for employed and unemployed workers are

$$\delta g^h(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \setminus \{0\}, \quad (\text{II.71})$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))g^u(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^u)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^u)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \{0\}. \quad (\text{II.72})$$

Since the entry state for a newly employed or unemployed worker is $\Delta z = 0$, the KFEs (II.71)–(II.72) do not hold at this point, but $g^h(\cdot)$ and $g^u(\cdot)$ must be continuous there.

The boundary conditions impose a zero measure of workers at the borders of the support, so $g^h(-\Delta^q) = g^h(\Delta^l) = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} g^u(\Delta z) = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} g^u(\Delta z) = 0$. These distributions must also be consistent with a unit measure of workers and a balance equation for steady-state employment:

$$1 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \quad (\text{II.73})$$

$$\underbrace{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}_{u\text{-to-}h \text{ flows}}(1 - \mathcal{E}) = \underbrace{\delta \mathcal{E} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^q} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{\Delta z \uparrow \Delta^l} (g^h)'(\Delta z) \right]}_{h\text{-to-}u \text{ flows}}. \quad (\text{II.74})$$

In equation (II.73), the unit measure of workers is composed of $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z = 1 - \mathcal{E}$ unemployed and $\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z = \mathcal{E}$ employed workers. In equation (II.74), the mass of u -to- h flows is $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) (1 - \mathcal{E})$, while the mass of h -to- u flows is $\delta \mathcal{E} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} [\lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^q} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{\Delta z \uparrow \Delta^l} (g^h)'(\Delta z)]$ —i.e., the sum of exogenous and endogenous job separations.

To summarize, equations (II.71)–(II.74), together with the continuity of $g^u(\Delta z)$ and $g^h(\Delta z)$ at $\Delta z = 0$, constitute the equilibrium conditions for the steady-state distributions of cumulative productivity shocks. Next, we show that these conditions are sufficient to characterize $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$ in closed-form.

Proposition II.13. *Assume $\delta > 0$. Then, $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$ are given by*

$$g^h(\Delta z) = \mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \begin{cases} \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, 0) \\ \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z - \Delta^l)} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)(\Delta z - \Delta^l)}}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \Delta^l) \end{cases}$$

$$g^u(\Delta z) = (1 - \mathcal{E})\mathcal{G}_u \begin{cases} e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, 0) \\ e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \infty) \end{cases}$$

where

$$\beta_1(x) = \frac{-(\gamma + \pi) - \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 x}}{\sigma^2}, \beta_2(x) = \frac{-(\gamma + \pi) + \sqrt{(\gamma + \pi)^2 + 2\sigma^2 x}}{\sigma^2},$$

$$\mathcal{E} = \frac{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + \delta + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\mathcal{G}_h \left[\frac{\beta_1(\delta) - \beta_2(\delta)}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^-} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^-}} - \frac{\beta_1(\delta) - \beta_2(\delta)}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} \right]},$$

$$\mathcal{G}_h = \left[\frac{\frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^-} - 1}{\beta_1(\delta)} - \frac{e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^-} - 1}{\beta_2(\delta)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^-} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^-}} + \frac{\frac{1 - e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l}}{\beta_1(\delta)} - \frac{1 - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}}{\beta_2(\delta)}}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} \right]^{-1},$$

$$\mathcal{G}_u = \left[-\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} + \beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))^{-1} \right]^{-1}.$$

Proof. Let us write the KFE and border conditions:

$$\delta g^h(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) / \{0\} \quad (\text{II.75})$$

$$g^h(-\Delta^q) = g^h(\Delta^l) = 0, \quad (\text{II.76})$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))g^u(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^u)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^u)''(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\infty, \infty) / \{0\}, \quad (\text{II.77})$$

$$\lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} g^u(\Delta z) = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} g^u(\Delta z) = 0, \quad (\text{II.78})$$

$$1 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^-}^{\Delta^l} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \quad (\text{II.79})$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))(1 - \mathcal{E}) = \delta \mathcal{E} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^-} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{\Delta z \uparrow \Delta^l} (g^h)'(\Delta z) \right], \quad (\text{II.80})$$

$$g^h(\Delta z), g^u(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}.$$

We guess and verify the proposed solution. Substituting the guess for $g^h(\Delta z)$ in (II.75) for $\Delta z < 0$, we have

$$0 = -\delta \mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} + (\gamma + \pi)\beta_1(\delta)\mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} + \mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \beta_1(\delta)^2 \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} \Leftarrow$$

$$0 = -\delta + (\gamma + \pi)\beta_1(\delta) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\beta_1(\delta)^2,$$

mutatis mutandis, for the terms that include $\beta_2(\delta)$. Given the definition of $\beta_1(\delta)$, the guess satisfies (II.75). A similar argument applies when (II.75) is evaluated at $\Delta z > 0$. It is easy to verify that the boundary conditions (II.76) are satisfied and that $g^h(\Delta z)$ is continuous at $\Delta z = 0$. Following the same steps for $g^u(\Delta z)$, we verify conditions (II.77) and (II.78). Next, we verify condition (II.79):

$$\begin{aligned}
& \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^-}^{\Delta^l} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z \\
&= (1 - \mathcal{E}) \mathcal{G}_u \left[\int_{-\infty}^0 e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} d\Delta z + \int_0^{\infty} e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} d\Delta z \right] + \dots \\
&+ \mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \left[\int_{-\Delta^-}^0 \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)(\Delta z + \Delta^q)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} d\Delta z + \int_0^{\Delta^l} \frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)(\Delta z - \Delta^l)} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)(\Delta z - \Delta^l)}}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^+} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} d\Delta z \right] \\
&= (1 - \mathcal{E}) \mathcal{G}_u \left[\frac{1 - \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z}}{\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))} + \frac{\lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta z} - 1}{\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))} \right] + \dots \\
&+ \mathcal{E} \mathcal{G}_h \left[\frac{\frac{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - 1}{\beta_1(\delta)} - \frac{e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^-} - 1}{\beta_2(\delta)}}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^-} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^-}} + \frac{\frac{1 - e^{-\beta_1\Delta^l}}{\beta_1(\delta)} - \frac{1 - e^{-\beta_2\Delta^+}}{\beta_2(\delta)}}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} \right] = (1 - \mathcal{E}) + \mathcal{E} = 1.
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, combining condition (II.80) with the definition of $g^h(\Delta z)$, the employment rate is

$$\mathcal{E} = \frac{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + \delta + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \mathcal{G}_h \left[\frac{\beta_1(\delta) - \beta_2(\delta)}{e^{\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^q} - e^{\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^q}} - \frac{\beta_1(\delta) - \beta_2(\delta)}{e^{-\beta_1(\delta)\Delta^l} - e^{-\beta_2(\delta)\Delta^l}} \right]}.$$

□

Now, we solve for the log nominal wage changes distribution. The distribution of log nominal wage changes between two new jobs is determined by the distributions of cumulative productivity shocks during completed employment and unemployment spells, as well as the equilibrium policies. The following proposition characterizes this distribution in closed-form.

Proposition II.14. *The distribution of log nominal wage changes satisfies*

$$l^w(\Delta w) = \mathcal{G}_u \left[\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta w} \Gamma_2(\Delta w) + \beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))) e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)))\Delta w} \Gamma_1(\Delta w) \right]$$

with

$$(\Gamma_1(c), \Gamma_2(c)) = \left(\int_{-\infty}^{-c} e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx, \int_{-c}^{\infty} e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx \right).$$

Proof. Fix a date t_0 and focus on a newly hired worker. Then, the distribution of wage changes between two new jobs is given by

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\Delta w \leq c) &= Pr(w_{t_0+\tau^m+\tau^u} - w_{t_0} \leq c) \\ &\stackrel{(1)}{=} Pr(w_{t_0+\tau^m+\tau^u} - z_{t_0+\tau^m+\tau^u} - (w_{t_0} - z_{t_0}) + (z_{t_0+\tau^m+\tau^u} - z_{t_0}) \leq c) \\ &\stackrel{(2)}{=} Pr(\hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^* + (z_{t_0+\tau^m+\tau^u} - z_{t_0}) \leq c) \\ &\stackrel{(3)}{=} Pr(-(\Delta z^h + \Delta z^u) \leq c), \end{aligned}$$

where Δz^h and Δz^u denote cumulative productivity shocks during completed employment and unemployment spells, respectively. Here, step (1) adds and subtracts productivity at the beginning of both job spells. In step (2), we use the result that \hat{w}^* is constant across jobs. Step 3 uses the facts that τ^u and the Brownian motion increments are independent of the filtration \mathcal{F}_{τ_u} . Therefore, the distributions of cumulative productivity shocks for completed employment and unemployment spells are given by

$$\bar{G}^h(\Delta z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \Delta z \in [\Delta^l, \infty) \\ \frac{1}{s\mathcal{E}} \left[\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^-} (g^h)'(\Delta z) + \delta \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta z} g^h(x) dx \right] & \text{if } \Delta z \in [-\Delta^q, \Delta^+) \\ 0 & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, -\Delta^q) \end{cases}$$

$$\bar{g}^u(\Delta z) = \mathcal{G}_u \begin{cases} e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in (-\infty, 0] \\ e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))\Delta z} & \text{if } \Delta z \in [0, \infty) \end{cases}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\Delta w \leq c) &= Pr(-(\Delta z^u + \Delta z^h) \leq c) \\ &= 1 - Pr(\Delta z^u + \Delta z^h \leq -c) \\ &\stackrel{(1)}{=} 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \bar{G}^h(-(c + \Delta z)) \bar{g}^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z \\ &\stackrel{(2)}{=} 1 - \mathcal{G}_u \left[\int_{-\infty}^0 e^{\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))\Delta z} \bar{G}^h(-(c + \Delta z)) d\Delta z + \int_0^{\infty} e^{\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))\Delta z} \bar{G}^h(-(c + \Delta z)) d\Delta z \right] \\ &\stackrel{(3)}{=} 1 + \mathcal{G}_u \left[\int_{\infty}^{-c} e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx + \int_{-c}^{-\infty} e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$=^{(4)} 1 - \mathcal{G}_u \left[e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))c} \int_{-c}^{\infty} e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx + e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))c} \int_{-\infty}^{-c} e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx \right].$$

In step (1), we use the independence of Δz^u and Δz^h . In step (2), we use the definition of $\bar{g}^u(\Delta z)$. In step (3), we integrate by substituting $x = -c - \Delta z$, and in step (4), we use the properties of an integral. The last step involves defining

$$(\Gamma_1(c), \Gamma_2(c)) = \left(\int_{-\infty}^{-c} e^{-\beta_1(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx, \int_{-c}^{\infty} e^{-\beta_2(f(\hat{w}^*))x} \bar{G}^h(x) dx \right).$$

□

III Additional Results for Section 3.3: Model Extension to Staggered Wage Renegotiations

III.1 Model with Staggered Wage Renegotiation

In this section, we generalize our model to the case of staggered wage renegotiations, which we assume follow a Nash bargaining protocol with worker weight χ and occur at rate $\delta^r \geq 0$ à la [Calvo \(1983\)](#). The generalized model nests as a special case the economy with fully rigid wages ($\delta^r \rightarrow 0$) presented in the main text and also the polar opposite case with fully flexible wages ($\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$). By convexifying between these two cases, the generalized model allows for arbitrary frequencies of wage changes in employment that can be matched to the data. The generalized model with staggered wage renegotiations yields several results, but our main conclusion is that all of our key insights extend to an environment with $0 < \delta^r < \infty$ subject to minor modifications.

In the baseline model, wages are completely rigid within a worker-firm match. We have chosen to present and analyze this simplified model to enhance clarity and provide a first theoretical foundation for analyzing several core aspects of the model. Nevertheless, this assumption is unrealistic and affects our results. To address this limitation, we follow the approach of [Gertler and Trigari \(2009\)](#) and extend the baseline model by incorporating staggered wage renegotiations à la [Calvo \(1983\)](#). The resulting insight is that all our key findings can be extended to this more general environment. Importantly, almost all the proofs can be extended to the model involving wage adjustments within a match with only minor modifications. Next, we present a summary of how wage renegotiations within a match affect our results.

Environment.

Here, we modify the baseline setup exclusively to permit wage renegotiations within a match. Preferences, technology, and search frictions remain unchanged from those outlined in the main text. Wage bargaining within a match is modeled by a Poisson process with a rate denoted by $\delta^r \geq 0$. We assume that these renegotiations entail setting the wage within a worker-firm match according to Nash bargaining, with the worker's weight over the prevailing surplus at the time of renegotiation given by χ (i.e., equal to the elasticity of the matching function to satisfy Hosios condition). As $\delta^r \rightarrow 0$, we recover the baseline model with fully rigid wages within a match. As $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, the model transitions to the opposite extreme where wages are flexible and continuously reset.

Recursive Formulation.

Value Functions. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of an unemployed worker is still given by

$$\rho u(z) = Be^z + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} + \max_w f(\theta(z; w)) [h(z; w) - u(z)].$$

The HJB equation of a worker employed at log wage w with log productivity $z \in \mathcal{Z}^j(w)$, for which the firm prefers to continue, is now

$$\rho h(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial h(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 h(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta^r [h(z; w^*(z)) - h(z; w)] - \delta [h(z; w) - u(z)], \rho u(z) \right\}$$

and for productivities $z \notin \mathcal{Z}^j(w)$ (i.e., at productivity for which the firm prefers to dissolve the match), the HJB is given by

$$h(z; w) = u(z) \quad \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w))^c,$$

with $h(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$. The only difference relative to the baseline model is the term $\delta^r [h(z; w^*(z)) - h(z; w)]$, which captures the expected capital gain from wage renegotiation.

Similarly, the HJB equation of a firm employing a worker at log wage w with log productivity $z \in \mathcal{Z}^h(w)$, for which the worker prefers to continue the match, is now given by

$$\rho j(z; w) = \max \left\{ e^z - e^w + \gamma \frac{\partial j(z; w)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 j(z; w)}{\partial z^2} + \delta^r [j(z; w^*(z)) - j(z; w)] - \delta j(z; w), 0 \right\}.$$

and the HJB equation evaluated at log productivity $z \notin \mathcal{Z}^h(w)$, when the worker prefers

to dissolve the match, is given by

$$j(z; w) = 0 \quad \forall z \in (\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w))^c,$$

with $j(\cdot; w) \in \mathbf{C}^1(\mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w)) \cap \mathbf{C}(\mathbb{R})$. Again, the only difference is the term $\delta^r[j(z; w^*(z)) - j(z; w)]$, which captures the expected capital gain that a firm experiences when renegotiating the wage with the worker.

Continuation Sets. The firm's and worker's optimal continuation sets are

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{Z}^{j^*}(w) &= \text{int} \{z \in \mathbb{R} : j(z; w) > 0 \text{ or } e^z - e^w > 0\}, \\ \mathcal{Z}^{h^*}(w) &= \text{int} \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R} : h(z; w) > u(z) \text{ or } 0 < e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Observe the following property: Allowing for wage renegotiation within a match does not affect the equilibrium conditions characterizing the continuation sets. We first explain the intuition behind this result, and then we formalize it.

To understand the intuition, we follow the same steps as in Supplementary Material I.1. We do so by focusing on the continuation set of the worker—a similar logic applies to the continuation set of the firm. Take a discrete time approximation Δt of our model. Let $\mathbb{I}_{\Delta t}^j(z; w)$ denote the firm's continuation policy, which is equal to 1 if the firm continues the match and zero if the firm lays the worker off. Continuing in the match dominates separating from it whenever

$$h_{\Delta t}(z; w) = e^w \Delta t + e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{(z; w)} [h_{\Delta t}(z'; w') \mathbb{I}^j(z'; w') + u_{\Delta t}(z') (1 - \mathbb{I}^j(z'; w'))] > u_{\Delta t}(z), \quad (\text{III.81})$$

for the firm's stopping policy $\mathbb{I}^j(z'; w')$. Here, $\mathbb{E}_{(z; w)}[\cdot]$ denotes the conditional expectation given wage renegotiations, the law of motion of productivity, and exogenous separations. Since the worker is optimally choosing to stay or quit, we have $h^\Delta(z; w) \geq u^\Delta(z)$ for all z . Since condition (III.81) holds for any policy $\mathbb{I}^j(z'; w')$, it must also hold for $\mathbb{I}^j(z'; w') = 0$ for all $(z'; w')$. Therefore,

$$e^w + \frac{e^{-\rho \Delta t} \mathbb{E}_{(z; w)} [u_{\Delta t}(z; w)(z'; w')] - u(z)}{\Delta t} > 0.$$

Taking the limit as $\Delta t \downarrow 0$, we have

$$e^w - \rho u(z) + \gamma \frac{\partial u(z)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u(z)}{\partial z^2} > 0,$$

which is the same condition derived from our baseline model.

The reason why wage renegotiations do not affect the condition for continuation to be a weakly dominating strategy is that they do not directly affect the worker's or the firm's value conditional on a separation (i.e., $u(z)$ and 0). Formally, define the law motion of the worker's state variables as

$$\begin{aligned} dw_t &= (\hat{w}^*(z) - \hat{w}_{t-}) d\mathcal{N}_t, \\ dz_t &= \gamma dt + \sigma d\mathcal{W}_t^z, \end{aligned}$$

where \mathcal{N}_t is a Poisson counter with arrival rate δ^r and $\hat{w}^*(z)$ is the bargained wage (see below). Given the law of motion of the state and a stopping time τ^m , the value functions of the worker and the firm are

$$\begin{aligned} h(w, z) &= \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\rho t} e^{w_t} dt + e^{-\rho \tau^m} u(z_{\tau^m}) \right], \\ j(w, z) &= \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-\rho t} [e^{z_t} - e^{w_t}] + e^{-\rho \tau^m} \times 0 dt \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Let \mathcal{A} be the characteristic operator of (w_t, z_t) adjusted by discounting—i.e., $\mathcal{A}(\phi) = -\rho\phi(w, z) + \delta^r(\phi(w^*(z), z) - \phi(w, z)) + \gamma \frac{\partial \phi(\cdot)}{\partial z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 \phi(\cdot)}{\partial z^2}$. Then, the pairs (w, z) for which the worker and the firm prefer to continue for every stopping time are given by

$$\begin{aligned} e^w + \mathcal{A}(u) &> 0, \\ 1 - e^w + \mathcal{A}(0) &> 0. \end{aligned}$$

Wage Renegotiations. Let $w^*(z)$ be the solution to a Nash bargaining problem with worker's bargaining weight given by χ :

$$w^*(z) = \arg \max_w \left\{ (h(z; w) - u(z))^\chi j(z; w)^{1-\chi} \right\}.$$

We conclude this section with a discussion on the wage-renegotiation protocol. Our aim is to expand our model by incorporating the on-the-job bargaining framework as presented in [Gertler and Trigari \(2009\)](#), while keeping the economic environment unchanged. However, it is important to make some comments. First, the opportunity cost for each agent during bargaining is the corresponding value of separation ($u(z)$ for the worker and 0 for the firm), not the corresponding value at the current wage. This implies that agents commit to separate from the match in the off-equilibrium event that bargaining fails—the

conventional assumption adopted in the literature (e.g., [Shimer, 2005](#); [Gertler and Trigari, 2009](#)). For a deviation from this assumption, refer to [Blanco *et al.* \(2025\)](#). Second, the entry wage coincides with the bargained wage. While a deviation from the bargaining weight χ would lead to a different surplus split, the economic mechanisms affecting the entry and bargained wages remain the same.

Equilibrium Characterization.

For the remainder of this section, we consider the case $\chi = \alpha$. Using the change of notation adopted in Lemma 1— $\hat{w} := w - z$, $\hat{\rho} := \rho - \gamma - \sigma^2/2$ and $\hat{\gamma} := \gamma + \sigma^2$ —we define

$$(\hat{U}, \hat{J}(w - z), \hat{W}(w - z), \hat{\theta}(w - z)) = \left(\frac{u(z)}{e^z}, \frac{j(z; w)}{e^z}, \frac{h(z; w) - u(z)}{e^z}, \theta(z; w) \right).$$

Rewriting the HJB equations using this change of notation, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\rho}\hat{U} &= B + \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}))\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \max \left\{ e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r (\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{W}(\hat{w})) - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}), 0 \right\} \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \max \left\{ 1 - e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r (\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{J}(\hat{w})) - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}), 0 \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Here, the terms $\delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)$ and $\delta^r \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)$ are constant, since the reset wage \hat{w}^* does not depend on the current value of \hat{w} . Therefore, the problem is identical to that in the baseline model with completely rigid wages (i.e., with $\delta^r = 0$), with the exception of three aspects. First, the effective discount rate for both workers and firms becomes $\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r$ instead of the previous expression $\hat{\rho} + \delta$. Second, the worker's flow value is now given by $e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ instead of the previous expression $e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}$. Third, the firm's flow value is now given by $1 - e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)$ instead of the previous expression $1 - e^{\hat{w}}$. It is important to note that these expressions simplify to those from the baseline model as $\delta^r \rightarrow 0$.

We now extend our key results to the case of on-the-job wage renegotiations.

Equilibrium Policies. We now analyze how on-the-job wage renegotiation affects equilibrium policies associated with job creation and job destruction. In particular, we extend Proposition 2, Parts 1 to 3, which focus on job creation. We skip Part 4 of that proposition since its extension to a setting with wage renegotiation is trivial.

Proposition III.15. *With wage renegotiations à la [Calvo \(1983\)](#), the BRE has the following properties:*

1. The joint match surplus satisfies

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r),$$

where

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) := \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta^r)t} dt \right]$$

is the expected discounted duration of current wages and $1 > \hat{\rho}\hat{U} > B$. The following properties hold:

$$\lim_{\delta^r \downarrow 0} \hat{S}(\hat{w}) = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{\delta^r \rightarrow \infty} \hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \frac{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \quad (\text{III.82})$$

i.e., endogenous separations do not affect the surplus (and thus, the entry wage) when $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$.

2. The competitive entry wage—i.e., $\hat{w}^* = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w})) \hat{W}(\hat{w})$ —exists and is unique. Moreover, it solves:

$$\hat{w}^* = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \left\{ \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha \hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \right\} = \arg \max_{\hat{w}} \left\{ \eta(\hat{w})^\alpha (1 - \eta(\hat{w}))^{1-\alpha} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) \right\},$$

with optimality condition

$$\underbrace{\eta'(\hat{w}^*) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} - \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*)} \right)}_{\text{Share channel}} = - \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}}_{\text{Surplus channel}}.$$

with $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$ as $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$.

3. Given $\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$, the equilibrium job finding rate $f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))$ and the flow opportunity cost of employment $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ are given by

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) = \left[(1 - \eta(\hat{w}^*)) \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) / K \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}},$$

$$\hat{\rho}\hat{U} = B + \left(K^{\alpha-1} (1 - \eta(\hat{w}))^{1-\alpha} \eta(\hat{w})^\alpha \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}.$$

Proof. Now, we prove each equilibrium property.

1. The fact that $\hat{\rho}U \geq B$ follows from the same argument as before. Combining the sequence and recursive formulations of the value functions, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta^r)t} (e^{\hat{w}t} + \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) dt \right] \\ \hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{m*}} e^{-(\hat{\rho}+\delta^r)t} (1 - e^{\hat{w}t} + \delta^r \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)) dt \right]\end{aligned}$$

where τ^{m*} is the optimal stopping time that determines match duration. Summing up, we have

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}) + \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = (1 + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r).$$

Evaluating the expression for match surplus $\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ at \hat{w}^* , we get

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) = (1 + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$$

and thus

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r).$$

Plugging this back into the above expression, we obtain

$$\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r),$$

which is an expression for $\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ that depends only on \hat{U} , $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$, but not on $\hat{S}(\hat{w}^*)$. Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w}), \hat{J}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$, then $\hat{S}(\hat{w}) \geq 0$ and thus

$$0 \leq \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) = (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}}_{>0} \iff 0 \leq 1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \iff 1 \geq \hat{\rho}\hat{U}.$$

Therefore, $1 \geq \hat{\rho}\hat{U} \geq B$. To go from weak to strict inequalities, we follow the same steps as in the baseline model.

Observe that, if $\hat{\tau}^{m*}$ denotes only the stopping times arising from endogenous sepa-

rations, then

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \mathbb{E}_{\hat{w}} \left[1 - e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \hat{t}^{m^*}} \right]$$

Using these results and the algebra of limits, we obtain

$$\lim_{\delta^r \rightarrow \infty} \hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}.$$

2. The proof is analogous. For log-concavity of the value functions, the Ricatti equation continues to hold following the redefinition of variables, but now

$$F(t) \equiv \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left[(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) - \frac{(e^{t+\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}) + \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{\hat{W}(t + \hat{w})} \right].$$

3. The same equilibrium conditions apply.

□


Discussion of the Effect of Wage Renegotiations on Job Creation and the Entry Wage.

Before discussing Proposition III.15, it is important to highlight a distinction between the baseline model and the model with on-the-job bargaining. In the baseline model, $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho})$ represented the expected discounted duration of a match, but now, $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$ denotes the expected discounted duration of the current wage. While these objects are trivially identical when $\delta^r = 0$, as shown in equation (III.82), they differ when $\delta^r > 0$.

Proposition III.15 formalizes a simple intuition: As the frequency of bargaining increases, the economic mechanisms influencing job creation resemble those in existing models of directed search. To illustrate this, Figure III1 shows the value functions of the worker and the firm, the surplus of the match, and the objective function $\hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha$ that the bargained wage \hat{w}^* maximizes. As we can see in Panel A, when $\delta^r = 0$, the surplus function exhibits curvature at $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$ since the entry wage affects the likelihood of future separations. Instead, when $\delta^r = 0.2$, the surplus function becomes independent of the wage for \hat{w} close to \hat{w}^* since the probability of an inefficient separation is small (i.e., it is quite likely that the wage will be renegotiated before the match gets endogenously dissolved). In the limit, as $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, the surplus function becomes a constant independent of \hat{w} .

Figure III2 plots the worker's share evaluated at the entry wage and the flow opportunity cost as a function of the renegotiation rate δ^r . As proposition III.15 shows, when

FIGURE III1. EQUILIBRIUM VALUES AND CONTINUATION SETS IN \hat{w} -SPACE



Notes: The figure plots the equilibrium value functions of the firm $\hat{J}(\hat{w})$ (red line) and the employed worker $\hat{W}(\hat{w})$ (blue line), the surplus of the match $\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ (green line), and the “Nash bargaining” objective function $\hat{J}(\hat{w})^{1-\alpha} \hat{W}(\hat{w})^\alpha$ (black line) as a function of $\hat{w} = w - z$ for $\delta^r = 0$ and $\delta^r = 0.2$. The vertical lines mark the boundaries of the firms’ continuation set $(-\infty, \hat{w}^+)$ and the worker’s continuation set (\hat{w}^-, ∞) .

$\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, the worker’s share of surplus $\eta(\hat{w}^*) \rightarrow \alpha$ and the flow opportunity cost $\hat{\rho} \hat{U}^*$ converges to the solution of the following equation

$$\hat{\rho} \hat{U}^{fb} = B + \left(K^{\alpha-1} (1-\alpha)^{1-\alpha} \alpha^\alpha \frac{1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}^{fb}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}},$$

i.e., the flow opportunity cost when there are no inefficient separations.

Static and Dynamic Considerations Behind Equilibrium Policies. We now extend Propositions 3, 4, and 5 within the model with wage renegotiations.

Proposition III.16. *The following properties hold:*


1. If $\gamma = \sigma = 0$, then the optimal policies are given by

$$(\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^+) = \log \left(\hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \alpha (1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}), \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \hat{\rho} \hat{U}, 1 + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} (1 - \alpha) (1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}) \right)$$

with $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = 1/(\hat{\rho} + \delta)$.

2. Assume $\hat{\gamma} = 0$ and $\alpha = 1/2$, and a first-order approximation of the flow payoffs around \hat{w}^* . Then $\hat{w}^\pm = \hat{w}^* \pm h(\varphi, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}})$ with $\varphi = \sqrt{2 \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}{\sigma^2}}$ and $\Phi = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{1 + \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}$. If $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, then $h \left(\sqrt{2 \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}{\sigma^2}}, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) \rightarrow \infty$. Fix φ such that $\varphi h \left(\varphi, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) < 1.606107734475270$,

FIGURE III2. EQUILIBRIUM POLICIES FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF δ^r



Notes: Panels A and B plot the worker's share evaluated at the entry wage $\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ and the flow opportunity cost $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$ as a function of the renegotiation rate δ^r , respectively. The solid blue lines show the equilibrium values of $\eta(\hat{w}^*)$ and $\hat{\rho}\hat{U}$, while the dotted red lines show the corresponding values when $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$.

then for a given φ , $h(\varphi, \Phi, \cdot)$ is decreasing in $\frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}}$. Furthermore, $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$ and

$$\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = \frac{1 - \operatorname{sech}\left(\varphi h\left(\varphi, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}}\right)\right)}{\delta + \hat{\rho} + \delta^r}.$$

3. Assume $\sigma^2 = 0$ and $\hat{\gamma} \geq 0$. Then,

$$\hat{w}^- = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \delta^r\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)).$$

There exists a $\bar{\delta}^r$ satisfying $\frac{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}(\hat{\rho} + \delta) < \bar{\delta}^r < \frac{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}e^{(\hat{\rho} + \delta)T(\hat{w}^*)}}{\int_0^{T(\hat{w}^*)} (e^{\hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) ds}$ such that if $\delta^r \uparrow \bar{\delta}^r$, then $\hat{w}^- \rightarrow -\infty$.

Proof. We depart from the equilibrium conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\gamma}\hat{W}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+) \\ (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= 1 - e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\gamma}\hat{J}'(\hat{w}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+) \\ (1 - \alpha)\frac{d\log \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}} &= -\alpha\frac{d\log \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}}, \\ \hat{W}(\hat{w}^-) &= \hat{J}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^+) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^+) = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{W}'(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{J}'(\hat{w}^+) = 0$$

whenever $\hat{\gamma} \neq 0$ or $\sigma > 0$. When $\hat{\gamma} = \sigma = 0$, we have the variational inequality holding without a smooth pasting condition. We now show the properties of equilibrium policies.

Case $\gamma = \sigma = 0$: When $\gamma = \sigma = 0$, we have that

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \max\{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*), 0\} \quad (\text{III.83})$$

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \max\{1 - e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*), 0\} \quad (\text{III.84})$$

$$(1 - \alpha)\frac{d\log \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}} = -\alpha\frac{d\log \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{d\hat{w}}. \quad (\text{III.85})$$

Evaluating the equilibrium conditions (III.83) and (III.84) at \hat{w}^*

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}, \quad \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}.$$

and using the equilibrium conditions again, we obtain

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}, \quad \hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}.$$

Next, we compute the reset wage. Given value functions, the equilibrium condition (III.85) yields

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \alpha)\frac{\frac{-e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}}{\frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{1 - e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}} &= -\alpha\frac{\frac{e^{\hat{w}^*}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}}{\frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}} \iff \\ \left(1 + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}\right) (\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}) &= e^{\hat{w}^*} (\alpha + (1 - \alpha)) \left(1 + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}\right) \\ e^{\hat{w}^*} &= \alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}. \end{aligned}$$

The boundaries of the continuation region \hat{w}^- and \hat{w}^+ are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{W}(\hat{w}^-) &= 0 \\ \frac{e^{\hat{w}^-} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} &= 0 \\ \frac{e^{\hat{w}^-} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} &= 0 \\ e^{\hat{w}^-} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta} \alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$e^{\hat{w}^-} = \hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}).$$

Similarly, \hat{w}^+ is given by

$$e^{\hat{w}^+} = 1 + \frac{\delta^r}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}(1 - \alpha)(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}).$$

The rest of the proof is similar to the proof in the baseline model without renegotiation.

Case $\hat{\gamma} = 0$ and $\alpha = 1/2$: We follow the same strategy as in Proposition 4. Let us guess and verify that $e^{\hat{w}^*} = \frac{1+\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2}$, $\hat{w}^- = \hat{w}^* - h$ and $\hat{w}^+ = \hat{w}^* + h$ for a given h . Using a Taylor approximation of the flow profits around \hat{w}^* , we have that

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{W}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} + e^{\hat{w}^*}(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*) + \delta^r\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{W}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^* - h, \hat{w}^* + h)$$

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\hat{J}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2} - e^{\hat{w}^*}(\hat{w} - \hat{w}^*) + \delta^r\hat{J}(\hat{w}^*) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{J}''(\hat{w}), \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^* - h, \hat{w}^* + h),$$

with the border conditions given by the value matching and smooth pasting conditions.

It is easy to check that when $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, $\hat{W}(\hat{w}) \rightarrow \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)$, so h converges to ∞ . Define

$J(x) = \frac{\hat{J}(x+\hat{w}^*) - \frac{1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2(\hat{\rho}+\delta+\delta^r)}}{e^{\hat{w}^*}}$ and $W(x) = \frac{\hat{W}(x+\hat{w}^*) - \frac{1-\hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{2(\hat{\rho}+\delta+\delta^r)}}{e^{\hat{w}^*}}$. Following the same steps as in Proposition 4, we have that $J(x) = W(-x)$ with

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)W(x) &= x + \delta^r W(0) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}W''(x), \quad \forall x \in (-h, h) \\ W(-h) &= W(h) = -\frac{\Phi}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}; \quad W'(-h) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Notice that an increase in the renegotiation arrival rate δ^r , increases the effective discount factor and, at the same time, it increases the worker's flow value. It is easy to show that the solution of the previous differential equation is given by

$$W(x) = Ae^{\varphi x} + Be^{-\varphi x} + \frac{x}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}}(A + B),$$

where $\varphi = \sqrt{2\frac{\hat{\rho}+\delta+\delta^r}{\sigma^2}}$. Writing the value matching conditions and operating, we obtain

$$A \left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) + B \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) = \frac{-\Phi - h}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}$$

$$A \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) + B \left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) = \frac{-\Phi + h}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}.$$

Solving for A and B,

$$A = -\frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (\Phi + h) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2}$$

$$B = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h + \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2}.$$

Thus,

$$-W(x) = \frac{\frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (\Phi + h) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2} \left(e^{\varphi x} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}$$

$$+ \frac{\frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h + \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2} \left(e^{-\varphi x} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) + x}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}.$$

Evaluating the smooth pasting condition, we obtain

$$-\frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (\Phi + h) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2} \varphi e^{-\varphi h}$$

$$- \frac{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h - \Phi) + \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right) (h + \Phi)}{\left(e^{\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2 - \left(e^{-\varphi h} + \frac{\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \right)^2} \varphi e^{\varphi h} + 1 = 0.$$

Operating on this expression and defining $q = \varphi h$, we get

$$\Phi \varphi 2 + \frac{4\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \frac{\sinh(q) - q \cosh(q)}{\cosh(2q) - 1} = -\frac{2 \sinh(2q) - 2q(\cosh(2q) + 1)}{\cosh(2q) - 1}.$$

Thus,

$$\Phi \varphi 2 = -\frac{4\delta^r}{\delta + \hat{\rho}} \frac{\sinh(q) - q \cosh(q)}{\cosh(2q) - 1} - \frac{2 \sinh(2q) - 2q(\cosh(2q) + 1)}{\cosh(2q) - 1}$$

The following properties hold: $-\frac{\sinh(q) - q \cosh(q)}{\cosh(2q) - 1}$ converges to 0 when $q \downarrow 0$, it increases until $q \approx 1.606$ and then decreases to 0 for $q > 1.606$. Since $-\frac{\sinh(q) - q \cosh(q)}{\cosh(2q) - 1}$ is increasing

in q if the solution q is lower than 1.606, we have that $q(\Phi\varphi 2, \frac{4\delta^r}{\delta+\hat{\rho}})$ is decreasing in the second argument.

As in the baseline model, due to symmetry $\hat{w}^\pm = \hat{w}^* \pm h(\varphi, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta+\hat{\rho}})$, we have that $T'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho}) = 0$ and $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = \frac{1 - \text{sech}(\varphi h(\varphi, \Phi, \frac{\delta^r}{\delta+\hat{\rho}}))}{\delta + \hat{\rho} + \delta^r}$.

Case $\hat{\gamma} > 0$ and $\sigma = 0$: In this case, the stopping time is a deterministic function; hence, it is easier to work with the sequential formulation:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{W}(\hat{w}) &= \max_T \int_0^T e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)s} \left(e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}s} + \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho} \hat{U} \right) ds, \\ \hat{J}(\hat{w}) &= \int_0^{T(\hat{w})} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)s} \left(1 + \delta^r \hat{J}(\hat{w}^*) - e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}s} \right) ds.\end{aligned}$$

In equation (I.52), $T(\hat{w})$ is the worker's optimal policy. Taking the FOC with respect to $T(\hat{w})$:

$$e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}T(\hat{w})} = \hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*).$$

Solving the previous equation,

$$T(\hat{w}) = \frac{\hat{w} - \log(\hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*))}{\hat{\gamma}}.$$

Thus, if $\hat{w} = \hat{w}^*$, we have that $\hat{w}^- = \hat{w}^* - \hat{\gamma}T(\hat{w}^*)$ satisfies

$$\hat{w}^- = \log(\hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)).$$

Following similar steps as in the baseline model, it is easy to show how $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)$ depends on $\hat{\gamma}$ and $\hat{\rho} + \delta$. Now, we prove the last property—i.e., there exists a $\bar{\delta}^r < \infty$ such that $\lim_{\delta^r \rightarrow \bar{\delta}^r} \hat{w}^- = -\infty$. That is, if the bargaining probability is high enough but finite, then the continuation region becomes unbounded. Observe that if $\delta^r \uparrow \bar{\delta}^r$, where $\bar{\delta}^r := \frac{\hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}$, then $\hat{w}^- \rightarrow -\infty$. Since $\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) < \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$, we have that

$$0 = \hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \bar{\delta}^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) > \hat{\rho} \hat{U} - \bar{\delta}^r \frac{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}, \iff \bar{\delta}^r > \frac{\hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{e^{\hat{w}^*} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}} (\hat{\rho} + \delta).$$

Thus, we have a lower bound for $\bar{\delta}^r$. To find an upper bound, we compute the value function without on-the-job bargaining. In this case, we have that

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) > \int_0^{T(\hat{w}^*)} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta)s} \left(e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U} \right) ds > e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta)T(\hat{w}^*)} \int_0^{T(\hat{w}^*)} \left(e^{\hat{w} - \hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U} \right) ds$$

Thus,

$$\bar{\delta}^r < \frac{\hat{\rho}\hat{U}e^{(\hat{\rho}+\delta)T(\hat{w}^*)}}{\int_0^{T(\hat{w}^*)} (e^{\hat{w}^*-\hat{\gamma}s} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}) ds}.$$

□

Discussion of Static and Dynamic Consideration for Equilibrium Policies. Intuition suggests that an increase in the frequency of bargaining will lead to a change in the quit and layoff triggers, ultimately resulting in an extended match duration. Proposition III.16-Part 1 demonstrates that this intuition holds true whenever there is no drift or shocks in idiosyncratic productivity. Furthermore, it illustrates how the continuation set of the match changes as a function of the primitives $(\delta^r, \hat{\rho} + \delta, \alpha, 1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. Importantly, the size of the surplus does not affect the separation thresholds when $\delta^r = 0$, but also affects the marginal effect of the frequency of bargaining since both terms appear multiplicatively. Also, observe that when $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, then $\hat{w}^- \rightarrow -\infty$ and $\hat{w}^+ \rightarrow \infty$. This property also holds for $\hat{\gamma} > 0$ and $\sigma > 0$.

Proposition III.16-Part 2 characterizes the interaction between the option value effect and the frequency of on-the-job bargaining. The width of the continuation region depends on $\frac{\sigma^2}{\hat{\rho}+\delta+\delta^r}$, the surplus, and the frequency of on-the-job bargaining. The first result, where we fix the value of σ^2 , shows that if the frequency of bargaining increases, then the width of the continuation set converges to infinity.

In the second result, we construct a specific case that highlights a counter-intuitive finding: If there is an increase in δ^r and σ^2 while keeping $\varphi = \sqrt{2\frac{\hat{\rho}+\delta+\delta^r}{\sigma^2}}$ fixed, then the width of the continuation region decreases. The intuition behind this result is not straightforward. To understand it, first recall that in the baseline model, the width of the inaction region does not grow unboundedly with the volatility of shocks due to lack of commitment. A firm paying a high \hat{w} is not willing to wait before dissolving the match when the volatility of productivity shocks is high because of the associated high probability of a sufficiently large and positive shock that would make the worker quit. In this version of the model, this willingness to wait before dissolving the match decreases when the frequency of bargaining increases. This is because a higher bargaining rate is associated with a \hat{w} that tends to fluctuate well within the boundaries of the continuation region of the match. Therefore, for the same increase in the volatility of productivity shocks, the probability of experiencing a shock positive enough that makes the worker quit is much higher; thus, the firm decides to dissolve the match sooner.

Proposition III.16-Part 3 characterizes the anticipatory effect of the drift on the quit threshold. When $\delta^r = 0$, we recover the result presented for the baseline model: The quit

threshold is fully static; i.e., the worker quits when $\hat{w} < \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U})$. When $\delta^r > 0$, the quit threshold is dynamic and depends on the value of renegotiating the wage. A novel result arises: If the renegotiation frequency is large enough, but not necessarily infinitely large, then the worker will never quit her job. The intuition is that if the incentives to wait offered by wage renegotiation are significantly larger than the opportunity cost, then the worker will never find it optimal to quit.

We finish this discussion with a joint analysis of equilibrium policies when $\sigma = 0$ and the worker's opportunity cost is kept constant. Figure III3-Panels A and C show the effect of the drift for different values of the monthly frequency of wage renegotiation. As we can see, the entry wage is increasing in the drift—as in the main text. In addition, the quit threshold is almost independent of the value of the drift—as in the main text—and it depends mainly on the probability of resetting the wage within the match. This is the result of two opposing forces almost balancing each other perfectly: i) for a fixed bargained wage, a larger drift and the associated higher quit probability reduce the value of the worker, and ii) a larger drift results in a higher bargained wage and, thus, a higher value when evaluated at that wage. Figure III3-Panels B and D show the effect of the frequency of bargaining for different values of the annual drift. As we can see, for a frequency large enough, the reset wage decreases—due a weaker anticipatory effect—and it converges to the static Nash bargaining solution. Once the entry wage converges, the elasticity of the quit threshold with respect to the renegotiation rate will become unboundedly large (recall that $\hat{w}^- = \log(\hat{\rho}\hat{U} - \delta^r\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*))$).


The CIR of Employment with Flexible and Sticky Entry Wages.

Before presenting the new results, we define new notation. Let τ^m denote the duration of the current wage spell. Let τ^r denote the time elapsed until the arrival of an opportunity to renegotiate the wage. Observe that, if $\tau^m < \tau^r$, then the match finishes in a separation. Otherwise, if $\tau^m = \tau^r$, then the current wage is renegotiated. Furthermore, as in the baseline model, let $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$ be the distributions of Δz across employed and unemployed workers, respectively. Observe that Δz now represents the cumulative shocks to revenue productivity $z + p$ that the match experienced since either its inception or its last wage renegotiation. The support of $g^h(\Delta z)$ is given by $[-\Delta^q, \Delta^l]$, where $\Delta^q := \hat{w}^* - \hat{w}^-$ and $\Delta^l := \hat{w}^+ - \hat{w}^*$. We denote by $\mathbb{E}_h[\cdot]$ and $\mathbb{E}_u[\cdot]$ the expectation operators under the distributions $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$, respectively.

Below, we describe the KFEs characterizing $g^h(\Delta z)$ and $g^u(\Delta z)$:

$$(\delta + \delta^r) g^h(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \quad \text{for all } \Delta z \in (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) / \{0\}. \quad \text{III.86}$$

FIGURE III3. COMPARATIVE STATICS WITH RESPECT TO THE DRIFT



Notes: Panels A and C plot the entry wage and the quit threshold as a function of the drift for three values of the monthly frequency of wage renegotiation, respectively. Panels B and D plot the entry wage and the quit threshold as a function of the frequency of bargaining for three values of the annual drift, respectively.

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))g^u(\Delta z) = (\gamma + \pi)(g^u)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^u)''(\Delta z) \quad \text{for all } \Delta z \in (-\infty, \infty) / \{0\} \quad \text{(III.87)}$$

$$g^h(\Delta z) = 0, \quad \text{for all } \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \quad \text{(III.88)}$$

$$\lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} g^u(\Delta z) = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} g^u(\Delta z) = 0. \quad \text{(III.89)}$$

$$1 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\Delta^-}^{\Delta^+} g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \quad \text{(III.90)}$$

$$f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))(1 - \mathcal{E}) = \delta \mathcal{E} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\lim_{\Delta z \downarrow -\Delta^q} (g^h)'(\Delta z) - \lim_{\Delta z \uparrow \Delta^l} (g^h)'(\Delta z) \right], \quad \text{(III.91)}$$

$$g^u(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}, \mathbb{C}^2((-\infty, \infty) / \{0\}), \quad g^h(\Delta z) \in \mathbb{C}, \mathbb{C}^2((-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) / \{0\})$$

The main difference with our baseline analysis is the additional δ^r term in the KFE for $g^h(\Delta z)$. For this to hold, the renegotiated wage must be the same as the entry wage from unemployment, which results from the assumption that the worker's bargaining weight equals the elasticity of the matching function.

We divide the proof of the extension of Proposition 6 to the case of wage renegotiations into three propositions. Proposition III.17 relates the CIR to a perturbation of two Bellman equations describing future employment fluctuations for initially employed and unemployed workers. This proposition covers both the case with flexible and sticky entry wages. Proposition III.18 relates steady-state moments of the perturbed Bellman equations to steady-state moments of the distribution of Δz . Finally, Proposition III.19 related the steady-state moments of Δz to observable moments in the steady-state.

Taken together, Propositions III.18 and III.19 extend Proposition 6 for the case with wage changes within a job. Finally, Proposition III.20 extends Lemma II.1 for the case with wage changes within a job. Whenever the steps of the proof are the same as those in the baseline model, we omit them.

Proposition III.17. *Given steady-state policies $(\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^*, \hat{w}^+)$ and distributions $(g^h(\Delta z), g^u(\Delta z))$, the CIR is*

$$CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z,$$

where the value functions $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)$ are characterized by:

$$0 = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta(m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)) + \delta^r(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)), \quad (\text{III.92})$$

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z^2} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)) \quad (\text{III.93})$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z), \quad \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l)$$

$$0 = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{d\Delta z} \quad (\text{III.94})$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, 0) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z. \quad (\text{III.95})$$

Proof. We define the CIR of aggregate employment to an aggregate inflation shock as

$$CIR_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_0^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t) - g^h(\Delta z)) d\Delta z dt.$$

Here, $\mathcal{E}_t = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t) d\Delta z$ is a function of ζ since aggregate shocks affect net flows into employment. As in the main proof of Proposition 6, starting from the definition of the

CIR, we can derive

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z, \mathcal{T}) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \lim_{\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z,$$

where we define

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0, \mathcal{T}) \equiv \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, t | \Delta z_0, h) \right] d\Delta z dt \right]$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta, \mathcal{T}) \equiv \int_0^{\mathcal{T}} \left[\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^h(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) + (-\mathcal{E}_{ss}) g^u(\Delta z, \zeta, t | \Delta z_0, u) \right] d\Delta z dt \right].$$

Taking the limit as $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \infty$, we have that the value functions $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0)$ and $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z_0, \zeta)$ satisfy the condition in equation (III.92) to (III.95). \square

Notice that the main difference between equations (III.92)–(III.95) and equations (II.19)–(II.23) is the extra term in the HJB characterizing $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_0)$, which takes into account staggered wage renegotiations.

The CIR of Employment with Flexible Entry Wages and Wage Renegotiations.

Proposition III.18. *Assume flexible entry wages. Up to first order, the CIR of employment is given by:*

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[(\gamma + \pi) \mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2}$$

$$- \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((\gamma + \pi) \mathcal{E}_{ss} \left(1 - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\}]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m]} \right) + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \delta^r \right) + o(\zeta),$$

where δ^r denotes the observed frequency of wage renegotiation within a match in the data.

Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. Step 1 computes the value function for an unemployed worker $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z)$ (when entry wages are flexible, the job-finding rate and this value function are independent of the shock ζ , so we omit this argument). Step 2 computes the value for the employed worker at $\Delta z = 0$ —i.e., $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0)$. Step 3 characterizes the CIR as a function of steady-state aggregate variables and moments.

Step 1. The CIR is given by

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}),$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \right) \\ &\quad + \delta^r (m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)), \\ m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) &= -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0), \quad \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \\ 0 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{III.96})$$

Proof of Step 1. To show this result, observe that the solution to (III.93) and (III.94) is

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z) = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0), \quad \forall \Delta z.$$

Thus,

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) (m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)) \iff m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0). \quad (\text{III.97})$$

Replacing (III.97) into the CIR, we have the result.

Step 2. We show that $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\}]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m]} \right) - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[a]$, where $\mathbb{E}_h[a]$ is the cross-sectional expected age of the match or the worker's tenure at the current match.

Proof of Step 2. Observe that $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$ satisfies the following recursive representation

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + \left(-\mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]. \quad (\text{III.98})$$

Define the following auxiliary function

$$\Psi(\Delta z | \varphi) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{\varphi t} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) dt + e^{\varphi \tau^m} \left(-\mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \middle| \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]. \quad (\text{III.99})$$

and note that $\Psi(\Delta z | 0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$. Then $\Psi(\Delta z | \varphi)$ satisfies the following HJB and border

conditions:

$$\begin{aligned}
& -\varphi\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) + (\delta + \delta^r) (\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0)) + \delta \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \\
& = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial\Delta z^2}, \tag{III.100} \\
\Psi(\Delta z, \varphi) & = \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l).
\end{aligned}$$

Taking the derivative with respect to φ in (III.100), we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
(\delta + \delta^r - \varphi) \frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial\varphi} - \Psi(\Delta z|\varphi) & = -(\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial^2\Psi(\Delta z, \varphi)}{\partial\Delta z\partial\varphi} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^3\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial\Delta z^2\partial\varphi}, \\
\frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|\varphi)}{\partial\varphi} & = 0 \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l).
\end{aligned}$$

Using Schwarz's Theorem to exchange partial derivatives, evaluating at $\varphi = 0$, and using $\Psi(\Delta z|0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
(\delta + \delta^r) \frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial\varphi} - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) & = -(\gamma + \pi) \frac{\partial}{\partial\Delta z} \left(\frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial\varphi} \right) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2}{\partial\Delta z^2} \left(\frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial\varphi} \right) \tag{III.101} \\
\frac{\partial\Psi(-\Delta^q|0)}{\partial\varphi} & = \frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta^l|0)}{\partial\varphi} = 0. \tag{III.102}
\end{aligned}$$

Equations (III.101) and (III.102) correspond to the HJB and border conditions of the function $\frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial\varphi} = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_t) dt \mid \Delta z_0 = \Delta z \right]$. Evaluating $\frac{\partial\Psi(\Delta z|0)}{\partial\varphi}$ at $\Delta z = 0$, using the occupancy measure and result (III.96), we write the previous equation as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial\Psi(0|0)}{\partial\varphi} & = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z_t) dt \mid \Delta z_0 = 0 \right] \\
& = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}} \\
& = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m] \left(\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) \frac{(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}, \tag{III.103}
\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\tau^m]$ is the mean duration of completed *wage* spells (the subscript highlights that

the moment can be computed from the data).²² From (III.99), we also have that

$$\frac{\partial \Psi(0|0)}{\partial \varphi} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m] \left[(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[a]}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} | \Delta z_0 = 0 \right] \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))'} \quad (\text{III.104})$$

Combining (III.103) and (III.104), and solving for $m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0)$ we obtain:

$$m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} | \Delta z_0 = 0 \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m]} \right) - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[a].$$

Observe that $\mathbb{E} \left[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} | \Delta z_0 = 0 \right]$ is equal to $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} \left[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} \right]$ —i.e., the average duration of wage spells that ended in a job separation.

Step 3. Up to a first-order approximation, the CIR is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) &= -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[(\gamma + \pi) \mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2} \zeta \\ &\quad - \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((\gamma + \pi) \mathcal{E}_{ss} \left(1 - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} \left[\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\} \right]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m]} \right) + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \delta^r \right) \zeta + O(\zeta^2). \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Step 3. To help the reader, we summarize below the conditions used in this step of the proof.

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \quad (\text{III.105})$$

with

$$(\delta + \delta^r) m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) = 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi) \frac{dm_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{d^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{d\Delta z^2} + \delta m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) + \delta^r m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0), \quad (\text{III.106})$$

$$\begin{aligned} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) &= m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \quad \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^q, \Delta^l) \\ 0 &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{III.107})$$

²²A completed wage spell starts when the worker earns a new wage (i.e., finding a new job or renegotiating the wage with the current employer) and ends either when the match dissolves or the wage is renegotiated.

1. **Zeroth Order:** If $\zeta = 0$, condition (III.107) implies

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) = 0.$$

2. **First Order:** Taking the derivative of (III.105) we obtain

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z + \zeta) d\Delta z,$$

which evaluated at $\zeta = 0$ becomes

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z.$$

Using condition (III.86) to replace $(\delta + \delta^r) = \frac{(\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z)}{g^h(\Delta z)}$ into equation (III.106), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{(\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z)}{g^h(\Delta z)} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) \\ = & 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} - (\gamma + \pi)m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}m''_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) + \left(\frac{(\gamma + \pi)g'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}g''(\Delta z)}{g(\Delta z)} - \delta^r \right) m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) \\ & + \delta^r m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0). \end{aligned}$$

Multiplying both sides by $g^h(\Delta z)\Delta z$ and integrating between $-\Delta^q$ and Δ^l ,

$$0 = (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi)T_1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}T_2 + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)T_3 + \delta^r (m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \quad (\text{III.108})$$

$$T_1 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z$$

$$T_2 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left[m''_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)''(\Delta z) \right] d\Delta z$$

$$T_3 = \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z \left((\gamma + \pi)(g^h)'(\Delta z) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}(g^h)''(\Delta z) \right) d\Delta z.$$

Operating on the terms T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 , we get

$$T_1 = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}), \quad (\text{III.109})$$

$$T_2 = -m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) \Delta z (g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} + 2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g'(\Delta z) d\Delta z, \quad (\text{III.110})$$

$$T_3 = -(\gamma + \pi) \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\Delta z (g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \right]. \quad (\text{III.111})$$

Combining (III.108), (III.109), (III.110), (III.111), and the results from Step 2, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi) T_1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} T_2 + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) T_3 + \delta^r (m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0)) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \\ &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi) m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \\ &\quad + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[-m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) \Delta z (g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} + 2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z \right] + \dots \\ &\quad + m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) \left[-(\gamma + \pi) \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left[\Delta z (g^h)'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \right] \right] + \delta^r \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \\ &= (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - (\gamma + \pi) m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0) + \sigma^2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \delta^r \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z], \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\begin{aligned} &\sigma^2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z \\ &= (\gamma + \pi) \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} + \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m \mathbf{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\}]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m]} \right) \right) - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[a] \\ &\quad - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] - \delta^r \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z], \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} &\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z \\ &= - (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[(\gamma + \pi) \mathbb{E}_h[a] + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2} \end{aligned}$$

$$- \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \left((\gamma + \pi) \mathcal{E}_{ss} \left(1 - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m \mathbb{1}\{\tau^m < \tau^{\delta^r}\}]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\tau^m]} \right) + \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \delta^r \right).$$

□

Next, we write the CIR as a function of observable moments. Let Δw_B denote the log wage change following a wage renegotiation and let $l^B(\Delta w)$ denote its distribution. In addition, let $l^{EUE}(\Delta w)$ be the distribution of wage changes following a separation (i.e., wage changes between two consecutive jobs). Our objective is to recover $\mathbb{E}_h[a]$ and $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$ from observable micro-data on wage changes. To simplify the discussion, from now on we focus on the case with $\gamma + \pi = 0$. Under this parametric restriction, we only need to recover one moment: $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$. The CIR of employment is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} &= -(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}) \frac{[\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]]}{\sigma^2} - \frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{\sigma^2 f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} (\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] \delta^r) + o(\zeta), \\ &= -\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} \left(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\delta^r}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Two moments are informative of $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$. The first one is obtained from the distribution of wage changes within a match $\Delta \hat{w}_B$. Under our assumptions that the worker's bargaining weight is α and the renegotiation hazard is independent of the idiosyncratic state, we have that

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\mathcal{E}_{ss}} = -\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B].$$

In addition, the next proposition provides an alternative expression that remains valid when these assumptions do not hold. Importantly, it is easy to show that the following proposition still holds when the hazard rate for renegotiation is state-dependent.

Proposition III.19. *Assume that $\gamma + \pi = 0$. Up to first order, the $\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)$ can be expressed in terms of data moments as follows:*

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = \frac{1}{3f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^3]}{\left[\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^2]\right]^2} + o(\zeta).$$

Proof. The goal is to express the sufficient statistics of the CIR, $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$, in terms of moments of the distribution of Δw^{EUE} , Δw^B , and (τ^u, τ^m) when $(\gamma + \pi) = 0$. Let $\tilde{x} \equiv x/\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[x]$ denote random variable x relative to its mean in the data.

Our starting point is the KFE for the distribution of employed workers:

$$(\delta + \delta^r) g_h(\Delta z) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} g_h''(\Delta z),$$

where we used the result that $\delta^r = \delta^r$. Since the arrival rate of bargaining opportunities is independent of the state of the match, we have that $\delta^r g_h(\Delta z) = \delta^r \mathcal{E}_{ss} l^B(-\Delta z)$. Thus,

$$\delta g_h(\Delta z) + \delta^r \mathcal{E}_{ss} l^B(-\Delta z) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} g_h''(\Delta z).$$

Multiplying both sides of the equation by Δz^2 and integrating, we

$$\delta \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 g_h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \delta^r \mathcal{E}_{ss} \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 l^B(-\Delta z) d\Delta z = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 g_h''(\Delta z) d\Delta z.$$

Notice that $\mathcal{E}_{ss} \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 l^B(-\Delta z) d\Delta z = \mathcal{E}_{ss} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^2]$. Integrating $\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 g_h''(\Delta z) d\Delta z$ by parts, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 g_h''(\Delta z) d\Delta z &= \Delta z^2 g_h'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} - 2 \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z g_h'(\Delta z) d\Delta z \\ &= \Delta z^2 g_h'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} - 2 \underbrace{\Delta z g_h(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l}}_{=0} + 2 \underbrace{\int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} g_h(\Delta z) d\Delta z}_{= \mathcal{E}_{ss}} \end{aligned}$$

Operating, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \int_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} \Delta z^2 g_h(\Delta z) d\Delta z - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \Delta z^2 g_h'(\Delta z) \Big|_{-\Delta^q}^{\Delta^l} + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^2] &= \sigma^2 \mathcal{E}_{ss} \iff \\ s \mathcal{E}_{ss} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2] + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^2] &= \sigma^2 \mathcal{E}_{ss}, \iff \\ \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2] + \frac{\delta^r}{s} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^2] &= \frac{\sigma^2}{s} \end{aligned}$$

Following Proposition II.5 when $\gamma + \pi = 0$, $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2] = [\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^2] + 2\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z] \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z] + \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2]] = \bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^2] + \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2]$ with $\bar{\mathbb{E}}_u[\Delta z^2] = \frac{\sigma^2}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}$. Thus,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2] = \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^2] + \frac{\sigma^2}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}.$$

Combining the previous two results, we have that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \frac{\delta^r}{s} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^2] = \frac{\sigma^2}{s} + \frac{\sigma^2}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))},$$

or equivalently

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{s \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^2]}{1 + \frac{s}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}}.$$

With this expression, we are ready to compute $\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$. Repeating the same steps as before but with Δz^3 , we have that

$$s \mathcal{E}_{ss} \bar{\mathbb{E}}_h[\Delta z^3] - \delta^r \mathcal{E}_{ss} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_B^3] = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} 6 \mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]$$

Following similar steps as in Proposition II.5, we have that

$$\bar{\mathbb{E}}_h [\Delta z^3] = -\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^3]$$

Thus,

$$\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z] = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{s \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^3]}{3\sigma^2}.$$

Combining this expression with the one for σ^2 , we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} &= -\mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{s \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^3]}{3(\sigma^2)^2} \\ &= -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{3} \left(1 + \frac{s}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}\right)^2 \frac{s \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^3]}{[s \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \delta^r \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^2]]^2}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the CIR for employment is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} &= -\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} \left(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\delta^r}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}\right) + o(\zeta) \\ &= \frac{1}{3f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^3]}{\left[\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}} [\Delta w_B^2]\right]^2} + o(\zeta). \end{aligned}$$

□

Discussion of Employment Dynamics With Flexible Entry Wages. How do infrequent wage adjustments within the match affect the business cycle dynamics of employment

when entry wages are flexible? The CIR of employment provides valuable theoretical insight to answer this question. Intuitively, with all other parameters in the model held constant, a higher frequency of wage renegotiation decreases the CIR of employment: Some workers will be able to reset their wages before transitioning into unemployment. The theory presented shows how the CIR of employment is affected by on-the-job renegotiation, which is now given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta)}{\zeta} &= \frac{1}{3f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^3] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \bar{\mathbb{E}}[\Delta w_B^3]}{\left[\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2] + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \mathbb{E}[\Delta w_B^2]\right]^2} + o(\zeta) \\
&= \frac{1}{3f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^3]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2]^2} \frac{\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \frac{\bar{\mathbb{E}}[\Delta w_B^3]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^3]}}{\left[\left(1 - \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r}\right) + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \frac{\mathbb{E}[\Delta w_B^2]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^2]}\right]^2} + o(\zeta) \\
&= \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Std}[\Delta w_{EUE}]} \frac{\text{Skew}[\Delta w_{EUE}]}{3} \frac{1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \left(\frac{\bar{\mathbb{E}}[\Delta w_B^3]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}[\Delta w_{EUE}^3]}\right)}{\left[1 + \frac{\delta^r}{s+\delta^r} \left(\frac{\text{Var}[\Delta w_B^2]}{\text{Var}[\Delta w_{EUE}]} - 1\right)\right]^2} + o(\zeta)
\end{aligned}$$

Notice that, without wage bargaining (i.e., $\delta^r = 0$), we recover the expression in Proposition 6 for the baseline case:

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_\varepsilon(\zeta)}{\zeta} = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \frac{1}{\text{Std}[\Delta w_{EUE}]} \frac{\text{Skew}[\Delta w_{EUE}]}{3} + o(\zeta).$$

A key result from this analysis is that the relevant micro-moments in the labor market are the second and third moments of the distributions of wage changes within and across jobs, alongside the probabilities of wage renegotiation and job-finding. The intuition for the relevance of the job-finding rate is the same as in the baseline model. The reason the weighted sum of moments of wage changes within and across jobs appear in the CIR is the simple application of Bayes' law:

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}[\Delta w^3]}{\mathbb{E}[\Delta w^2]^2} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\Delta w^3|EUE]Pr(EUE) + \mathbb{E}[\Delta w^3|bargaining]Pr(bargaining)}{(\mathbb{E}[\Delta w^2|EUE]Pr(EUE) + \mathbb{E}[\Delta w^2|bargaining]Pr(bargaining))^2}$$

where $Pr(EUE) + Pr(bargaining) = 1$. Thus, the CIR of employment following an inflation shock is fully captured by the moments of the distribution of Δz , which can be recovered with micro-data on wage changes workers experience within and across jobs.

The CIR of Employment with Sticky Entry Wages and Wage Renegotiations.

As in the previous subsection, we focus on the case with no drift; i.e., $\gamma + \pi = 0$.

Furthermore, for pedagogical purposes, we consider the case with symmetric separation thresholds $\Delta^q = \Delta^l$.

Proposition III.20. *Assume sticky entry wages. Up to first order, the CIR of employment is given by*

$$\frac{\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta)}{\zeta} = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} + o(\zeta), \quad (\text{III.112})$$

where

1. If $\Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$, then

$$\left. \frac{\text{dlog}(\eta(\hat{w}))}{\text{d}\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{[\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}]}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}.$$

2. If $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, then

$$\left. \frac{\text{dlog}(\eta(\hat{w}))}{\text{d}\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = 0.$$

3. If Δ^l small enough, then

$$\left. \frac{\text{dlog}(\eta(\hat{w}))}{\text{d}\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = \frac{\sqrt{s^{end}}}{2\alpha\sigma}.$$

Proof. We divide the proof into three steps. Step 1 characterizes $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)$. Step 2 uses the equilibrium conditions to show (III.112). Step 3 extends proposition II.8 for the case with on-the-job bargaining.

The starting point is the CIR for employment, which is given by

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z + \zeta) \text{d}\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) g^u(\Delta z + \zeta) \text{d}\Delta z, \quad (\text{III.113})$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= 1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\text{d}^2 m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)}{\text{d}\Delta z^2} + \delta(m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)) \\ &\quad + \delta^r(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) - m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z)), \quad \forall \Delta z \in (-\Delta^l, \Delta^l) \\ 0 &= -\mathcal{E}_{ss} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{\text{d}^2 m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{\text{d}\Delta z^2} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{III.114})$$

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0,0) = m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z), \quad \forall \Delta z \notin (-\Delta^l, \Delta^l) \quad (\text{III.115})$$

$$0 = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow -\infty} \frac{\text{d}m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{\text{d}\Delta z} = \lim_{\Delta z \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\text{d}m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)}{\text{d}\Delta z} \quad (\text{III.116})$$

$$0 = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) g^h(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z) g^u(\Delta z) d\Delta z \quad (\text{III.117})$$

Step 1. The value function $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta)$ is independent of Δz and satisfies

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta).$$

Proof of Step 1. We guess and verify that $m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, \zeta)$ for all Δz . From the equilibrium conditions (III.114) and (III.116),

$$0 = -\mathcal{E}_{ss} + f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))(m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta) - m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, \zeta)).$$

Thus,

$$m_{\mathcal{E},u}(0, \zeta) = m_{\mathcal{E},u}(\Delta z, \zeta) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss}}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^* - \zeta))} + m_{\mathcal{E},h}(-\zeta).$$

Step 2. Up to a first-order approximation, the CIR is given by:

$$\text{CIR}_{\mathcal{E}}(\zeta) = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} \zeta + O(\zeta^2).$$

Proof of Step 2. From Step 1, we have that

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z + \left(-\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss} f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))^2} - m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) \right) (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss}).$$

Since $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z$ satisfies the same system of functional equations as the CIR of employment with flexible entry wages and wage renegotiations characterized in Supplementary Material III.1,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z = -\frac{\mathbb{E}_h[\Delta z]}{\sigma^2} \left(1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss} + \mathcal{E}_{ss} \frac{\delta^r}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} \right).$$

By the symmetry of separation thresholds, we have that

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} m_{\mathcal{E},h}(\Delta z) (g^h)'(\Delta z) d\Delta z = 0.$$

and $m'_{\mathcal{E},h}(0) = 0$. Thus,

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = -\frac{\mathcal{E}_{ss} f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))^2} (1 - \mathcal{E}_{ss})$$

Since under symmetry $\eta(\hat{w}^*) = \alpha$ and $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = 0$, from free entry and optimality of \hat{w}^* ,

$$\frac{f_{\hat{w}}(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*))} = -\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)}.$$

Thus,

$$\text{CIR}'_{\mathcal{E}}(0) = \frac{1}{f(\hat{\theta}(\hat{w}^*)) + s} \frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)}.$$

Step 3. Define

$$\tau^{end} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \Gamma_t \notin (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)\}$$

where (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+) is a Nash equilibrium. Then, the worker's share $\eta(\hat{w})$ satisfies the Bellman equation

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{end}} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)t} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \left(\frac{e^{\Gamma_t} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} (1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)) + 1 \right) dt \right. \\ \left. + e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\tau^{end}} \mathbb{1}[\Delta z_{\tau^{end}} = \Delta^l] | \Gamma_0 = \hat{w} \right]$$

with

$$d\Gamma_t = (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) dt + \sigma \sqrt{\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)} dW_t^z.$$

Proof of step 3. The HJB equations for the worker's value and the surplus of the match are

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \hat{W}(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r \hat{W}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \hat{W}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)$$

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \hat{S}(\hat{w}) = 1 + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \hat{S}''(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+),$$

respectively. Replacing $\eta(\hat{w}) = \hat{W}(\hat{w})/\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ in the worker's value function, we have

$\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)$:

$$(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)(\eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})) = e^{\hat{w}} + \delta^r \eta(\hat{w}^*)\hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} (\eta(\hat{w})\hat{S}''(\hat{w}) + 2\eta'(\hat{w})\hat{S}'(\hat{w}) + \eta''(\hat{w})\hat{S}(\hat{w})).$$

Using the HJB equation of the surplus to replace $(\hat{\rho} + \delta)\hat{S}(\hat{w})$ on the left hand side,

$$(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*))\eta(\hat{w}) = e^{\hat{w}} - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*) + \eta'(\hat{w})\sigma^2 \hat{S}'(\hat{w}) + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\hat{S}(\hat{w}) \quad \forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+).$$

Since $\hat{S}(\hat{w}) = \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$, operating from the left hand side $\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U} + \delta^r \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*))\eta(\hat{w}) \\ = & e^{\hat{w}} - 1 + \frac{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} + \eta'(\hat{w})\sigma^2 \frac{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \frac{(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \end{aligned}$$

In conclusion, we arrive at

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = (1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)) \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} + 1 + \eta'(\hat{w})\sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r).$$

Multiplying by $(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)$, we have, $\forall \hat{w} \in (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)$:

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\eta(\hat{w}) = & (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \left((1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)) \frac{e^{\hat{w}} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} + 1 \right) \\ & + \eta'(\hat{w})\sigma^2 (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \mathcal{T}'(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) + \eta''(\hat{w})\frac{\sigma^2}{2} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, recall the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions

$$\hat{W}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^-) = \hat{W}(\hat{w}^+) = \hat{J}(\hat{w}^+) = 0, \quad \hat{W}'(-\Delta^q) = \hat{J}'(\Delta^l) = 0.$$

By L'Hôpital's rule,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^-} \eta(\hat{w}) &= \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^-} \frac{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\hat{S}(\hat{w})} = \lim_{\hat{w} \downarrow \hat{w}^-} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{J}'(\hat{w})} = 0 \\ \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^+} \eta(\hat{w}) &= \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^+} \frac{\hat{W}(\hat{w})}{\hat{S}(\hat{w})} = \lim_{\hat{w} \uparrow \hat{w}^+} \frac{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})}{\hat{W}'(\hat{w})} = 1, \end{aligned}$$

which are the boundary values for the worker's share at the separation triggers.

Finally, the equivalence of the combined Dirichlet-Poisson problem (i.e., the mapping from the corresponding HJB equations and boundary conditions of $\eta(\hat{w})$ to the sequential formulation) gives us the following Bellman equation

$$\eta(\hat{w}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^{end}} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)t} (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \left(\frac{e^{\Gamma_t} - 1}{1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U}} (1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)) + 1 \right) dt \right. \\ \left. + e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)\tau^{end}} \mathbb{1}[\Delta z_{\tau^{end}} = \Delta^l] | \Gamma_0 = \hat{w} \right]$$

where

$$\tau^{end} = \inf\{t \geq 0 : \Gamma_t \notin (\hat{w}^-, \hat{w}^+)\}$$

and

$$d\Gamma_t = (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r) \sigma^2 \mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) dt + \sigma \sqrt{\mathcal{T}(\Gamma_t, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)} dW_t^z.$$

Step 4. The following results hold:

1. If $\Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$, then

$$\left. \frac{d\log(\eta(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{[\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\hat{\rho}\hat{U}]}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho}\hat{U})}.$$

2. If $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, then

$$\left. \frac{d\log(\eta(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = 0.$$

3. If Δ^l small enough, then

$$\left. \frac{d\log(\eta(\hat{w}))}{d\hat{w}} \right|_{\hat{w}=\hat{w}^*} = \frac{\sqrt{s^{end}}}{2\alpha\sigma}.$$

Proof of step 4.

Next, we prove the first two results. If $\Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$, then $\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho}) = \int_0^\infty e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)t} dt = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r}$ and $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = 0$. Similarly, if $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, then $\lim_{\delta^r \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathcal{T}(\hat{w}, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \delta}$;

thus, $\mathcal{T}'_{\hat{w}}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r) = 0$. Therefore, by the definition of $\eta(\hat{w})$,

$$\alpha = \eta(\hat{w}^*) = \frac{\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}{S(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta^r)t + w_t} | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right] + (\delta^r \overbrace{\hat{W}(\hat{w}^*)}^{\alpha \hat{S}(\hat{w}^*)} - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}{\frac{1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}{1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)} \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)}$$

which gives, for both limits $\Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$ and $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta^r)t + w_t} | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right] = (\alpha + (1 - \alpha) \hat{\rho} \hat{U}) \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)$$

Take the limit $\Delta^l \rightarrow \infty$ and following similar steps as in the proof in the baseline model, we obtain

$$\eta'(\hat{w}^*) = (\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r)(1 - \delta^r \mathcal{T}(\hat{w}^*, \hat{\rho} + \delta^r)) \frac{\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^{\tau^m} e^{-(\hat{\rho} + \delta^r)t + \hat{w}_t} dt | \hat{w}_0 = \hat{w}^* \right]}{1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U}}.$$

Combining all these results, we finally obtain

$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\hat{\rho} + \delta}{\hat{\rho} + \delta + \delta^r} \frac{(\alpha + (1 - \alpha) \hat{\rho} \hat{U})}{\alpha(1 - \hat{\rho} \hat{U})}.$$

Regarding the second limit $\delta^r \rightarrow \infty$, it is easy to show that $\eta'(\hat{w}^*) = 0$.

Following similar steps as in the proof for the baseline model, we have that if Δ^l is small, then

$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{1}{2\alpha\Delta^l}.$$

Since $\frac{1}{s + \delta^r} = \mathcal{T}(0, \delta^r) \approx \frac{1}{\delta + \delta^r + (\sigma/\Delta^l)^2}$ and letting $s^{end} = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\Delta^l}\right)^2$ denote the rate of endogenous separations,

$$\frac{\eta'(\hat{w}^*)}{\eta(\hat{w}^*)} = \frac{\sqrt{s^{end}}}{2\alpha\sigma}.$$

□

Discussion of Employment Dynamics With Sticky Entry Wages. Several insights emerge from this analysis. From the first part of Proposition III.20, we learn that the presence of on-the-job wage renegotiations affects the response of the job-finding rate to the inflation shock. The intuition is that the possibility of wage renegotiations reduces the effect of the inflation shock on job creation: Shocks stop affecting the real normalized

wage following the first wage renegotiation. In the extreme case, when the frequency of bargaining tends to ∞ , job creation does not respond to the shock since wages become renegotiated and reflect the occurrence of the shock immediately after the match is created. The last part of Proposition [III.20](#) shows that the possibility of wage renegotiations does not affect the shape of the sufficient statistic for the elasticity of the worker's share to the entry wage, which continues to be determined by the frequency of endogenous separations. However, wage renegotiations do affect the value of the elasticity of the worker's share to the entry wage because a higher frequency of wage renegotiations reduces the frequency of endogenous separations.

IV Additional Results for Section 4: Exploring the Theory's Quantitative Implications

IV.1 The Role of Asymmetric Wage Renegotiations

A distinguishing feature of our theory is that it generates layoffs and quits as separate equilibrium outcomes. Since layoffs are around three times as frequent as quits in the data—see Panel D of Table 3—it seems interesting to understand how much each type of job separation matters for the propagation of business cycle shocks. To this end, we extend our baseline quantitative model to feature asymmetric probabilities of wage renegotiations on the job: wage decreases occur with probability $\delta^{r-} \geq 0$, and wage increases occur with probability $\delta^{r+} \geq 0$. While this generalization nests our baseline quantitative model when $\delta^{r-} = \delta^{r+}$, we calibrate δ^{r+} and δ^{r-} to match the empirical probabilities of a wage increase (0.0066) and a wage decrease (0.0003) in Grigsby *et al.* (2021). We then use the calibrated model extension for a series of counterfactuals: one with no worker quits ($\delta^{r+} \rightarrow \infty$), one with no firm layoffs ($\delta^{r-} \rightarrow \infty$), and one with only exogenous separations ($\delta^{r-} \rightarrow \infty$ and $\delta^{r+} \rightarrow \infty$).

Table IV1 shows the results from the calibrated model extension as well as the three model alternatives. The model almost matches the *levels* of quits (15% in the data and 9% in the model) and layoffs (53% in the data and 62% in the model) in steady state; the model also gets close to matching their empirical *volatilities*. The first model alternative with no quits has a lower volatility of job finding by around 16 percent and a lower volatility of job separations by around 4 percent. Thus, as shown in the theory, the presence of quits matters mostly for the predicted job finding rate since it has a large effect on the firms' value, and therefore, on job finding. Conversely, the second model alternative with no layoffs has a lower volatility of job finding by around 2 percent and a lower volatility of job separations by around 49 percent. Thus, the presence of layoffs matters mostly for the predicted job separation rate. Finally, the third model alternative without quits or layoffs has a lower volatility of job finding by around 14 percent and, by construction, zero volatility in job separations, which are now all exogenous at a constant rate. From this exercise, we infer that our model's quits and layoffs each play an important role in the business cycle propagation of aggregate shocks.

TABLE IV1. THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC WAGE RENEGOTIATIONS

Standard deviation ($\times 100$)				
f_t	s_t	q_t	l_t	w_t
Data				
12.00	11.49	13.84	17.25	1.38
Models				
<i>Model extension with asymmetric renegotiations</i>				
4.96	8.37	16.20	11.91	0.49
<i>Alternative model 1: No quits</i>				
4.18	7.80	–	11.42	0.57
<i>Alternative model 2: No layoffs</i>				
4.85	4.24	20.03	–	0.54
<i>Alternative model 3: No quits or layoffs</i>				
4.24	0.00	–	–	0.63

Notes: The job finding rate (f_t), separation rate (s_t), quit rate (q_t), and layoff rate (l_t) are all from [Graves et al. \(2026\)](#). Real wages are from the Atlanta Wage Growth Tracker, deflated by the CPI. The data is from 1978–2020, except for real wages, which are available from 1997–2020. Model extension refers to the model with asymmetric wage renegotiations. Each cell reports the mean based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations. All variables are reported in logs as deviation from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 10^5 ([Shimer, 2005a](#)). Source: Model simulations based on SIPP, CPS, and ADP.

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